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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), independently proposed by Miller [Mil86] and Koblitz 
[Kob87] in mid 80’s, is finding momentum to consolidate its status as the public-key system of 
choice in a wide range of applications and to further expand this position to settings traditionally 
occupied by RSA and DL-based systems. The non-existence of known subexponential attacks on 
this cryptosystem directly translates to shorter keylengths for a given security level and, 
consequently, has led to implementations with better bandwidth usage, reduced power and 
memory requirements, and higher speeds. Moreover, the dramatic entry of pairing-based 
cryptosystems defined on elliptic curves at the beginning of the new millennium has opened the 
possibility of a plethora of innovative applications, solving in some cases longstanding problems 
in cryptography. Nevertheless, public-key cryptography (PKC) is still relatively expensive in 
comparison with its symmetric-key counterpart and it remains an open challenge to reduce 
further the computing cost of the most time-consuming PKC primitives to guarantee their 
adoption for secure communication in commercial and Internet-based applications. The latter is 
especially true for pairing computations. Thus, it is of paramount importance to research methods 
which permit the efficient realization of Elliptic Curve and Pairing-based Cryptography on the 
several new platforms and applications. 
 
This thesis deals with efficient methods and explicit formulas for computing elliptic curve 
scalar multiplication and pairings over fields of large prime characteristic with the objective of 
enabling the realization of software implementations at very high speeds. 
 






identify the elliptic curve settings with the fastest arithmetic; accelerate the precomputation stage 
in the scalar multiplication; study number representations and scalar multiplication algorithms for 
speeding up the evaluation stage; identify most efficient field arithmetic algorithms and optimize 
them; analyze the architecture of the targeted platforms for maximizing the performance of ECC 
operations; identify most efficient coordinate systems and optimize explicit formulas; and realize 
implementations on x86-64 processors with an optimal algorithmic selection among all studied 
cases.  
In the case of pairings, the following tasks are accomplished: accelerate tower and curve 
arithmetic; identify most efficient tower and field arithmetic algorithms and optimize them; 
identify the curve setting with the fastest arithmetic and optimize it; identify state-of-the-art 
techniques for the Miller loop and final exponentiation; and realize an implementation on x86-64 
processors with optimal algorithmic selection. 
The most outstanding contributions that have been achieved with the methodologies above in 
this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
• Two novel precomputation schemes are introduced and shown to achieve the lowest costs 
in the literature for different curve forms and scalar multiplication primitives. The 
detailed cost formulas of the schemes are derived for most relevant scenarios. 
• A new methodology based on the operation cost per bit to devise highly optimized and 
compact multibase algorithms is proposed. Derived multibase chains using bases {2,3} 
and {2,3,5} are shown to achieve the lowest theoretical costs for scalar multiplication on 
certain curve forms and for scenarios with and without precomputations. In addition, the 
zero and nonzero density formulas of the original (width-w) multibase NAF method are 
derived by using Markov chains. The application of “fractional” windows to the 
multibase method is described together with the derivation of the corresponding density 
formulas.   
• Incomplete reduction and branchless arithmetic techniques are optimally combined for 
devising high-performance field arithmetic. Efficient algorithms for “small” modular 
operations using suitably chosen pseudo-Mersenne primes are carefully analyzed and 
optimized for incomplete reduction. 
• Data dependencies between contiguous field operations are discovered to be a source of 
performance degradation on x86-64 processors. Three techniques for reducing the 
number of potential pipeline stalls due to these dependencies are proposed: field 
arithmetic scheduling, merging of point operations and merging of field operations. 
• Explicit formulas for two relevant cases, namely Weierstrass and Twisted Edwards 
curves over pF  and 2pF , are carefully optimized employing incomplete reduction, 






contiguous field operations. 
• Best algorithms for the field, point and scalar arithmetic, studied or proposed in this 
thesis, are brought together to realize four high-speed implementations on x86-64 
processors at the 128-bit security level. Presented results set new speed records for 
elliptic curve scalar multiplication and introduce up to 34% of cost reduction in 
comparison with the best previous results in the literature.      
• A generalized lazy reduction technique that enables the elimination of up to 32% of 
modular reductions in the pairing computation is proposed. Further, a methodology that 
keeps intermediate results under Montgomery reduction boundaries maximizing 
operations without carry checks is introduced. Optimized formulas for the popular tower 
 are explicitly stated and a detailed operation count that permits 
to determine the theoretical cost improvement attainable with the proposed method is 
carried out for the case of an optimal ate pairing on a Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve at the 
128-bit security level.  
• Best algorithms for the different stages of the pairing computation, including the 
proposed techniques and optimizations, are brought together to realize a high-speed 
implementation at the 128-bit security level. Presented results on x86-64 processors set 
new speed records for pairings, introducing up to 34% of cost reduction in comparison 
with the best published result.   
From a general viewpoint, the proposed methods and optimized formulas have a practical 
impact in the performance of cryptographic protocols based on elliptic curves and pairings in a 
wide range of applications. In particular, the introduced implementations represent a direct and 
significant improvement that may be exploited in performance-dominated applications such as 
high-demand Web servers in which millions of secure transactions need to be generated. 
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1 Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
Since its discovery by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [DH76], public-key cryptography (PKC) has 
revolutionized the way communications are securely achieved by governments, banks, 
enterprises and even plain people. Based on clever mathematical constructs, public-key systems 
appeared to alleviate the difficult problem of key management and distribution, and provide such 
powerful tools as digital signatures. See, for example, [HMV04, Section 1.2] or [ACD+05, 
Section 1] for an introduction to PKC. 
Nonetheless, RSA, the dominant public-key system during many years, and discrete 
logarithm (DL)-based cryptosystems are already exhibiting clear limitations to keep an 
acceptable performance level in the plethora of new applications and platforms in the new 
millennium that range from constrained, power-limited wireless devices [BCH+00, Lau04] to 
cluster servers performing millions of secure transactions for e-commerce and e-banking 
[GGC02, GSF04]. A relatively new, more “compact” player in the public-key crypto arena has 
been gaining increasing attention in academia and commercial applications: elliptic curve 
cryptosystems.  
Elliptic Curves for Cryptography 








algebra geometers long time before the remarkable work by Lenstra [Len87] using elliptic curves 
for factoring led to the independent discovery by Miller [Mil86] and Koblitz [Kob87] of Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) in 1985. Since then, with the exception of some studies that found 
vulnerabilities in certain special curves [MOV93, Sma99], it has not been possible to find better 
attacks than Pollard’s rho [Pol78], which runs in exponential time, for elliptic curves with large 
prime order subgroup. As a consequence, elliptic curve cryptosystems require shorter keys to 
attain a certain security level in comparison with those required by the traditional RSA and DL-
based systems. For instance, to achieve a level of security equivalent to the Advanced Encryption 
Standard algorithm with 256 bits (AES-256), the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) recommends the use of ECC keys of 512 bits, whereas RSA would require keylengths of 
more than 15000 bits [NIST07]. This significant difference in favour of ECC has led in many 
scenarios to faster, more power-efficient and/or memory-friendly implementations, which make 
this cryptosystem especially attractive for constrained devices such as wireless sensor nodes, 
smartcards, personal digital assistants (PDAs), cellphones, smartphones, and many others. 
Moreover, the superior speed of ECC over RSA supports the improvement of performance of 
Web servers in which public-key transactions may be a bottleneck, thus enabling the use of 
strong cryptography on a wider range of Internet-based applications [GSF04].   
A clear example of the importance of ECC in future commercial and governmental 
applications has been set by the inclusion of ECC primitives in the U.S. National Security 
Agency (NSA) Suite B Cryptography, which contains a set of recommended algorithms for 
classified and unclassified U.S. security systems and information [NSA09]. In particular, the 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA) algorithm and the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 
(ECDH) key exchange over prime fields (see §2.2.3) are recommended in Suite B for providing 
security up to top secret level. Hence, ECC is arguably getting positioned as the dominant public-
key system in many applications, and is expected to occupy that privileged position for several 
years to come. As direct consequence of this technological shift, the efficient implementation of 
ECC schemes in software and hardware platforms is gaining key importance to realize strong 
cryptography.    
In that direction, this thesis deals with the fast and efficient computation of elliptic curve 
scalar multiplication. This critical operation, denoted by kP (where k is a scalar and P a point on 
an elliptic curve), is the central and most time-consuming operation in ECC. Although several 
methods to compute kP efficiently have been proposed and extensively studied in past years, it is 
still a very interesting challenge to improve further the performance of this operation. Elliptic 
curve scalar multiplication comprises three arithmetic layers: field arithmetic, point arithmetic 
and scalar arithmetic. Cryptographic protocols and schemes work on top of these layers; see 
Section 2.2.3 and [HMV04, Chapter 4] for an overview. In this thesis, we focus on improving the 








software. In this effort we follow the next steps: (i) identify the elliptic curve settings with the 
fastest arithmetic; (ii) accelerate the precomputation stage of scalar multiplication; (iii) study 
number representations and scalar multiplication algorithms for speeding up the evaluation stage; 
(iv) identify most efficient field arithmetic algorithms and optimize them; (v) analyze the 
architecture of the targeted platforms for maximizing the performance of ECC operations; (vi) 
identify most efficient coordinate systems and optimize explicit formulas; and (vii) realize 
implementations on x86-64 processors with an optimal algorithmic selection among all studied 
cases.  
Grouping together the steps above, let us consider in greater detail the most relevant 
problems and aspects that are considered in this study. 
Precomputation Stage: step (ii) 
A practical strategy that reduces the number of required operations at the expense of some extra 
memory is the use of precomputations. In this case, a table of points is built and stored in 
advance (precomputation stage) for later use during the execution of the scalar multiplication 
itself (evaluation stage). The effect of computing these additional points in the overall cost 
basically depends on the context in which the scalar multiplication occurs. In [HMV04], 
Hankerson et al. distinguishes two possible scenarios that depend on the prior knowledge of the 
initial point P, and classifies the different methods for scalar multiplication according to them.    
Let us illustrate both scenarios, and their subtleties, in the context of the ECDH key exchange 
(see Section 2.2.3): when each Bob and Alice computes the initial scalar multiplication using a 
random scalar in the first phase of the ECDH scheme, both use a publicly known point P for the 
computation. Because P is available beforehand, it is obvious that methods that extensively 
exploit precomputations to reduce the cost of the evaluation stage are preferable in this scenario. 
Examples of efficient methods in this case are comb methods [HMV04, Section 3.3.2]. On the 
other hand, during the second phase of the ECDH scheme, Bob and Alice exchange the results 
from the first phase and calculate a new scalar multiplication. This time, however, the results 
(which are also points on the curve) are not known in advance by their corresponding receptors. 
Although methods may still exploit precomputations, this time the overall cost includes the costs 
of both the precomputation and evaluation stages. A well-known method in this case is width-w 
NAF (wNAF) [Sol00], which is the windowed version of the standard non-adjacent form (NAF).     
Scalar Representation in the Evaluation Stage: step (iii) 
The cost of the evaluation stage in the computation kP is strongly tied to the representation used 
for the scalar k. With the exception of Montgomery’s method [Mon87], the most popular 








of the double-and-add algorithm (see Section 2.2.4.3). However, recently there has been an 
increased interest in using novel arithmetic representations of integers based on double- and 
multi-base number systems [DJM98, DIM05]. In general, it has been observed that these 
representations enable a reduction in the number of point operations required for computing kP. 
However, it is still an open question to determine up to what extent and in which scenarios the 
new multibase representations reduce the computational cost of scalar multiplication. It has been 
shown that these methods in fact reduce the number of point operations but in exchange they 
require more complex formulas besides point doubling and addition. Partially, the question above 
could be answered by trying to find the “optimal” (or close to “optimal”) multibase 
representation of a given scalar for a particular setting, where “optimal” is defined here as 
relative to the computational cost and not to the minimization of the number of additions.  
Efficient Implementation on x86-64 Processors: steps (iv)-(vii) 
Over the years, many efforts have focused on efficient implementation of ECC primitives on 
different platforms [BHL+01, GPW+04, GAS+05, Ber06, CS09]. An incomplete list includes the 
analysis on 8-bit microcontrollers, 32-bit embedded devices, graphical processing units, 
processors based on the x86 Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) or the cell broadband engine 
architecture, among many others. At a high-level, these works provide two main contributions: 
• The compilation of state-of-the-art algorithms and their efficient combination trying to 
achieve the highest performance possible on the targeted platforms. 
• The publication of benchmark results that illustrate the potential performance achievable 
by the particular cryptographic primitive on the targeted platforms. 
As a side-effect, when different test results are made available, readers learn from direct 
comparisons among alternative methods or algorithms.  
Processors based on the x86-64 ISA [AMD] have become increasingly popular in the last few 
years and are now being extensively used for notebook, desktop and server computers. Hence, 
efficient cryptographic computation on these processors is of paramount importance to realize 
strong cryptography in a wide variety of applications. Relevant questions are then: what are the 
methods, formulas and parameters that once combined achieve the highest performance for 
computing ECC primitives on these processors? and what are the features of these devices that 
can be exploited to gain (or sometimes, not to lose) performance? It is then obvious that, for best 








Elliptic Curve Forms: step (i) 
Elliptic curves over prime fields have been traditionally represented in its short Weiertrass form, 
2 3y x ax b= + + , where , pa b∈F . More specifically, the projective form of this curve equation 
using Jacobian coordinates has been the preferred elliptic curve shape for many years by most 
implementers and standardization bodies such as NIST and IEEE [NIST00, NIST09, IEEE00]. 
However, in the last few years intense research has been working on new and improved curve 
forms. Although these curves have not been standardized by national/international bodies up to 
date, they provide attractive advantages such as faster arithmetic and/or higher resilience against 
certain side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks [Sma01, BJ03b, BL07]. Since in this thesis we are 
particularly interested in high-speed cryptography, we focus on two curve forms that currently 
exhibit the lowest point operation costs: extended Jacobi quartic form, 2 4 22 1y dx ax= + + , 
, pa d ∈F ; and Twisted Edwards form, 
2 2 2 21ax y dx y+ = + , , .pa d ∈F  For each case, we 
consider in our analysis and implementations the coordinate system(s) and curve parameters that 
in our experience provide the highest performance (see Section 2.2.5 for further details):   
• Mixed homogeneous/extended homogeneous coordinates for the Twisted Edwards curve 
2 2 2 21ax y dx y+ = +  with 1a = −  [HWC+08, His10]. 
• Inverted Edwards coordinates for the Twisted Edwards curve 2 2 2 21ax y dx y+ = +  with 
1a =  [BL07b]. 
• Extended Jacobi quartic coordinates for the extended Jacobi quartic curve  
2 4 22 1y dx ax= + +  with 1d =  [HWC+07, HWC+08b]. 
We also include the short Weierstrass form because of its widespread use in practice: 
• Jacobian coordinates for the short Weierstrass form 2 3y x ax b= + +  with 3a = −  . 
Pairing-Based Cryptography   
Since Boneh and Franklin [BF01], following pioneering works by several authors [Jou00, 
SOK00, Ver01], formalized the use of pairings based on elliptic curves with the introduction of 
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) in 2001, the interest of cryptographers and implementers in this 
new research area have grown dramatically. This is mainly due to the potential of pairings for 
elegantly solving many open problems in cryptography such as Identity-Based Encryption 
[BF01], short signatures [BLS04], multi-party key agreements [Jou00], among many others. See, 
for example, [Men09] for an introduction to pairing-based cryptography. 
Nevertheless, the pairing computation, which is the central and most time-consuming 








operations (e.g., an elliptic curve scalar multiplication is about ten times faster than a pairing 
computation at the 128-bit security level on x86-64 processors [BGM+10, GLS09]). Hence, the 
development of techniques and methods leading to optimization of the pairing computation are of 
great importance. Given the technological shift to x86-64-based processors, a series of efforts 
have recently developed faster pairing implementations targeting these platforms [HMS08, 
NNS10, BGM+10]. However, it remains a challenging effort to try to optimize further this 
crucial operation for incentivizing the adoption of these elegant cryptosystems in commercial 
applications.         
In this thesis, we focus on improving the overall pairing computation to try to achieve the 
highest speed possible in software. In this effort we follow the next steps: (i) accelerate tower and 
curve arithmetic; (ii) identify most efficient tower and field arithmetic algorithms and optimize 
them; (iii) identify elliptic curve setting with the fastest arithmetic and optimize it; (iii) identify 
state-of-the-art techniques for the Miller loop and final exponentiation; and (iv) realize 
implementation on x86-64 processors with an optimal algorithmic selection.  
1.2. Contributions 
In this thesis, we propose efficient methods and optimized explicit formulas for accelerating the 
computation of elliptic curve scalar multiplication and pairings on ordinary curves over prime 
fields. In many cases, the improvements are generic and apply to different types of (hardware and 
software) platforms. 
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows: 
• At the precomputation stage, we propose two innovative low-cost precomputation 
schemes. The first scheme, intended for standard curves using Jacobian coordinates, is 
based on a special addition formula due to Meloni [Mel07]. The second scheme, 
especially effective for some special curves and multiple scalar multiplication methods 
such as the Joint Sparse Form (JSF) [Sol01], is based on the concept of conjugate 
addition in projective coordinates. We provide the theoretical costs for single and 
multiple scalar multiplications and perform an extensive comparative analysis for three 
specific systems: Jacobian, extended Jacobi quartic and inverted Edwards coordinates.  
• At the evaluation stage, we provide the theoretical cost analysis of the multibase NAF 
representation and its windowed variant [Lon07], adapt the concept of “fractional” 
windows [Möl03] to width-w multibase NAF to obtain a more generic method that 
allows choosing a flexible number of precomputed points, and introduce a method for 
deriving high-performance multibase algorithms based on the operation cost per bit that 








applications where memory is not scarce. An extensive comparison with other works is 
performed on curves using Jacobian, extended Jacobi quartic and inverted Edwards 
coordinates at different security levels. A relevant comparison with the fastest curves 
using radix-2 methods is presented and demonstrates that “slower” curves employing 
refined multibase chains become competitive for suitably chosen curve parameters on 
memory-constrained devices.  
• We bring together the most efficient ECC algorithms for performing elliptic curve scalar 
multiplication on x86-64 processors and optimize them using techniques from computer 
architecture. We study the optimal combination of incomplete reduction technique and 
elimination of conditional branches to achieve high-speed field arithmetic over pF  using 
a pseudo-Mersenne prime. We also demonstrate the high penalty incurred by data 
dependencies between instructions in neighbouring field operations. Three generic 
techniques are proposed to minimize the number of pipeline stalls due to true data 
dependencies and to reduce the number of function calls and memory accesses. Further, 
explicit formulas are optimized by minimizing the number of “small” field operations, 
which are not inexpensive on the targeted platforms. Improved explicit formulas 
exploiting incomplete reduction and exhibiting minimal number of operations and 
reduced number of data dependencies between contiguous field operations are derived 
and explicitly stated for Jacobian coordinates and mixed Twisted Edwards 
homogeneous/extended homogeneous coordinates for two cases: with and without using 
the GLS method [GLS09]. Record-breaking implementations demonstrating the 
significant performance improvements obtained with the optimizations and techniques 
under analysis at the 128-bit security level are described. Benchmark results for different 
x86-64 processors exhibiting up to 34% cost reduction in comparison with the best 
published results are presented. 
• We introduce a generalized lazy reduction technique that allows us to eliminate up to 
32% of the total number of modular reductions when applied to the towering and curve 
arithmetic in the pairing computation. Furthermore, we present a methodology to keep 
intermediate results under Montgomery reduction boundaries so that the number of 
operations without carry checks is maximized. We illustrate the method with the well-
known tower , for which case we explicitly state the improved 
formulas. Curve arithmetic using Jacobian and homogeneous coordinates is optimized 
using the projective equivalence class and with the application of lazy reduction. A 
detailed operation count that allows us to determine the theoretical cost improvement 
attainable with the proposed method is carried out for the case of an optimal ate pairing 
on a BN curve [BN05] at the 128-bit security level. To illustrate the practical 
performance boost obtained with the new formulas we realize a record-breaking 
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implementation of the pairing above, also incorporating state-of-the-art techniques. 
Benchmark results for different x86-64 processors exhibiting up to 34% cost reduction in 
comparison with the best published results in the literature are presented. 
The details above only highlight the most relevant contributions of this thesis. The reader is 
referred to Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 for additional outcomes. 
Partial results that have been developed further in this thesis already appear in the following 
relevant publications: 
[1] “New Composite Operations and Precomputation Scheme for Elliptic Curve 
Cryptosystems over Prime Fields”, with A. Miri. In Proc. Int. Conference on Practice 
and Theory in Public Key Cryptography (PKC 2008), 2008. This corresponds to part of 
Chapter 3. 
[2] “Novel Precomputation Schemes for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems”, with C. Gebotys. In 
Proc. Int. Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS 2009), 
2009. This corresponds to part of Chapter 3. 
[3] “Fast Multibase Methods and Other Several Optimizations for Elliptic Curve Scalar 
Multiplication”, with C. Gebotys. In Proc. Int. Conference on Practice and Theory in 
Public Key Cryptography (PKC 2009), 2009. This corresponds to Chapter 4. 
[4] “Efficient Techniques for High-Speed Elliptic Curve Cryptography”, with C. Gebotys. In 
Proc. Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES 2010), 
2010. This corresponds to Chapter 5. 
[5] “Faster Explicit Formulas for Computing Pairings over Ordinary Curves”, with D.F. 
Aranha, K. Karabina, C. Gebotys and J. Lopez. In Proc. Advances in Cryptology - 
Eurocrypt 2011 (to appear), 2011. This corresponds to Chapter 6.     
1.3. Outline  
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present the mathematical background 
necessary for the understanding of Elliptic Curve and Pairing-based Cryptography, including 
curve definitions and operation costs that will be accessed throughout the thesis.  
In Chapter 3, we introduce the novel precomputation schemes, namely LM and LG schemes, 
and present their operation costs when applied to different curve forms in various settings. 
In Chapter 4, we discuss our contributions for accelerating the evaluation stage using 
multibase representations. We present the theoretical analysis of the (width-w) multibase NAF 
method, optimize the windowed variant by applying fractional windows and introduce the new 








In Chapter 5, we discuss the efficient implementation of elliptic curve scalar multiplication 
on x86-64 processors, present highly optimized field and point arithmetic and discuss our 
implementation results on a variety of 64-bit platforms.   
In Chapter 6, we discuss the generalization of the lazy reduction technique for the efficient 
computation of pairings, present the highly optimized formulas and illustrate the performance 
improvement with a high-speed implementation of an optimal ate pairing on a BN curve. 
Finally, in Chapter 7 we summarize the contributions of this thesis and discuss future work.  
At the end, we present several appendices. In Appendices A1 and A2 we present the detailed 
pseudocode of the LM precomputation scheme and derive the costs of the method for the 
different variants. In Appendix A3, we present the explicit formulas for conjugate addition using 
Jacobian, extended Jacobi quartic and inverted Edwards coordinates. In Appendix A4 we detail 
the calculation of points using the LG precomputation scheme for different number of 
precomputations. In Appendices A5 and A6, we prove the theoretical costs of the LG method for 
single and multiple scalar multiplication cases. Appendix A7 presents extended cost comparisons 
between precomputation methods using 256- and 512-bit scalars. In Appendix B1 and B2, we 
detail the optimized point formulas used in our traditional and GLS-based implementations of 
scalar multiplication, respectively. Appendix C1 discusses the application of the generalized lazy 




2 Chapter 2 
Background 
In this chapter, we introduce the mathematical tools that are considered fundamental for the 
understanding of Elliptic Curve and Pairing-based Cryptography. For more extensive treatments, 
the reader is referred to [HMV04, ACD+05]. First, we begin with an exposition of basic abstract 
algebra and elliptic curves, and then discuss the security foundations of ECC, some of the most 
popular EC-based cryptographic schemes and the arithmetic layers that constitute the 
computation of elliptic curve scalar multiplication. Following, we summarize some advanced 
research topics related to special curves and the Galbraith-Lin-Scott (GLS) method, which are 
extensively used in Chapters 3-5. We end this chapter with a brief introduction to Pairing-based 
Cryptography, including a description of the optimal ate pairing used in Chapter 6.   
2.1. Preliminaries 
In this section, we introduce some fundamental concepts about finite groups, finite fields, cyclic 
subgroups and the generalized discrete logarithm problem. 
Finite Groups 
A set G is called a finite group with order q, and denoted by (G,∗ ), if it has a finite number q of 








• Associativity: ( ) ( )a b c a b c∗ ∗ = ∗ ∗ , for all elements , , Ga b c ∈ .    
• Existence of an identity: there exists an element Ge∈ such that a e e a a∗ = ∗ =  for all 
Ga ∈ . Element e is called the identity of the group. 
• Existence of inverses: for each element Ga ∈ , there exists an element Gb ∈  such that 
a b b a e∗ = ∗ = . Element b is called the inverse of a.  
In addition, the group is called abelian if it satisfies the commutativity law, that is, 
a b b a∗ = ∗ , for all elements , Ga b∈ .     
If the binary (group) operation is called addition (+), then the group is additive. In this case, 
the identity element is usually denoted by 0 (zero) and the additive inverse of an element a is 
denoted by a− . If, otherwise, the binary (group) operation is called multiplication ( )i , then the 
finite group is multiplicative. In this case, the identity element is usually denoted by 1 and the 
multiplicative inverse of an element a is denoted by 1a
− .  
Finite Fields 
A field is a set F
 
together with two operations, addition (+) and multiplication ( )i , s.t. (F , + ) 
and ( ∗F , i ) are abelian groups and the distributive law ( )a b c a c b c+ ⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅  holds for all 
elements , ,a b c ∈F . There exists a finite field if and only if its order q is a prime power with the 
form mq p= , where p is a prime and 1m ≥ . We denote this field by qF  and distinguish the 
following cases: 
• If 1m = , it is called prime field and is denoted by pF . In this case, {0,1,2, , 1}p p= −…F , 
which are all the integers modulo p. The group operations are then addition and 
multiplication modulo p.  
• If 2m ≥ , it is called extension field and is denoted by mpF . Using polynomial basis 
representation, one can define mpF  as the set of all polynomials in the indeterminate x 
with coefficients in pF  and degree at most ( 1)m − :  
                   1 21 2 1 0[ ] / ( ) { : }m
m m
p m m i pp
x f x a x a x a x a a− −− −= = + + + + ∈…F F F . 
The group operations are polynomial addition and multiplication with coefficients 
reduced modulo p. Multiplication is performed modulo an irreducible polynomial ( )f x . 
Special cases of extension fields are, for example, 
2m
F , which are known as binary 
extension fields (or, simply, binary fields), and 2pF , which are known as quadratic 
extension fields.  
Two notable cases are extensively used today to build elliptic curve cryptosystems: prime 
fields pF  and binary fields 2mF . In this thesis, we focus on the former case. Also, other  
extension fields mpF  








pairing-based cryptography (see Section 2.3) and new ECC systems based on the GLS method 
(see Section 2.2.6).  
Cyclic Subgroups 
Let G be a finite group of order n with multiplication ( )i  as binary operation, and let g be an 
element of G such that { :0 1}ig g i r= ≤ ≤ −  is the subgroup of G generated by g, where r is the 
order of the element g, that is, r is the smallest positive integer for which 1
rg = . It is known that 
r always exists and is in fact a divisor of n. Then, G is a cyclic group with generator g if G g=  
(i.e., r n=  holds). The set g  is also a group itself under the same binary operation and is called 
the cyclic subgroup of G generated by g. More precisely, G contains exactly one cyclic subgroup 
of order d for each divisor d of n.      
In the next section, we explore the way in which all the points belonging to an elliptic curve 
over a prime field pF  form an abelian group under addition, and how the cyclic subgroups of this 
group can be used to implement EC-based cryptosystems. 
Generalized Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) 
Given a multiplicative cyclic group (G, )i  of order n with generator g and an element y g∈ , 
the DLP is defined as the problem of determining the unique integer [0, 1]x n∈ −  such that 
xy g= . In this case, a system based on this problem is considered suitable for cryptography if 
the discrete logarithm problem is intractable and there are fast algorithms to compute the group 
operation in G. 
Two groups are extensively used in discrete logarithm (DL) systems: the cyclic subgroups of 
the multiplicative group of a finite field and cyclic subgroups of elliptic curve groups. The former 
case has been studied since the late 70’s. Hence, cryptosystems based on this setting will be 
regarded as traditional DL-based systems. 
2.2. Introduction to Elliptic Curves 
A non-singular elliptic curve E over a finite field K, which is denoted by E/K, is defined by the 
general Weierstrass equation: 
                                
1 2 3 4 6
2 3 2
, , , , , 1 3 2 4 6:W a a a a aE y a xy a y x a x a x a+ + = + + + ,                           (2.1) 
where: 1 2 3 4 6, , , ,a a a a a K∈ , the discriminant 
2 3 2
2 8 4 6 2 4 68 27 9 0d d d d d d d∆ = − − − + ≠ , 
2
2 1d a= + 24a , 4 4 1 32d a a a= + , 
2
6 3 64d a a= +  and 
2 2 2
8 1 6 2 6 1 3 4 2 3 44d a a a a a a a a a a= + − + − . 
The condition 0∆ ≠  guarantees that there does not exist more than one tangent line for a given 








If we define elliptic curve points as the pairs ( , )x y  solving the curve equation (2.1) and L  is 
any extension field of K, the set of L -rational points on 
1 2 3 4 6, , , , ,W a a a a a
E  is: 
                   2 3 21 3 2 4 6( ) ( , ) : 0{ } { }WE x y y a xy a y x a x a x a= ∈ × + + − − − − = ∪L L L O ,        (2.2) 
where O represents the point at infinity and is an L -rational point for all extension fields L  of 
K.   
Definition 2.1. Two elliptic curves 
1 2 3 4 61 , , , , ,W a a a a a
E E=  and 
1 2 3 4 62 , , , , ,W b b b b b
E E=  defined over K 
in Weierstrass form are said to be isomorphic over K if there exist , ,r s t K∈  and \ {0}u K∈  
such that the mapping (also called an admissible change of variables):  
                                                  ( )2 3 2( , ) ,x y u x r u y u sx t+ + +                                            (2.3) 
transforms 1E  into 2E . 
Definition 2.2. If , ,r s t K∈  (closure of K) and \ {0}u K∈  in the setting of Definition 2.1, then 
curves 1E  into 2E  are isomorphic over K  or twists of each other. Moreover, 1 2( ) ( )j E j E=  if 
and only if 1E  into 2E  are twists, where ()j  denotes the j-invariant of a given curve equation. 
Following Definition 2.2, the j-invariant can be used to determine if two curves are twists.  
The Weierstrass equation has had a privileged role in most standards and cryptographic 
applications because of the fact that every elliptic curve can be expressed in this form. Moreover, 
it enables efficient computation when simplified to its isomorphic forms over K known as short 
Weierstrass curves, which are obtained through an admissible change of variables.  
2.2.1. Short Weierstrass Form 
Since in the present work we mainly focus our attention on prime fields pF  with p > 3, we limit 
following definitions to pF  only. However, the reader should be aware that the same descriptions 
extend to any prime field K with prime characteristic > 3.  
For the case of pF  with p > 3, the general Weierstrass equation (2.1) simplifies to the 
following form, known as short Weierstrass form:              
                                                      2 3, , :W a bE y x ax b= + + ,                                             (2.4) 
where , pa b∈F , 
3 216(4 27 ) 0a b∆ = − + ≠  and 3, ,( ) 1728 / 4W a bj E a= ∆ . In the remainder of this 
work, we refer to eq. (2.4) as simply WE . Since this curve form has been recommended (and 








refer to it as standard curve. 
The set of elliptic curve points ( , )x y  solving the curve equation (2.4) plus the point at 
infinity, which is given by:  
                                2 3( ) ( , ) : 0{ } { }W p p pE x y y x ax b= ∈ × − − − = ∪F F F O ,                         (2.5)       
form an additive abelian group ( ( ), )W pE +F  when the so called chord-and-tangent rule is used to 
define the group operation. In this case, the point at infinity O acts as the identity element of the 
group law (see Section 2.2.4.2 for more details).  
Cyclic subgroups of the group ( ( ), )W pE +F  
can be used to build elliptic curve cryptosystems. 
The hardness of these constructs is based on the so-called Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
Problem (ECDLP), described next. 
2.2.2. Scalar Multiplication and the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
Problem (ECDLP) 
Let / pE F  
be an elliptic curve defined over pF . If ( )pP E∈ F  is a point of order r, the cyclic 
subgroup of ( )pE F  generated by P is { , ,2 , ( 1) }P P r P−…O . Then, if we define the scalar k as an 
integer in the range [1, 1]r − , we can represent the main operation in ECC, namely, scalar 
multiplication (a.k.a. point multiplication), as the following computation: 
                                                                      Q k P= ,                                                           (2.6) 
where the result Q is also a point in the subgroup of ( ( ), )pE +F  generated by P.  
Although the scalar multiplication with form (2.6) is the most common operation in elliptic 
curve cryptosystems, some settings such as digital signatures require a computation with the form                                            
k P lQ+ , where , ( )pP Q E∈ F  are points of order r and k, l are integers in the range [1, 1]r − . 
This operation is also known as multiple scalar multiplication. To make a clear distinction 
between both primitives, we will refer to operation (2.6) as single scalar multiplication whenever 
necessary. 
The hardness of systems based on elliptic curve scalar multiplication is based on the Elliptic 
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), which is an adaptation of the traditional DLP to 
elliptic curve groups. 
Definition 2.3. Given the cyclic group ( ( ), )pE +F  
with generator P and a point Q P∈ ,  the 
ECDLP is defined as the problem of determining the unique integer [0, 1]k r∈ −  such that 








The ECDLP is assumed to be harder than other recognized problems such as integer 
factorization and the discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative group of a finite field, 
which are the foundations of RSA [RSA78] and the ElGamal [ElG84] cryptosystems, 
respectively.  
To assess more precisely the impact of the attacks available for each problem, we first 
introduce the following definition about algorithmic running time.    
Definition 2.4. If we define the running time of a given algorithm with input n by 
( )1[ , ] exp(( )(ln ) (ln ln ) )a anL a c O c n nε −= + , where 0c >  and 0 1a≤ ≤  are constants and 
lim 0n ε→∞ = , then it is said to be polynomial in ln n  (i.e., ((ln ) )
c
O n
ε+ ) if a = 0, exponential in 
n (i.e., ( )cO n ε+ ) if a = 1, and subexponential if 0 1a< < . 
Then, the parameter a can be seen as a measure of the efficacy of an attack to solve a 
particular problem, where higher values indicate inefficiency (as it is approximating to 
exponential running time) and lower values indicate efficiency (as it is approximating to 
polynomial running time). As consequence, one would prefer systems for which only exponential 
attacks are known. 
In particular, the need for increasingly larger keys in RSA and traditional DL-based systems 
is due to the existence of a sub-exponential attack, known as the Number Field Sieve (NFS) 
[LLM+93, Gor93], which solves the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. This 




[ ,1.923]nL . In contrast, the fastest known method to solve ECDLP is Pollard’s rho 
[Pol78], which falls in the category of square root attacks and has the exponential running time
( )O r , where r is the order of the cyclic group with generator P in the setting of Definition 2.3.  
Note that there are “weaker” curves such as supersingular curves for which it is feasible to 
transport the ECDLP to the DLP in the group *k
q
F  using the Weil pairing and then to apply index 
calculus attacks [MOV93]. However, for the wide range of remaining elliptic curves with large 
prime order subgroup there are still no better attacks than Pollard’s rho.   
In conclusion, it is expected that the key sizes required for ECC using a suitably chosen curve 
and underlying field for a given security level are significantly smaller than those required for 
traditional cryptosystems based on the integer factorization and DL problems. 
Table 2.1 shows the key sizes for EC-based and RSA cryptosystems for equivalent security 
levels, as recommended by [NIST07]. Security levels are shown at the bottom of the table and 
refer to the bitlength n of keys in a well-designed symmetric cryptosystem such that a brute force 
attack would require performing 2
n
 steps in order to break the system. For instance, an attacker 
would need to go through all 
256
2  possible keys to break AES-256, where 256n = . Estimates for 








algorithm that solves each problem (i.e., Pollard’s rho and NFS, respectively) in a number of 
steps that matches the corresponding security level.   
Table 2.1. Key sizes for ECC and RSA for equivalent security levels [NIST07]. 
Cryptosystem Key size (bits) 
ECC 160 224 256 384 512 
RSA 1024 2048 3072 7680 15360 








As we can observe from Table 2.1, ECC requires much smaller keys. This directly translates 
to important savings in bandwidth and memory requirements to transmit/store key material. 
Moreover, with the rapid advances in software/hardware implementation during the last years, 
that advantage has also been extended to faster execution times.  
These advantages directly reflect on cryptographic systems based on elliptic curves that have 
single and multiple scalar multiplications as their main primitives. Next, we review some of the 
best known elliptic curve cryptosystems. 
2.2.3. Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Schemes 
Elliptic Curve Key Generation 
First, a public-key system requires a key pair consisting of the private and public keys. This is 
given in Algorithm 2.1 for the case of ECC.  
 
Algorithm 2.1.  Elliptic curve key generation  
Input:  domain parameters ( , , , )E p P r  
Output:  private key k and public key Q 
1: Select a random integer [1, 1]k r∈ −    
2: Compute Q kP=           
3: Return Q    
 
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (ECDH) 
Based on the original key exchange proposed by Diffie and Hellman in [DH76], this scheme 








public medium. The protocol is illustrated in Algorithm 2.2 for the case of ECC.  
 
Algorithm 2.2.  Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange (ECDH)  
Input:  domain parameters ( , , , )E p P r  
Output:  shared secret key Q = abP 
                        Alice side:                        Bob side: 
1: Select a random integer [1, 1]a r∈ −  1: Select a random integer [1, 1]b r∈ −  
2: Compute aQ aP=  and send it to Bob       2: Compute bQ bP=  and send it to Alice      
3: Upon reception of bQ , compute bQ aQ=  3: Upon reception of aQ , compute aQ bQ=
 
ElGamal Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem 
This cryptosystem is an adaptation to ECC of the encryption/decryption system proposed by 
ElGamal in [ElG84]. Encryption and decryption schemes are illustrated in Algorithms 2.3 and 
2.4, respectively.  
 
Algorithm 2.3.  ElGamal elliptic curve encryption  
Input:  domain parameters ( , , , )E p P r , public key Q and plaintext m 
Output:  ciphertext 0 1( , )C C  
1: Represent m as a point ( )pM E∈ F    
2: Select a random integer [1, 1]d r∈ −         
3: Compute 0C dP=           
4: Compute 1C M dQ= +           
5: Return 0 1( , )C C    
 
Algorithm 2.4.  ElGamal elliptic curve decryption  
Input:  domain parameters ( , , , )E p P r , private key k and ciphertext 0 1( , )C C  
Output:  plaintext m 
1: Compute 1 0M C kC= −           
2: Extract m from M          
3: Return m   
 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 








popular EC-based signature scheme. It has been standardized in ANSI X9.62, FIPS 186-2, IEEE 
1363-2000 and ISO/IEC 15946-2. Signature generation and verification are illustrated in 
Algorithms 2.5 and 2.6 . H denotes a hash function that is assumed to be preimage and collision 
resistant. 
 
Algorithm 2.5.  ECDSA signature generation  
Input:  domain parameters ( , , , )E p P r , private key k and message m 
Output:  signature 0 1( , )s s  
1: Select a random integer [1, 1]d r∈ −         
2: Compute 1 1( , )dP x y=  and set 1z x=    
3: Compute 0 (mod )s z r≡ . If 0 0s = , go to step 1   
4: Compute ( )e H m=           
5: Compute 11 ( ) mods d e kz r
−= + . If 0 0s = , go to step 1          
6: Return 0 1( , )s s    
 
Algorithm 2.6.  ECDSA signature verification  
Input:  domain parameters ( , , , )E p P r , public key Q, message m and signature 0 1( , )s s  
Output:  reject or accept the signature 
1: If  0 1( , ) [1, 1]s s r∉ − , return (reject the signature)       
2: Compute ( )e H m=           
3: Compute 11 modt s r
−≡ .    
4: Compute modu et n=  and 0 modv s t n=          
5: Compute 1 2( , )T uP vQ x x= + =  and set 1z x= . If T =O , return (reject the signature)     
6: If 0 (mod )s z r≡ , return (accept the signature)       
7: Else return (reject the signature)   
 
The security of the ECDH key exchange, ElGamal elliptic curve cryptosystem and ECDSA is 
based on the intractability of the ECDLP in P . In addition, the ECDSA requires that the hash 
function H be preimage and collision resistant. As can be seen, scalar multiplication (or multiple 
scalar multiplication) constitutes the central (and most time-consuming) operation of the schemes 
above. Hence, speeding up this operation has a direct impact in the computing performance of 
any cryptographic protocol based on elliptic curves.    
 In the following section, we briefly describe the arithmetic layers that constitute the 
computation of elliptic curve scalar multiplication. The interested reader is referred to [HMV04, 








2.2.4. ECC Scalar Multiplication Arithmetic 
The computation of elliptic curve scalar multiplication consists of three arithmetic levels or 
layers: field, point and scalar arithmetic. As previously seen, a cryptographic protocol or scheme 
works on top of scalar multiplication. However, since this thesis focuses on the efficient 
computation of this operation, our discussion will center on the aforementioned arithmetic levels.  
2.2.4.1. Level 1: Finite Field Arithmetic 
The lowest level of scalar multiplication over prime fields consists of finite field operations, 
which are basically traditional arithmetic operations reduced modulo the prime p: 
• Addition: given , pa b ∈F , compute ( )moda b p r+ = , where r a b p= + −  if a b p+ ≥  
or  r a b= +  if a b p+ < . 
• Subtraction: given , pa b∈F , compute ( )moda b p r− = , where r a b p= − +  if 
0a b− <  or  r a b= −  if 0a b− ≥ .  
• Multiplication: given , pa b ∈F , compute ( )moda b p r⋅ = , where r is the remainder of 
dividing ( )a b⋅  by p s.t. 0 1r p≤ ≤ − . 
• Squaring: given pa ∈ F , compute 
2
moda p r= , where r is the remainder of dividing 2a  
by p s.t. 0 1r p≤ ≤ − .  
• Inversion: given a nonzero element pa ∈F , compute 
1
moda p r
− = , where r is the 
unique integer in pF  for which ( )mod 1a r p⋅ = . 
Since modular reduction represents an important portion of the cost of computing modular 
arithmetic, it is relevant to optimize this operation. In the setting of elliptic curve point 
multiplication, the selection of a prime of special form (e.g., a pseudo-Mersenne prime p s.t. 
2mp ≈ ) enables very efficient modular reduction; see Chapter 5 for an implementation of the 
field arithmetic using a pseudo-Mersenne prime. If a general form for the prime p is mandatory 
for security concerns (e.g., in pairing-based cryptosystems), then the use of Montgomery 
arithmetic [Mon85] is a popular choice given its relatively efficient reduction step. In this case, 
elements x are represented with the form 2 modNa x p= ⋅ , where N t w= ⋅ , 2N p> , w is the 
computer wordlength and t is the number of words. Montgomery reduction produces 
2 modNa p−⋅  for an input 2Na p< ⋅ . Then, Montgomery multiplication of elements a =  
2 modNx p⋅  and 2 modNb y p= ⋅  can be performed as 2mod ( 2 ) 2 (mod )N Nc ab p x y p−= = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =  
2 modNxy p⋅ , which is in Montgomery representation; see Chapter 6 for an implementation of 
the field arithmetic using Montgomery arithmetic with a prime of “general” form.       
The reader is referred to [HMV04, Chapter 2] and [ACD+05, Chapter 10] for more detailed 








In the remainder of this work, we use the following notation in italics to specify the 
computing time (or computing cost) required to perform field operations in pF : A (field addition 
or subtraction), S (field squaring), M (field multiplication) and I (field inversion). In some cases, 
multiplication by a curve parameter is required. The cost of this operation is denoted by D.  
In theoretical estimates throughout this work, we make the following assumptions: 
1 0.8S M= , which is commonly used in the literature; the costs of computing field addition/ 
subtraction and division/multiplication by a small constant are roughly equivalent to one another 
and/or negligible in comparison with the cost of field multiplication and squaring; and curve 
parameters are suitably chosen such that the cost of multiplying by these constants is negligible. 
Whenever required for simplification purposes, the assumptions above are applied in our 
theoretical cost analysis. However, the reader should be aware that these assumptions may vary 
from one implementation to another.  
2.2.4.2. Level 2: Point Arithmetic 
This level consists of the binary (group) operation accompanying the defined additive abelian 
group ( ( ), )pE +F . The different variants of this group operation are better known as point 
operations.  
The elementary representation of points is based on the natural representation using ( , )x y  
coordinates, which is called in the context of ECC affine coordinates (denoted by A for the 
remainder of this work). As previously stated, the group addition is geometrically defined by the 
chord-and-tangent rule: (i) the result of adding two points is the projection over the x axis of the 
point that intersects the line that crosses the two original points being added. This operation is 
referred to as point addition and can be visualized in Figure 2.1(a) over the real numbers; (ii) the 
result of adding a point to itself can be geometrically defined as the projection over the x axis of 
the point that intersects the tangent of the original point. This operation is referred to as point 
doubling and can be visualized in Figure 2.1(b) over the real numbers.     
Following the geometrical definition, it is relatively easy to derive the following formula to 
add two points. Let WE  be an elliptic curve over pF  
in short Weierstrass form (2.4), where p > 
3. Given two points 1 1( , )P x y=  and 2 2( , ) ( )W pQ x y E= ∈ F , where P Q≠ ± , the addition 
3 3( , )P Q x y+ =  is obtained as follows:  
2










. This addition formula has a cost of 1I + 2M + 1S. 
Similarly, formula for point doubling in affine coordinates can be easily derived from the 
previously described geometric description. Let WE  be an elliptic curve over pF  
in short 








                   (a) Addition P+Q                                                                  (b) Doubling 2P     















= . The cost of the previous formula is 1I + 2M + 2S. 
There are a few exceptions to the previous formulas that can be solved by applying the 
identity element, namely, the point at infinity O. Recall that the point at infinity can be 
geometrically defined as the point “lying far out on the y-axis such that any line x = c, for some 
constant c, parallel to the y-axis passes through it” [ACD+05]. Thus, if 1 1( , )P x y=  and 
1 1( , )Q x y= − , then the addition is given by: 1 1 1 1( , ) ( , )P Q x y x y+ = + − =O . 1 1( , )Q x y= −  is 
called the negative of P and is denoted by P− . Similarly, P P P+ = + =O O , and = −O O .          
Inversion-Free (Projective) Coordinates 
As we have seen in the previous section, point formulas based on affine coordinates require the 
computation of field inversions. Particularly over prime fields, inversions are highly expensive in 
comparison with other field operations, and should be avoided as much as possible. Although 
their relative cost depends on the characteristics of a particular implementation, it has been 
observed that, especially in the case of efficient forms for the prime p as recommended by 
[NIST00], 1 30I M> . For instance, benchmarks presented by [LH00] and [BHL+01] show I/M 
ratios between 30-40 and 50-100, respectively. 





1 1( , )P x y=
1 1( , )P x y=
2 2( , )Q x y=
3 3( , )P Q x y+ =








in which case the third coordinate Z permits to replace inversions for a few other field operations. 
More precisely, given a prime field pF  and ,c d
+∈Z , there is an equivalence relation ∼  among 
nonzero triplets over pF , such that [HMV04]: 
1 1 1 2 2 2( , , ) ( , , )X Y Z X Y Z∼   ⇔ 1 2
cX Xλ= , 1 2
dY Yλ=  and 1 2Z Zλ= , for some 
*
pλ ∈F ,          (2.9) 
The equivalence class of a projective point is *( : : ) {( , , ) : }c d pX Y Z X Y Zλ λ λ λ= ∈F , where 
any element ( , , )X Y Z  can be used as a representative of such a point. In particular, 
( / , / ,1)c dX Z Y Z  is the only representative in the set for which 1Z = . That means that there is a 
one-to-one mapping between affine points and projective points.    
If, for instance, one fixes 2c =  and 3d =  the new representation is known as Jacobian 
coordinates (denoted by J in the remainder), which is a special case of projective coordinates 
that has yielded very efficient point formulae [HMV04, Elm06]. Then, in this case the 
equivalence class of a (Jacobian) projective point is given by: 
                                            2 3 *( : : ) {( , , ) : }pX Y Z X Y Zλ λ λ λ= ∈F .                                       (2.10) 
Note that, in the Jacobian representation, each projective point ( : : )X Y Z  corresponds to the 
affine point 2 3( / , / )X Z Y Z . In this case, the curve equation (2.4) acquires the projective form 
2 3 4 6
Y X aXZ bZ= + + , the negative of a point ( : : )P X Y Z=  is given by ( : : )P X Y Z− = −  and 
the point at infinity corresponds to (1 :1 : 0)=O . 
In Table 2.2, we summarize costs of the most efficient point formulas in J coordinates, 
including recently proposed composite operations such as tripling (3P) and quintupling (5P) of a 
point, which are built on top of traditional doubling and addition operations and are relevant for 
the efficient implementation of multibase scalar multiplication methods (see Chapter 4). Also, we 
include the highly efficient doubling-addition operation proposed by the author in [Lon07] which 
computes the recurrent value 2P Q+  and is more efficient than performing a doubling followed 
by an addition when using Jacobian coordinates (see also [LM08b]). Besides “traditional” costs 
in each case, we also show costs of formulas after applying the technique of replacing 
multiplications by squarings (labeled as “Using S-M tradings”) [LM08] using the algebraic 
substitutions 2 2 2( ) 2a b a b a b ⋅ = + − −   or 
2 2 22 ( )a b a b a b ⋅ = + − −  . In general, this 
technique is more efficient always that 4M S A− >  or 2M S A− >  (respect.). The reader is 
referred to our online database [Lon08] for complete details about state-of-the-art formulas using 
Jacobian coordinates.  
Note that formulas considered in Table 2.2 fix 3a = −  in the curve equation (2.4) for 
efficiency purposes. This assumption, which has been shown not to impose significant restrictions 









Table 2.2. Costs (in terms of multiplications and squarings) of point operations using Jacobian 
(J ) and mixed Jacobian-affine coordinates.  
Point operation 
Cost 
“Traditional” Using S-M tradings 
Doubling (DBL), 2 →J J  4M + 4S 3M + 5S 
Mixed doubling (mDBL), 2 →A J  2M + 4S 1M + 5S                           
Tripling (TPL), 3 →J J  9M + 5S 7M + 7S 
Mixed tripling (mTPL), 3 →A J  7M + 5S 5M + 7S 
Quintupling (QPL), 5 →J J  13M + 9S 10M + 12S 
Mixed quintupling (mQPL), 5 →A J  12M + 8S 8M + 12S 
Mixed addition (mADD), + →J A J   8M + 3S 7M + 4S 
Mixed2 addition (mmADD), + →A A J   4M + 2S 4M + 2S 
Addition (ADD), + →J J J  12M + 4S 11M + 5S 
Addition with two stored values ( [1,1]ADD ), + →J J J  11M + 3S 10M + 4S
 
Addition with four stored values ( [2,2]ADD ), + →J J J  10M + 2S 9M + 3S
 
Mixed doubling-addition (mDBLADD), 2 + →J A J  13M + 5S 11M + 7S 
Doubling-addition (DBLADD), 2 + →J J J  17M + 6S 14M + 9S 
Doubling-addition ( [1,1]DBLADD ), 2 + →J J J  16M + 5S 13M + 8S
 
 
For the remainder, doubling (2P), tripling (3P), quintupling (5P), addition (P+Q) and 
doubling-addition (2P+Q) are denoted by DBL, TPL, QPL, ADD and DBLADD, respectively. If 
at least one of the inputs is in affine and the output is in J coordinates, the operations use mixed 
coordinates (see Cohen et al. [CMO98]) and are denoted by mDBL, mTPL, mQPL, mADD and 
mDBLADD, corresponding to each of the previous point operations. For addition, the case in 
which both inputs are in affine is denoted by mmADD. Costs are expressed in terms of field 
multiplications (M) and squarings (S) only. The reader is referred to [Lon08] for the full 
operation count.  
In some cases, it is possible to reduce the cost of certain operations if some values are 
precomputed in advance. That is the case of addition and doubling-addition with stored values 
(identified by the subscripts [ , ]M S , where M and S denote the number of precalculated 
multiplications and squarings, respect.). If, for instance, values 2iZ  and 
3
iZ  are calculated for 
each precomputed point id P  in windowed methods the costs of the aforementioned operations 




2Z  and 
3
2Z , can be precalculated before performing an addition of the form 1 1 1( : : )X Y Z +








Variants of J coordinates have also been explored in the literature. In particular, the four-
tuple 
4( : : : )X Y Z aZ  and five-tuple 
2 3
:( : : : )X Y Z Z Z , known as modified Jacobian ( mJ ) 
[CMO98] and Chudnovsky (C) [CC86] coordinates, respectively, permit the saving of some 
operations by passing recurrent values between point operations. However, most benefits 
achieved with these representations are virtually cancelled by assuming 3a = −  in the EC 
equation and with the alternative use of operations with stored values. Other (somewhat less 
efficient) system, referred to as homogeneous (H) coordinates, is defined by fixing 1c d= =  in 
(2.9).    
The costs presented in Table 2.2 (specifically, costs labeled as “Using S-M tradings”) will be 
used later for assessing the methods proposed for precomputation and multibase scalar 
multiplication in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. Also, our high-speed implementations of scalar 
multiplication in Chapter 5 are based on standard curves using this system. In this case, given the 
relatively high cost of additions and other “small” operations on x86-64 processors, we make use 
of “traditional” operations without exploiting S-M tradings.  
2.2.4.3. Level 3: Scalar Arithmetic 
This level of computation refers to the efficient execution of scalar multiplication (2.6) 
employing the point operations discussed in the previous section. Because the naïve method 
computing kP P P P= + + +…  using ( 1)k −  point additions is highly expensive, it is important 
the use of efficient number representations for the scalar k to make this operation reasonably 
efficient.  
In that direction there have appeared a myriad of methods for computing scalar multiplication 
in the last few years. These methods are generically classified according to their applicability to 
two possible scenarios: (i) the initial point P is fixed and known before execution; (ii) the initial 
point P varies and is not known in advance. If the initial point P is known in advance, as happens 
in the ElGamal elliptic curve encryption scheme or the first phase of the Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange (see Section 2.2.3), efficient methods can precalculate multiples of P almost for “free” 
to reduce costs during the evaluation stage (e.g., comb methods). On the other hand, if the point 
P is not known in advance, as happens during the ElGamal decryption or the second phase of the 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange, methods should include the precomputation cost in the overall cost 
and, hence, precomputed points should be used sensibly.  
In this thesis we focus on methods falling in the second category (i.e., point P is not known in 
advance). In this case, it is standard to use the so-called double-and-add algorithm, which is the 
analogue of the square-and-multiply method used for exponentiation in multiplicative groups. 
This method uses the binary representation of integers, as can be seen in Algorithm 2.7(a). 
Moreover, since negating points is inexpensive and can be performed on-the-fly it is convenient 








directly translates to a reduction in the number of required additions). By adjusting the double-
and-add for this case, we obtain what is known as the double-and-(add-or-subtract) method. See 
Algorithm 2.7(b). Popular signed binary representations are the standard non-adjacent form 
(NAF) and its variants, which are briefly described in the next subsection. 
 
Algorithm 2.7.  Left-to-right methods for scalar multiplication  
Input:  (a) 1 2 0 2( , , , )t tk k k k− −= …  or (b) 1 2 0 NAF( , , , )t tk k k k− −= …  ; and ( )pP E∈ F  
Output:  kP 
 (a)  (b) 
1: Q =O  1: Q =O  
2: For 1i t= −  downto  0  do 2: For 1i t= −  downto  0  do 
3: 
    
2Q Q←  3: 
    
2Q Q←  
4:      If  1ik =  then  Q Q P← +          4:      If  1ik =  then  Q Q P← +          
5: Return Q  5:      If  1ik = −  then  Q Q P← −  
  6: Return Q  
 
Note that Algorithm 2.7 presents left-to-right versions of the methods discussed above. There 
are also right-to-left variants which can be advantageous when protection against side-channel 
analysis (SCA) attacks is required. The same observation applies to other methods such as the 
Montgomery Ladder [Mon87].   
In the remainder of this work, for a scalar multiplication kP, we assume that ( )pP E∈ F  is of 
order r and ( )pE F  is of order # ( )pE h r= ⋅F , where r is prime and h << r. Since it is known 
that # ( )pE p≈F  following Hasse’s theorem (see Theorem 3.7 in [HMV04]), we have that 
.r p≈  Then, if k is a scalar randomly chosen in the range [1, 1]r − , the average length of k in 
binary representation is 2logn p=  and the corresponding operation will be referred as n-bit 
scalar multiplication. In this case, double-and-add and double-and-(add-or-subtract) algorithms 
will require in average ( 1)n −  main loop iterations. We refer as nonzero density or Hamming 
weight to the number of nonzero digits in a given scalar representation. In particular, for scalar 
multiplication, the nonzero density of the representation of k directly translates to the number of 
required point additions to compute kP.     
Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) and Width-w Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) 
Among different signed radix-2 representations using digits from the set {0, 1}D = ± , NAF is a 
canonical representation with the fewest number of nonzero digits for any scalar k [Rei60]. The 
NAF representation of k contains at most one nonzero digit among any two successive digits. The 








bit scalar multiplication using NAF is approximately ( 1)DBL ( /3)ADDn n− + , where DBL and 
ADD represent the cost of doubling and addition, respectively. 
If there is memory available, one can exploit the use of precomputations by means of a 
method known as wNAF [Sol00], which uses precomputed values to “insert” windows of width 
w. The latter permits the consecutive execution of several doublings to reduce the density of the 
expansion. The wNAF representation of k contains at most one nonzero digit among any w 
successive digits, and uses the digit set 
1{0, 1, 3, 5, , (2 1)}wD −= ± ± ± ± −… , where 2w +> ∈Z . The 
average density of nonzero digits for a window of width w is NAF 1/( 1)w wδ = + , and the number 
of required precomputed points is 
2(2 1)w− −  (hereafter we refer as precomputed points to non-
trivial points not including { , }PO ). Hence, the cost using this method is approximately 
( 1)DBL ( /( 1))ADDn n w− + +  plus the cost of the precomputation stage.                     
Fractional Width-w NAF (Frac-wNAF) 
The wNAF representation requires the precomputation of 
2(2 1)w− −  non-trivial points, i.e., 1, 3, 
7, 15 points, and so on. However, a specific implementation could have memory restrictions that 
do not adjust to these values. Moreover, because the applicable scenario involves an initial point 
P not known in advance, the precomputed table must be built every time a scalar multiplication is 
performed. Hence, it is often the case that a table with a number of points different to that fixed 
by standard windows achieves the minimal cost.  
Möller [Möl03] proposed to solve this problem by recoding the binary representation of an 
integer with windows of flexible size using a digit set of the form {0, 1, 3, 5, , }D m= ± ± ± ±… , 
where 1m ≥  is an odd integer. In this way, one can flexibly choose any number of precomputed 








  = + + +    [Möl05].  
Note that if 1m = , Frac-wNAF is actually reduced to the NAF method with a nonzero density 
of about 1/3. Similarly, Frac- NAFwδ  attains the same values as NAFwδ  for the standard window 
values of wNAF. For instance, Frac-wNAF with 7m =  reduces to wNAF with w = 4 (in this case, 
0.2δ = ).   
2.2.5. Special Curve Forms 
During the last few years, there has been a growing interest in studying curve forms different to 
the standardized Weierstrass form (2.4). These special curves have gained increasing attention 
because in some cases they offer higher resilience against side-channel analysis attacks and/or 
enable faster implementations. In this work, we focus on two special curve forms that have been 
shown to achieve very high performance: extended Jacobi quartics and Twisted Edwards curves.  








Extended Jacobi Quartic Curve  
It is defined by the non-singular curve equation: 
                                                        
2 4 2
: 2 1JQE y dx ax= + + ,                                               (2.11) 
where , pa d ∈F  and 
2( ) 0d a d− ≠ . Results by Billet and Joye [BJ03b] show that every elliptic 
curve of even order can be written in extended Jacobi quartic form. The projective curve in 
weighted projective coordinates is given by 2 4 2 2 42Y dX aX Z Z= + + , where a projective point 
( : : )X Y Z  corresponds to the affine point 
2( / , / )X Z Y Z . In this case, the negative of a point 
( : : )P X Y Z=  is represented by ( : : )P X Y Z− = −  and the identity element is given by (0 :1:1) . 
The most efficient formulae for this case have been developed by Hisil et al. [HWC+07, 
HWC+08b] using an extended coordinate system of the form 
2 2( : : : : )X Y Z X Z  that will be 
referred in the remainder of this work as eJQ .   
Note that, recently, Hisil et al. [HWC+09]  proposed the use of a mixed system that 
efficiently combines homogeneous coordinates with an extended homogeneous coordinate 
system with the form ( : : : )X Y Z T , where 2 /T X Z= . However, formulas for composite 
operations known to date are faster in weighted projective coordinates eJQ . 
In Table 2.3, we summarize the costs of formulas using extended Jacobi quartic coordinates 
[HWC+07, HWC+08b]. Note that it is also possible to trade multiplications for squarings in some 
cases (labeled as “Using S-M tradings”). And similarly to the case of operations with stored values 
Table 2.3. Costs of point operations for an extended Jacobi quartic curve with d = 1 using 
extended Jacobi quartic ( eJQ ) coordinates.  
Point operation Coord. 
Cost 
“Traditional” Using S-M tradings 
 DBL 2( )e e→JQ JQ  3M + 4S + 1D
 2M + 5S + 1D 
 mDBL 2( ) e→A JQ  1M + 6S + 1D                          7S + 1D                          
 TPL 3( )e e→JQ JQ  8M + 4S + 1D
 8M + 4S + 1D 
 mTPL 3( ) e→A JQ  5M + 6S + 2D
 5M + 6S + 2D 
 QPL 5( )e e→JQ JQ  14M + 4S + 1D
 14M + 4S + 1D 
 mQPL 5( ) e→A JQ  11M + 6S + 2D
 11M + 6S + 2D 
 mADD e e+ →JQ A JQ  7M + 2S + 1D 6M + 3S + 1D 
 mmADD e+ →A A JQ  4M + 3S + 1D 4M + 3S + 1D 
 ADD   e e e+ →JQ JQ JQ  8M + 3S + 1D 7M + 4S + 1D 
[0,1]ADD  








using Jacobian coord. (see Section 2.2.4.2), the original cost of addition can be reduced further. 
For instance, the addition with cost of 7M + 4S can be reduced to 7M + 3S by noting that 
2( )i iX Z+  can be precomputed for each precomputed point (see [HWC+07] for complete 
details).  
Given the relatively “well-balanced” performance among all point operations listed in Table 
2.3, we use these costs (specifically, the costs labeled as “Using S-M tradings”, assuming that 
1 0D M≈ ) for evaluating the multibase methods in Chapter 4. We also use this system for 
illustrating the use of the LG precomputation scheme in Chapter 3. 
Twisted Edwards Curve 
This form is a generalization of Edwards curves [Edw07] and is defined by the non-singular 
curve equation: 
                                                     
2 2 2 2: 1TEE ax y dx y+ = + ,                                                (2.12) 
where , pa d ∈F  and ( ) 0ad a d− ≠ . An efficient projective system for performing arithmetic on 
these curves is known as inverted Edwards coordinates (referred to as IE coordinates for the 
reminder) [BL07b]. In this system, the equation takes the form 
2 2 2 2 2 4( )X Y Z X Y dZ+ = + , 
assuming that 1a = , where 0X Y Z ≠ , each projective point ( : : )X Y Z  corresponds to ( / ,Z X  
/ )Z Y  in affine and the negative of a point ( : : )P X Y Z=  is given by ( : : )P X Y Z− = − . 
Recently, there have been remarkable improvements in the case of Twisted Edwards curves 
using homogeneous coordinates (denoted by E). For this case, the curve acquires the projective 
form 2 2 2 2 2 2 4aX Z Y Z dX Y Z+ = +  for which each triplet ( : : )X Y Z  corresponds to the affine 
point ( / , / )X Z Y Z , 0Z ≠ . Hisil et al. [HWC+08] introduced extended homogeneous coordinates 
(denoted by 
e
E ), where each point ( : : : )X Y Z T  corresponds to ( / , / )X Z Y Z
 
in affine and 
/T XY Z= . The negative of ( : : : )X Y Z T  
is given by ( : : : )X Y Z T− − , and ( : : : )X Y Z T =  
*
{( , , , ) : }pX Y Z Tλ λ λ λ λ ∈ F . In [HWC+08], Hisil et al. also suggest the map ( , ) ( / , )x y x a y−  
to convert the Twisted Edwards curve to 
2 2 2 21x y d x y′− + = + , where /d d a′ = − , allowing 
further reductions in the cost of point operations. For the point multiplication, they ultimately 
propose to compute a doubling followed by an addition as 2
e→E E  and e e+ →E E E  or 
e + →E A E  (which can be unified into a doubling-addition operation with the form 
(2 )e e+ →E E E
 
or (2 )
e + →E A E ) and to compute the remaining doublings as 2 →E E . This 
combined system is called mixed homogeneous/extended homogeneous coordinates and is 
denoted by /
e
E E . 
In Table 2.4, we summarize the costs of formulas using IE [BL07b] and /
e
E E  [HWC+08] 
coordinates. Again, it is possible to trade multiplications for squarings in some cases (labeled as 








Table 2.4. Costs of point operations for a Twisted Edwards curve using inverted Edwards (IE) 
and mixed homogeneous/extended homogeneous ( /
e
E E ) coordinates.  
Point operation 
IE  (a = 1) /
e







 DBL 2( )→IE IE  4M + 3S + 1D 3M + 4S + 1D 2( ) →E E  4M + 3S 3M + 4S 
 mDBL 2( )→A IE  4M + 2S 3M + 3S 2( ) →A E  - - 
 TPL 3( )→IE IE  9M + 4S + 1D 9M + 4S + 1D 3( ) →E E  - - 
 mTPL 3( )→A IE  7M + 3S 7M + 3S 3( ) →A E  - - 
 mADD + →IE A IE  8M + 1S + 1D 8M + 1S + 1D e e+ →E A E  7M 7M 
 mmADD + →A A IE  7M 7M  e+ →A A E  - - 
 ADD  + →IE IE IE  9M + 1S + 1D 9M + 1S + 1D 
e e e+ →E E E  8M 8M 
 mDBLADD 
 
2( ) + →IE A IE  - - (2 )e + →E A E  11M + 3S 10M + 4S 
 DBLADD 2( ) + →IE IE IE  - - (2 )
e e+ →E E E
 
12M + 3S 11M + 4S 
 
Given the availability of a tripling formula of relatively good performance in IE coordinates, 
we use this system (costs labeled as “Using S-M tradings”, assuming that 1 0D M≈ ) for 
evaluating the multibase methods discussed in Chapter 4. We also use IE coordinates for 
illustrating the use of the LG precomputation scheme in Chapter 3. On the other hand, /
e
E E  
coordinates currently offer the highest performance for scalar multiplication using traditional 
radix-2 methods, even surpassing the performance of mixed Jacobi quartic homogeneous/ 
extended homogeneous coordinates (see [HWC+09]). Hence, our high-speed implementations of 
scalar multiplication in Chapter 5 are based on Twisted Edwards curves using this system. In this 
case, given the relatively high cost of additions and other “small” operations on x86-64 
processors, we make use of “traditional” operations without exploiting S-M tradings. 
2.2.6. The Galbraith-Lin-Scott (GLS) Method 
Recently, Galbraith et al. [GLS09] proposed to perform ECC computations on the quadratic twist 
E ′  of an elliptic curve E over 2pF  with an efficiently computable homomorphism ( , )x yψ →  
( , )x yα β  such that ( )P Pψ λ=  and 2 1 0(mod )rλ + ≡ , where 2( )[ ]
p
P E r′∈ F . Then, following 
[GLV01], kP  can be computed as a multiple point multiplication with form 0 1( )k P k Pλ+ , 
where 0k  and 1k  have approximately half the bitlength of k. Integers 0k  and 1k  can be calculated 
by solving a closest vector in a lattice or (in the case of a random scalar k) by simply choosing 








It has also been observed that the GLS method can be adapted to different curve forms. In 
Chapter 5, we evaluate various techniques and optimizations in combination with this method to 
realize high-speed elliptic curve implementations on software. For this purpose, we choose 
curves in Weierstrass and Twisted Edwards form. The details of these curve forms using the GLS 
method, mainly taken from the literature, are summarized next. For complete details, please refer 
to [GLS09, GLS08]. 
The Case with Weierstrass Form     
Corollary 2.1. Let curve WE  
over pF  be defined by (2.4) with # ( ) 1W pE p t= + −F  points, 
where t is called the trace of /W pE F , 2t p≤ , and µ  be a quadratic non-residue in 2pF . If 
0ab ≠ , WE  is isomorphic to the curve:  
                                                       2
2 3/ :W pE y x a x b′ ′ ′= + +F ,                                             (2.13) 
with 
2a aµ′ =  and 23
p
b bµ′ = ∈ F , and  2
2 2
# ( ) ( 1)W pE p t
′ = − +F . Curve WE ′  is the quadratic 
twist of WE  
over 2
p
F . The twisting isomorphism is given by : W WE Eφ ′→ , ( , )x yφ =
3
( , )ux u y , which is defined over 4pF . The group homomorphism is given by: 
                                                   3 3( , ) ( , / )p
p




= ⋅ ⋅ ,                                         (2.14) 
where x  and y  denote the Galois conjugates of x and y, respectively.   
The Case with Twisted Edwards Form 
Corollary 2.2. Let curve TEE  
over pF  be defined by (2.12) with # ( ) 1TE pE p t= + −F  points 
4 | ( 1 )p t+ − , 2t p≤ , and µ  be a quadratic non-residue in 2pF .Then TEE  is isomorphic to the 
curve:  
                                                  2
2 2 2 2/ : 1TE pE a x y d x y′ ′ ′+ = +F ,                                          (2.15) 
with a aµ′ =  and 2pd dµ′ = ∈ F , and  2
2 2
# ( ) ( 1)TE pE p t
′ = − +F . Curve TEE′  is the quadratic 
twist of TEE  
over 2pF . The twisting isomorphism is given by : TE TEE Eφ ′→ , ( , )x yφ =
( , )x u y , and the group homomorphism is: 
                                                        ( , ) ( / , )px y x yψ µ µ= ⋅  .                                              (2.16) 
Following [GLS09], for our implementations on Weierstrass and Twisted Edwards curves in 
Chapter 5 we fix 1272 1 3(mod 4)p = − ≡
 
and 22 piµ = + ∈F  where 1 pi = − ∈ F . The chosen 








2.2.6.1. Arithmetic over Quadratic Extension Fields 
Since for our case 2 ( )pp i=F F  with 1 pi = − ∈F , elements in 2pF  can be represented by 
x a bi= + , where , pa b ∈F . The conjugate of x is given by x a bi= − .  
Then, field arithmetic consists of usual polynomial addition and multiplication in i with 
coefficients reduced modulo p.  Moreover, as suggested in [GLS09], 2pF  multiplication can be 
sped up by using Karatsuba method [Kar95] such that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )a bi c di ac bd bc ad i+ ⋅ + = − + +  is 
computed as ( ) (( )( ) )ac bd a b c d ac bd i− + + + − − , which requires 3 pF  multiplications and 5 
pF  additions/subtractions instead of 4 pF  multiplications and 2 pF  additions/subtractions. 
Similarly, a squaring with the form 2( )a bi+  can be computed as ( )( ) 2a b a b abi+ − +  with 2 
pF  multiplications and 3 pF  additions/subtractions, which is more efficient than computing 
2 2 2( ) ( ) 2a bi a b abi+ = − +  always that 2S M A> +  or 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) [( ) ]a bi a b a b a b i+ = − + + − −  
always that 3 2S A M+ > . 
2.2.6.2. Security of the GLS Method 
An attack by Gaudry [Gau09] has been shown to solve the ECDLP on general abelian varieties of 
small dimension. Specifically, this attack can solve the ECDLP in ( )mqE F
 in 
2 2 /( )mO q − , which 
is faster than Pollard’s rho algorithm if 2m > . Hence, it does not have any implications on the 
practical implementations in 2( )qE F  discussed in this work. 
Definition 2.5. Let E be an elliptic curve defined in qF , a point ( )qP E∈ F  of order r, a point 
xP P∈  for a random integer [0, 1]x r∈ −  and a reusable point aP P∈  for an integer 
[0, 1]a r∈ − . The Static Diffie-Hellman Problem (denoted by Static DHP) is defined as the 
problem of determining axP .  
Recently, Granger [Gra10] introduced a new attack that was shown to solve the Static DHP in 
heuristic time 
1 1/( 1)( )mO q − +  for any elliptic curve in ( )mqE F  if an attacker has access to a Static 
DHP oracle. Hence, this result is immediately more efficient than Gaudry’s attack and, most 
importantly, faster than Pollard’s rho attack if 2m = . Accordingly, it is suggested to avoid the 
use of the GLS method in settings where the Static DHP applies (e.g., when the same Diffie-
Hellman secret is reused for various Diffie-Hellman key agreements). Alternatively, one may 
increase the key size accordingly to make this attack and Pollard’s rho algorithm roughly 
equivalent for solving the ECDLP in 2( )qE F . 
We remark that it is known that the Static DHP can be solved for any arbitrary curve in 
( )qE F  with 
1/3( )O q  Static DHP oracle queries and 
1/3( )O q  group operations [BG04], which is 
faster than the best generic attack achieving complexity 








2.3. Introduction to Pairings 
An admissible bilinear pairing is an efficiently computable function 1 2 T: G G Ge × → , where 
1G  and 2G  are cyclic subgroups of elliptic curve groups, TG  is a cyclic subgroup of the 
multiplicative group of a finite field, 1G , 2G  and TG  have order r, and the following conditions 
hold: 
• Bilinearity: for all 1, GP Q ∈  and all 2, GR S ∈ , ( , ) ( , ) ( , )e P Q R e P R e Q R+ = ⋅  and 
( , ) ( , ) ( , )e P R S e P R e P S+ = ⋅ .  
• Non-degeneracy: ( , ) 1e P R ≠  for some 1GP ∈  and 2GR ∈ . Or, equivalently, 
( , ) 1e P R =  for all 2GR ∈  if and only if P = O ; and ( , ) 1e P R =  for all 1GP ∈  if and 
only if R = O . 
Also, it immediately follows that ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
ab
e aP bR e P R e bP aR= =  for any two integers a 
and b.  
Bilinear pairings provide elegant solutions to some longstanding problems in cryptography 
such as Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [BF01, SOK00], three-party one-round Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange [Jou00], short signatures [BLS04], among others, and has been the focus of intense 
research since its introduction by Boneh, Franklin and others at the beginning of the new 
millennium. For illustration purposes we show in Algorithm 2.8 the three-party one-round key 
agreement by Joux using a bilinear pairing on 1 T(G ,G ) . The reader is referred to [Men09] for a 
discussion of other fundamental pairing-based protocols.  
 
Algorithm 2.8.  Pairing-based tree-party one-round key exchange  
Input:  domain parameters 1 T(G ,G , , , , )E p P r  
Output:  shared secret key ( , )abcK e P P=  
                        Alice side:                        Bob side: 
1: Select a random integer [1, 1]a r∈ −  1: Select a random integer [1, 1]b r∈ −  
2: Send aQ aP=  to Bob and Charlie       2: Send bQ bP=  to Alice and Charlie       
3: Upon reception of bQ  and cQ , compute  3: Upon reception of aQ  and cQ , compute  
 ( , )aK e bP cP=   ( , )bK e aP cP=  
                    Charlie side: 
1: Select a random integer [1, 1]c r∈ −  
2: Send cQ cP=  to Alice and Bob       
3: Upon reception of aQ  and bQ , compute  









The security of Algorithm 2.8 relies on the impossibility of computing ( , )
abc
e P P  given P, 
aP, bP and cP by an eavesdropper. This is an instance of the so-called Bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
Problem, whose intractability is the security basis of many pairing-based protocols. As will be 
evident later, the hardness of this problem implies the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman Problem. 
Definition 2.6. The Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (denoted by BDHP) is the problem of 
computing ( , )
xy
e P R given P, xP, yP and R. 
Definition 2.7. The (Computational) Diffie-Hellman Problem (denoted by DHP) is the problem 
of computing xyP  given P, xP, yP. 
Note that if the DHP can be solved in 1G , the value xyP  is available and ( , )
xy
e P R  can be 
easily computed as ( , )e xyP R . A similar conclusion is achieved for TG . Since the DHP can be 
easily solved if the DLP can be solved ( assumption P assumptionDLP DHP≥ , that is, DHP is not harder 
than the DLP), it can be concluded that assumption P assumption P assumptionDLP DHP BDHP≥ ≥ . Since 
nothing else is known about the difficulty of solving the BDHP, it is assumed to be as difficult as 
the DHP and that the security of pairing-based cryptographic schemes ultimately relies on the 
hardness of the DLP in 1G , 2G  and TG .     
Miller introduced in [Mil86b] an algorithm to evaluate rational functions on algebraic curves, 
enabling the efficient computation of pairings at linear complexity with respect to the input size 
(see also [Mil04]). Since then many optimizations have been proposed to improve the so called 
Miller’s algorithm by, for instance, reducing the loop length [HSV06, LLP09, Ver10] or 
constructing pairing-friendly elliptic curves [BN05, BW05, SB06]. 
When 1 2G G=  the pairing is called symmetric and is defined over supersingular curves. In 
this case, Tη  pairing is arguably the most efficient algorithm [BGO+07]. If, otherwise, 1 2G G≠ , 
the pairing is called asymmetric and is defined over ordinary elliptic curves. In this case, the 
optimized variants of the Tate pairing [BKL+02] (e.g., ate [HSV06], R-ate [LLP09], optimal ate 
[Ver10] pairing) achieve the highest performance.  
In this work, we focus on the efficient implementation of asymmetric pairings with ordinary 
curves (see Chapter 6). Accordingly, we will assume the following groups for the construction of 




F .  
For the case of ordinary curves, Barreto and Naehrig [BN05] proposed a large and easy-to-
generate family of elliptic curves (called BN curves) with embedding degree 12k = , which is 
optimal for implementing pairings at the 128-bit security level. For our analysis and tests we 
choose the optimal ate pairing algorithm [Ver10]. We stress, however, that according to our tests 









2.3.1.   Optimal Ate Pairing on BN Curves 
A Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve has the form: 
                                                               
2 3:BNE y x b= + ,                                                    (2.17) 
defined over  with 0b ≠  and embedding degree k = 12, where
4 3 236 36 24 6 1p u u u u= + + + + , 
prime order  and u∈Z .  
Let the map :p BN BNE Eπ →  be the p-power endomorphism ( , ) ( , )
p p
p x y x yπ = , [ ]BNE n  the 
n-torsion subgroup of BNE , BNE′  the sextic twist 2
2 3
/ :BN p
E y x b ξ′ = +F   with ξ  neither a 
cube nor a square in 2pF , 1G [ ] Ker( [1]) ( )[ ]BN p BN pE n E nπ= ∩ − = F , 2G  the preimage 
2( )[ ]BN p
E n′ F  of 12[ ] Ker( [ ]) ( )[ ]BN p BN pE n p E nπ∩ − ⊆ F  and 12
*
TG n p
µ= ⊂F  the group of n-th 
roots of unity. The optimal ate pairing on equation (2.17) is defined as [NNS10]:   
                     2 1 T: G G Gopta × →  




, [ ] , ( ) [ ] ( ), ( )




r Q r Q Q r Q Q Q
Q P f P l P l Pπ π π
−
+ −
→ ⋅ ⋅ ,                 (2.18) 
where 6 2r u= + ∈Z , , ( )r Qf P  is a normalized function with divisor ,( ) ( ) ([ ] )r Qf r Q r Q= − −
( 1)( )r − O  and 
1 2,Q Q
l  is the line arising in the addition of points 1Q  and 2Q  evaluated at point P. 
Precisely, Miller’s algorithm computes the function ,r Qf  using a double-and-add approach that 
involves the computation of point doublings, point additions and line evaluations. In Algorithm 
2.9, the so-called Miller loop corresponds to lines 2-4. The pairing computation is completed by the  
    




G , G , 6 2 2
r i
ii
P Q r u r
=
∈ ∈ = + =∑   
Output:   
  1: , 1T Q f← ←  
  2: For 2log 1i r= −    downto  0  do                                                          
  3:          
  4:          
  5:  
  6:  If 0u <  then 1,T T f f −← − ←                                                         
  7: 
1, 1
( ),T Qf f l P T T Q← ⋅ ← +  
  8: 
2, 2
( ),T Qf f l P T T Q−← ⋅ ← −  
  9:                                                           




36 36 18 6 1n u u u u= + + + +
0u <
( , )opta Q P
2
, ( ), 2T Tf f l P T T← ⋅ ←
,if 1 then ( ),i T Qr f f l P T T Q= ← ⋅ ← +
2
1 2( ), ( )p pQ P Q Qπ π← ←








final exponentiation, which corresponds to line 9 in the same algorithm. Note that the power 
 is factored in the exponents ,  and . 
 




3 Chapter 3 
New Precomputation Schemes 
This chapter revisits the problem of calculating precomputations efficiently when the base 
point(s) is not known in advance. There are two standard table forms used by most elliptic curve 
scalar multiplication methods in the literature: id P  
and i ic P d Q+ , where {, 0, 1,i ic d D∈ = ±  
}3, 5,..., m± ± ±  with m odd. In the first case, it is required the on-line calculation of the non-trivial 
points id P , where { }\ {0,1} 3,5,...,id D m
+∈ =
 
with m odd. In the second case, it is required (in 
the extreme case) the on-line calculation of the non-trivial points ,i ic P d Q±  where 
{ }, 0,1,3,5,...,i ic d D m
+∈ = , 1ic >  if 0id = , 1id >  if 0ic = , and m odd. The negative of these 
points can be computed on-the-fly at negligible cost. In the remainder, we will refer to these 
tables built with non-trivial points as simply id P  and ,i ic P d Q± respectively. Well-known 
methods to compute scalar multiplication using the former table are wNAF and Frac-wNAF in 
the case of single scalar multiplication, and the interleaving NAF method in the case of multiple 
scalar multiplication [HMV04]. Methods that employ a table with the form i ic P d Q±  are 
commonly intended for multiple scalar multiplication, such as the Joint Sparse Form (JSF) 
[Sol01] and its variants [KZZ04, OKN10]. 
In this chapter, we propose two novel methods for precomputing points and carry out an 
exhaustive analysis at different memory and security requirement levels: 
• The first scheme, referred to as Longa-Miri (LM) Scheme, is based on the special 








id P  using Jacobian coordinates on standard curves.  
• The second scheme, referred to as Longa-Gebotys (LG) Scheme, is based on the concept 
of conjugate addition in projective coordinates and offers superior flexibility since it can 
be applied to any curve form  and adapted to tables with forms id P  
and i ic P d Q± .  
The different schemes are adapted and analyzed (whenever relevant) in three possible 
scenarios (see Section 3.1.1): case 1, without using inversions; case 2, using only one inversion; 
and case 3, using multiple inversions. The analysis of the proposed schemes includes three 
curves of interest: Weiertrass curves using Jacobian coordinates J, extended Jacobi quartics 
using extended Jacobi quartic coordinates eJQ , and Twisted Edwards curves using inverted 
Edwards coordinates IE . 
This chapter is organized as follows. §3.1 discusses the most relevant previous work. §3.2 
introduces the LM precomputation scheme for standard curves using Jacobian coordinates, 
targeting the single scalar multiplication case. §3.3 introduces the LG precomputation scheme 
and discusses its applicability to different curves forms for both single and multiple scalar 
multiplication. §3.4 presents the performance analysis of the proposed schemes, including 
detailed comparisons with previous methods. §3.5 discusses other applications for conjugate 
additions. And, finally, some conclusions are drawn in §3.6.  
3.1. Previous Work 
In this section we summarize most relevant efforts in the literature to reduce the time complexity 
of the precomputation stage of scalar multiplication. We also recall the special addition by 
Meloni [Mel07], which is used here to build a novel precomputation scheme. We remark that, in 
the present work, we focus on methods that are efficient when the initial point P in the 
computation kP is not known in advance. 
3.1.1. Precomputation for Single Scalar Multiplication 
The most commonly used precomputation table has the form id P , where \{0,1}id D
+∈ =
{ }3,5,...,m , for some odd integer m. This table form can be found in most algorithms to compute 
scalar multiplication such as the wNAF and Frac-wNAF methods (see Section 2.2.4.3). 
The traditional approach is to compute the points by following the sequence P → 3P → 5P 
→ … → mP with the application of an addition with 2P at each step. Depending on the 
coordinate system(s) applied for the calculation, we can distinguish three different cases: 








potential advantage of having very low cost because no additional coordinate system 
conversion is required. However, because points are left in certain projective system, 
additions during the evaluation stage have general form and one cannot make use of 
efficient mixed addition or mixed doubling-addition operations. 
• Case 2: points are computed in some projective system and then converted to affine 
coordinates. The latter step is usually performed with the Montgomery’ simultaneous 
inversion method in order to reduce the number of inversions (see Alg. 2.26 of 
[HMV04]). In this scenario, precomputation cost is higher because of the conversion to 
affine step. However, the use of mixed additions (or mixed doubling-additions) allows 
reducing costs during the evaluation stage. 
• Case 3: points are computed and left in affine coordinates. This case is probably the most 
expensive approach of all three cases in terms of speed, mainly because inversion is 
especially expensive over prime fields. One potential advantage of this approach is that 
memory requirement is kept to a minimal.  
Cases 1 and 2 were studied by Cohen et al. [CMO98] when proposed the use of mixed 
coordinates to implement scalar multiplication on Weiertrass curves. In particular, Cohen et al. 
proposed two alternatives using different coordinate systems: 
1 2 3( , , ) ( , , )mC C C = J J C  and 
1 2 3( , , ) ( , , )mC C C = J J A , where 1C  represents the system to perform doublings, 2C  represents 
the system for every doubling before an addition, and 3C  represents the system to perform 
additions (in the evaluation and precomputation stages). In particular, the first approach, which 
computes precomputations in C coordinates (corresponding to case 1), was shown to be more 
efficient than the second approach using A coordinates combined with the Montgomery’ 
simultaneous inversion method (corresponding to case 2) always that 1I > 30M approximately.  
Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn in [CMO98] are somewhat outdated because mJ  
coordinates (proposed for the evaluation stage in both cases) do not provide any advantage if 
3a = − , as discussed in Section 2.2.4.2. Also, Cohen et al.’s approach to case 2 involves the use 
of Montgomery’s method over groups of points. However, a more popular alternative in recent 
years has been to apply the method to all points in the table so that the number of inversions is 
limited to only one. In this scenario, possible approaches are to compute precomputed points in 
J, C or H coordinates and then use Montgomery’s method over all the partial points.  
Very recently, Dahmen et al. [DOS07] proposed a highly efficient method (called the DOS 
method) and showed that it is more cost-effective than all other previous schemes using one 
inversion (case 2). Also, when compared to the approach using only A coordinates (case 3), the 
DOS method exhibits superior performance for a wide range of I/M ratios. The DOS method’s 
cost is 1 (10 1) (4 4)I L M L S+ − + + , where ( 1) / 2L m= −  is the number of non-trivial points in 








each “register” can store a field element). One disadvantage of the DOS method is that there is no 
straightforward version to compute points as in case 1.  
3.1.2. Special Addition with Identical Z Coordinate 
The following formula was proposed by Meloni in [Mel07]. Let 1 1( : : )P X Y Z=  and 
2 2( : : )Q X Y Z=  be two points with the same Z coordinate in J on an elliptic curve WE  defined 
over pF . The addition 3 3 3( : : )P Q X Y Z+ =  can be obtained as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )2 3 23 2 1 2 1 1 2 12X Y Y X X X X X= − − − − − , 
( ) ( ) ( )2 33 2 1 1 2 1 3 1 2 1Y Y Y X X X X Y X X = − − − − −  , 
( )3 2 1Z Z X X= − .                                                                                         (3.1) 
Remarkably, Meloni also noticed that one can extract from (3.1) a new representative of 
1 1( : : )P X Y Z=  given by ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 3,1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1,X X X Y X X Z X X− − − , which has identical Z 
coordinate to 3 3 3( : : )P Q X Y Z+ = . So one can continue applying the same formula recursively. 
The new addition only costs 5M + 2S, which represents a significant reduction in comparison 
with 8M + 3S (or 7M + 4S), corresponding to the mixed Jacobian-affine addition (see Table 2.2). 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly replace traditional additions with this special 
operation since, obviously, it is expected that additions are computed over operands with 
different Z coordinates during standard scalar multiplication. Hence, Meloni [Mel07] applied his 
formula to the context of scalar multiplication with star addition chains, where the particular 
sequence of operations allows the replacement of each traditional addition by formula (3.1) 
(referred to as Co-ADD Z  for the remainder, borrowing notation from [GMJ10]).  
Nevertheless, the author noticed in [Lon07] that the new addition can in fact be useful to 
devise new formulas for composite operations such as doubling-addition that are applicable to 
traditional scalar multiplication methods (see [Lon07] and also [LM08b]).  
In Section 3.2, we again exploit the Co-ADD Z  operation to build low-cost precomputation 
tables. The new approach is called LM Scheme, offers very low cost and can be easily adapted to 
cases 1 and 2, exhibiting higher performance and flexibility than the DOS method.  
3.1.3. Precomputation for Special Curves and Multiple Scalar 
Multiplication 
To the best of our knowledge, most research in the literature has only explored the efficiency of 








sequence P → 3P → 5P → … → mP can be easily adapted to special curves, it is still lacking a 
thorough performance analysis. In this work, we derive for first time the costs involved in 
computing the precomputed table on certain special curves using the traditional sequence and 
applying the most efficient point operations at our disposal. Moreover, we propose a new scheme 
based on the concept of “conjugate” additions (see Section 3.3). The new method is called LG 
Scheme and is shown to achieve the lowest costs on extended Jacobi quartics using eJQ  
coordinates and Twisted Edwards curves using IE  coordinates.  
For the case of multiple scalar multiplication, JSF-based methods need the calculation of a 
table of the form i ic P d Q± , where { }, 0,1,3,5,...,i ic d m∈  for some odd integer value m [KZZ04]. 
In [OTV05], Okeya et al. observed that an inversion can be saved when computing P Q±  in 
affine coordinates (which can be seen as an addition/conjugate addition in A). However, the 
derived scheme was basically intended for implementations using the affine representation only 
and, hence, inefficient when compared to cases using some projective system over prime fields. 
Recently, Järvinen et al. [JFS07] extended Okeya et al.’s idea of exploiting redundancies in affine 
formulae to precompute points. To get rid of the multiple inversions, they took advantage of 
Montgomery’ simultaneous inversion method and derived an efficient scheme for a table with the 
form dP lQ kR± ± , where , , {0,1}d l k ∈ . Hence, in its actual format their methodology only 
applies to that specific table form and is expected to be efficient on standard curves only since it 
is still based on affine formulae.     
Because the concept of “conjugate” addition, as discussed in this work, takes advantage of 
redundancies in the computation of P Q±  in projective coordinates, it naturally applies to 
precomputation tables that appear in multiple scalar multiplication algorithms and enables 
efficient computation over prime fields. In Section 3.3.3, we analyze the savings achieved with 
this approach and show its advantages in terms of computing cost. Moreover, we analyze for first 
time the performance of precomputation methods on certain special curves in this setting. 
Specifically, we study the case with Jacobi quartics using eJQ  coordinates and Twisted 
Edwards curves using IE  coordinates.   
 
NOTE: Okeya et al.’s idea is similar to the proposed concept of “conjugate” addition. However, 
their observation was restricted to affine coordinates whereas we discovered the idea of saving 
operations in the computation P Q±  when observing redundancies in projective coordinate 
formulae. In general, projective coordinates are largely preferred over prime fields (especially on 
special curves), so savings in these settings are more valuable.     
 
For the remainder of this chapter, we assume that curve parameters for the curves under 
analysis can be chosen such that the cost of multiplying a curve constant can be considered 








subtractions are neglected in our cost analysis. These assumptions greatly simplify our analysis 
without affecting the conclusions.        
3.2. Precomputation Scheme Based on the Addition with 
Identical Z Coordinate: LM Scheme 
The proposed scheme, computes the precomputed table as follows: 
                                                     2 2 2id P P P P P= + + + +… ,                                                (3.2) 
performing additions from right to left. We will show that all the additions in (3.2) can be 
computed with the Co-ADD Z  operation proposed by Meloni [Mel07], reducing costs in 
comparison with previous approaches.  
The direct scheme applying (3.2) and calculating the points in J coordinates is referred to as 
LM Scheme, case 1. Furthermore, although the author proposed in [Lon07, Section 3.4.1] a 
version of the method using only one inversion (case 2), in this work we observe that some 
values computed during the aforementioned additions can be efficiently exploited to minimize 
costs during conversion to A coordinates. In this regard, we present two new and optimized 
schemes which are referred to as LM Scheme, cases 2a and 2b.   
3.2.1. Method Description 
Our method can be summarized in the following two steps.  
Step 1: Computation of precomputed points in Jacobian coordinates 
Point P is assumed to be initially in A coordinates. By applying the mixed coordinates approach 
proposed in [CMO98], we can compute the point 2P required in (3.2) in J  as follows: 
2
2 2X α β= − ,  ( )
4
2 2 1Y X yα β= − − ,  2 1Z y=  ,                                                                      (3.3) 
where 
2
1(3 ) 2x aα = + , 
2 2 2 4
1 1 1 1( ) 2x y x yβ  = + − −  , and the input and result are 1 1( , )P x y=  
and 2 2 22 ( : : ) ( )pP X Y Z E= ∈ F , respectively. Formula (3.3) can be easily derived from the 
doubling formula (5.2), Section 5.4, by setting 1 1Z = , and has a cost of only 1 5 12M S A+ + . 
Note that, if 1 1 4M S A− < , then computing  β  as 21 1x y⋅  is more efficient with a total cost of 
2 4 8M S A+ + .   
Then, by fixing 1yλ =  in (2.10) we can set a point 
(1)
P  equivalent to P given by: 








whose computation does not involve additional costs since its coordinates have already been 
computed in (3.3). Following additions to compute points id P  are performed using the special 
addition Co-ADD Z  as follows:  
1
st
   Compute ( ) ( ) ( )(1) (1) (1)(1) 2 2 2 3 3 31 1 13 2 , , , , , ,P P P X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z= + = + =  : 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 3 2
(1) (1) (1)
3 2 2 2 21 1 12X Y Y X X X X X= − − − − − , 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 3
(1) (1) (1)
3 2 2 2 3 2 21 1 1Y Y Y X X X X Y X X
 
= − − − − − 
 
, 




Fix ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 3
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)(1)
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 1 1 12 , , , , , ,P X Y Z X X X Y X X Z X X X Y Z
 
= = − − − ≡ 
 
, 
and compute ( ) ( ) ( )(1) (1) (1)(1) 3 3 3 4 4 42 2 25 2 3 , , , , , ,P P P X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z= + = + =  :    
( ) ( ) ( )
2 3 2
(1) (1) (1) (1)
4 3 3 32 2 2 22X Y Y X X X X X= − − − − − , 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 3
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
4 3 3 4 32 2 2 2 2Y Y Y X X X X Y X X
 
= − − − − − 
 
, 
( )(1) (1)4 32 2Z Z X X= −  ,  ( )(1)4 3 2A X X= − ,  ( )
2
(1)
4 3 2B X X= − ,  ( )
3
(1)







   
Fix ( ) ( )( 2(( 3) / 2) (( 3) / 2) (( 3) / 2) (( 5) / 2) (( 5) / 2)(( 3) / 2) ( 1) / 22 2 2 2 22 , ,m m m m mm mP X Y Z X X X− − − − −− −= = − ,
( ) ( ))
3
(( 5) / 2) (( 5) / 2) (( 5) / 2) (( 5) / 2)
( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 22 2 2 2,
m m m m
m mY X X Z X X
− − − −
− −− −
 
≡  ( (( 5) / 2) (( 5) / 2)2 2, ,m mX Y− −
)(( 5) / 2)2 mZ − , and compute ( )(( 3) / 2) (( 3) / 2) (( 3) / 2)(( 3) / 2) 2 2 22 ( 2) , ,m m mmmP P m P X Y Z− − −−= + − = +
( ) ( )( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2 ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2, , , ,m m m m m mX Y Z X Y Z+ + + + + +=  : 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 3 2
(( 3) / 2) (( 3) / 2) (( 3) / 2) (( 3) / 2)
( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 22 2 2 22
m m m m
m m m mX Y Y X X X X X
− − − −
+ + + += − − − − − , 
( ) ( )
2
(( 3) / 2) (( 3) / 2) (( 3) / 2)
( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2 ( 3) / 22 2 2
m m m
m m m mY Y Y X X X X
− − −
+ + + +
 
= − − − − 
 
…  
                ( )
3
(( 3) / 2) (( 3) / 2)




+ −… ,  
( )(( 3) / 2) (( 3) / 2)( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 22 2m mm mZ Z X X− −+ += − ,   ( )(( 3) / 2)( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 2 2 mm mA X X −+ += − , 
( )
2
(( 3) / 2)
( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 2 2
m
m mB X X
−
+ += − ,   ( )
3
(( 3) / 2)
( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 2 2
m
m mC X X
−
+ += − . 
Intermediate values iA  and ( , )i iB C , for i = 4 to ( 3) / 2m + , are stored for LM Scheme, 
cases 2a and 2b, respectively, and used in Step 2 to save some computations when converting 








( , , )i i iA B C  nor executing Step 2. 
Step 2: Conversion to affine coordinates (cases 2a and 2b only) 
This step involves the conversion from J to A of points ( ): :i i iX Y Z  computed in Step 1, for i = 
3 to ( 3) / 2m + , 3m > , enabling the use of the efficient mixed addition operation during the 
evaluation stage of scalar multiplication. 
Conversion from J to A is achieved by applying 
2 3( / , / , 1)i i i iX Z Y Z  (see Section 2.2.4.2). 
Then, to avoid the computation of several expensive inversions we use a modified version of the 
Montgomery’s method of simultaneous inversion to limit the requirement to only one inversion 
for all the points in the precomputed table id P . 
In LM Scheme, case 2a, we first compute the inverse 1( 3) / 2mr Z
−
+= , and then recover every 
point using 
2 3( / , / , 1)i i i iX Z Y Z  as follows: 
mP :  2( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2m mx r X+ += ⋅ ,  
3
( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2m my r Y+ += ⋅ , 
(m−2)P : ( 3) / 2mr r A += ⋅ ,  
2
( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2m mx r X+ += ⋅ ,  
3
( 1) / 2 ( 1) / 2m my r Y+ += ⋅ , 
                           
3P :        4r r A= ⋅ ,  
2
3 3x r X= ⋅ ,  
3
3 3y r Y= ⋅ . 
It is important to observe that 3 4
j
j iiZ Z A== × ∏ , for j = 4 to ( 3) / 2m + , according to Step 1 
and, hence, for ( 2), ( 4), ,3i m m= − − … , the value 1( 3) / 2iZ
−
+  for each point iP is recovered at 
every multiplication ( 5) / 2ir A +⋅ .   
For LM Scheme, case 2b, we first compute ( )
2
1
1 ( 3) / 2mr Z
−
+=  and ( )
3
1
2 ( 3) / 2mr Z
−
+= , and then 
recover every point using 
2 3( / , / , 1)i i i iX Z Y Z  as follows: 
mP :  ( 3) / 2 1 ( 3) / 2m mx r X+ += ⋅ ,  ( 3) / 2 2 ( 3) / 2m my r Y+ += ⋅ , 
(m−2)P : 1 1 ( 3) / 2mr r B += ⋅ , 2 2 ( 3) / 2mr r C += ⋅ , ( 1) / 2 1 ( 1) / 2m mx r X+ += ⋅ , ( 1) / 2 2 ( 1) / 2m my r Y+ += ⋅ , 
                           
3P :  1 1 4r r B= ⋅ ,  2 2 4r r C= ⋅ ,  3 1 3x r X= ⋅ ,  3 2 3y r Y= ⋅ . 
In this case: 2 23 4
j




j iiZ Z C== ×∏ , for  j = 4  to  ( 3) / 2m + , according to 
Step 1 and, hence, for ( 2), ( 4), ,3i m m= − − … , the pair 2 3( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2( , )i iZ Z
− −
+ +  for each point iP is 
recovered with 1 ( 5) / 2ir B +⋅  and 2 ( 5) / 2ir C +⋅ .  








3.2.2. Cost Analysis 
The cost of the LM Scheme, case 1, is given by: 
                                            LM Scheme, case 1Cost (6 1) (3 5)L M L S= + + + ,                                 (3.4) 
where ( 1)/2L m= −  is the number of non-trivial points in the table id P . The cost (3.4) assumes 
the use of the addition (or doubling-addition) with stored values during the evaluation stage that 
requires precalculating values 
2
iZ  and 
3
iZ  (see Table 2.2). Otherwise, the cost can be reduced to 
only (5 1) (2 5)L M L S+ + + . In terms of memory usage (for temporary calculations and point 
storage), LM Scheme, case 1, requires (5 6)L +  registers if using the addition or doubling-
addition with stored values or
 
(3 6)L +  registers if using operations without stored values.  
The LM Scheme, case 2a, has the following cost: 
                                          LM Scheme, case 2aCost 1 (9 ) (3 5)I L M L S= + + + ,                               (3.5) 
In terms of memory usage, LM Scheme, case 2a, requires (3 3)L +  registers overall. In the 
case of LM Scheme, case 2b, the cost is as follows: 
                                          LM Scheme, case 2bCost 1 (9 ) (2 6)I L M L S= + + + ,                               (3.6) 
For this scheme, we require (4 1)L +  registers when L > 1. For L = 1, the requirement is fixed 
at 6 registers. It will be shown later that memory requirements of cases 2a and 2b do not exceed 
the memory allocated for scalar multiplication for small or intermediate values of L, whereas case 
1 does not exceed memory constraints in any case. For the detailed estimation of costs and 
memory requirements of the LM Scheme, cases 1, 2a and 2b, please refer to Appendix A2.  
For the record, the original scheme in [Lon07] has a cost of 1 (11 2) (3 5)I L M L S+ + + + . As 
can be seen in (3.5) and (3.6), the new LM Scheme variants represent an important improvement 
in terms of computing cost. In particular, case 2b achieves the lowest cost in scenarios using one 
inversion at the expense of some extra memory.  
Next, we analyze the memory requirements for scalar multiplication and determine if our 
method adjusts to such constraints.  
In the case of using general (doubling-additions) additions or general (doubling-additions) 
additions with stored values for the evaluation stage (i.e., case 1), scalar multiplication requires in 
total (3L+R) or (5L+R) registers, respectively, where R is the number of registers needed by the 
most memory-consuming point operation in a given implementation. In scalar multiplications 
using solely radix 2, addition and doubling-addition are usually such operations. Depending on 
the implementation details, these operations can require up to 8 registers [Lon08]. Consequently, 








and 5 6 5L L R+ ≤ +  for the two aforementioned cases.   
In the case of using mixed additions (or mixed doubling-addition) during evaluation (i.e., 
case 2), the total requirement of scalar multiplication is given by (2L+R) registers. Thus, LM 
Scheme, case 2b, adjusts to the previous requirements for small precomputed tables. If mixed 
addition or doubling-addition is the most memory-consuming operation then 4 1 2 7L L+ ≤ +  for 
3L ≤ . A similar analysis for case 2a allows us to verify that this scheme adjusts to memory 
constraints for 4L ≤ , which demonstrates that it is efficient for practical implementations based 
on fractional windows if n = 160 bits. Although cases 2a and 2b require more memory resources 
for higher values of L necessary in 256- and 512-bit scalar multiplications, we show in Section 
3.4.1 that these schemes still achieve the lowest costs for most scenarios for equivalent memory 
constraints.     
In Section 3.4, we analyze in great detail the performance of the proposed method in 
comparison with the best previous efforts on standard curves.  
3.3. Precomputation Scheme based on Conjugate Additions: 
LG Scheme 
The proposed scheme is based on the following simple observation: if P Q+  has been computed 
for two distinct points P, Q, the subtraction of those points only requires a few additional field 
operations. In the remainder, we will refer to this operation, namely ( ( ))P Q P Q− = + − , as 
“conjugate” addition and denote it by ADD′ . It will turn out that this operation allows the 
efficient computation of precomputed tables.  
Next, we describe the strategy of the conjugate addition in projective coordinates, and then 
discuss its application to computing tables of the form id P  and i ic P d Q± . 
3.3.1. The Strategy: Conjugate Addition using Projective Coordinates 
First, ( )P Q P Q− = + − . As the negative of a point only involves the change of at most one of the 
coordinate values in the projective representation (see Sections 2.2.4.2 and 2.2.5), it is then 
expected than computing P Q+  and P Q−  share most of the intermediate computations.  
Let us illustrate the latter with the point addition formula using J coordinates. Let 
1 1 1( : : )P X Y Z=  and 2 2 2( : : )Q X Y Z=  be two points on an elliptic curve /W pE F . If the 
addition 3 3 3( : : )P Q X Y Z+ =  is performed using the optimized addition formula: 
2 3 2 2
3 2 12X Z Xα β β= − − ,  
2 2 3 3
3 2 1 3 2 1( )Y Z X X Z Yα β β= − − ,  3Z θβ= ,                                  (3.7) 
where 
3 3
1 2 2 1Z Y Z Yα = − , 
2 2
1 2 2 1Z X Z Xβ = −  and 
2 2 2








computed as 1 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 4( ) ( : : ) ( : : ) ( : : )P Q X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z+ − = + − =  reusing the partial values 
3 2 2
2 1( 2 )Z Xβ β+ , 
2 2
2 1Z X β , 
3 3
2 1Z Y β , 3Z , 
3
1 2Z Y  and 
3
2 1Z Y . Thus, the conjugate addition can be 
computed with the following: 
 
2 3 2 2
4 2 12X Z Xγ β β= − − ,  
2 2 3 3
4 4 2 1 2 1( )Y X Z X Z Yγ β β= − − ,  4 3Z Z= ,                                   (3.8) 
where 3 31 2 2 1Z Y Z Yγ = + . Note that (3.8) only involves the extra cost of 1 1M S+ , which is 
significantly less than the cost of a general addition (3.7) (i.e., 11 5M S+ ). If we also consider 
other usually neglected operations, the cost drops from 11 5 9 1( 2) 1( 2)M S A+ + + × + ÷  to only 
1 1 4M S A+ + . In total, the addition/conjugate addition pair costs 12 6 13 1( 2) 1( 2)M S A+ + + × + ÷ . 
It may seem that performing this conjugate operation would involve several extra registers to 
store partial values temporarily. However, memory requirements can be minimized by 
performing P Q+  and P Q−  concurrently. For instance, a possible execution sequence for 
computing P Q±  using formulas (3.7) and (3.8) would be as the one shown in Table 3.1. 
The execution of the addition/conjugate addition pair detailed in Table 3.1 requires 8 registers 
only (including temporary registers and registers storing input/output coordinates), which is the 
same memory requirement of the addition formula alone. Thus, executing the conjugate addition 
does not increase the memory consumption in this case. Similar results are expected for other 
coordinate systems. 
Table 3.1. Pseudocode of an “interlaced” execution of an addition/conjugate addition pair in J.  
INPUT:  1 1 1( : : )P X Y Z=  
and  2 2 2( : : )Q X Y Z= ; 1 1T X← , 2 1T Y← , 3 1T Z← , 4 2T X← , 5 2T Y← , 6 2T Z←  
OUTPUT:  3 3 3 1 2 3( : : ) ( : : )P Q X Y Z T T T+ = =  
and 4 4 4 4 5 3( : : ) ( : : )P Q X Y Z T T T− = =  
  1.  27 3T T=              
2
1{ }Z  12.  8 1 8T T T= ×       
2
2 1{ }Z X  23.  
2
1 6T T=                   
2{ }α  
  2.  4 4 7T T T= ×        
2
1 2{ }Z X  13.  7 4 8T T T= −  
    { }β  24.  1 1 4T T T= −             3{ }X  
  3.  8 3 7T T T= ×        
3
1{ }Z  14.  3 3 / 2T T=  
       { }θ  25.  7 2 7T T T= ×            
3 3
2 1{ }Z Y β  
  4.  5 5 8T T T= ×        
3
1 2{ }Z Y  15.  3 3 7T T T= ×  
     3 4{ }Z Z=  26.  2 8 1T T T= −    
2 2
2 1 3{ }Z X Xβ −  
  5.  28 6T T=              
2
2{ }Z  16.  
2
6 7T T=            
2{ }β  27.  2 2 6T T T= ×   
2 2
2 1 3{ ( )}Z X Xα β −  
  6.  7 7 8T T T= +        
2 2
1 2{ }Z Z+  17.  7 6 7T T T= ×      
3{ }β  28.  2 2 7T T T= −            3{ }Y  
  7.  3 3 6T T T= +        1 2{ }Z Z+  18.  8 6 8T T T= ×      
2 2
2 1{ }Z X β  29.  
2
6 5T T=                   
2{ }γ  
  8.  23 3T T=              
2
1 2{ ( ) }Z Zω = +  19.  4 82T T=          
2 2
2 1{2 }Z X β  30.  4 6 4T T T= −            4{ }X  
  9.  3 3 7T T T= −        
2 2
1 2{ }Z Zω = −  20.  4 4 7T T T= +     
3 2 2
2 1{ 2 }Z Xβ β+  31.  8 4 8T T T= −    
2 2
4 2 1{ }X Z X β−  
10.  6 6 8T T T= ×        
3
2{ }Z  21.  6 5 2T T T= −      
{ }α  32.  8 5 8T T T= ×    
2 2
4 2 1{ ( )}X Z Xγ β−  
11.  2 2 6T T T= ×        
3
2 1{ }Z Y  22.  5 5 2T T T= +      { }γ








We have derived conjugate addition formulas in projective coordinates (J, eJQ  and IE 
coordinates) and in affine for the three curves under analysis. The costs of the different variants 
of addition/conjugate addition pairs are summarized in Table 3.2. Note that, in some cases, the 
traditional operations have been slightly modified so that the cost of the overall formula is 
minimized. Refer to Appendix A3 for complete details. 




Standard curve  
(a = −3), J 
Twisted Edwards 
(a = 1), IE 
Ext. Jacobi quartic 
(d = 1), eJQ  
 ADD-ADD′ , ± →P P P  12M + 6S 14M + 1S 9M + 5S 
 [ , ]ADD-ADD M S
′ , ± →P P P  11M + 5S  - 9M + 4S 
 [2,2]ADD-ADD
′ , ± →P P P  10M + 4S - - 
 mADD-mADD′ , ± →P A P  8M + 5S 13M + 1S 8M + 4S 
 mmADD-mmADD′ , ± →A A P  5M + 3S 11M 6M + 4S 
 ADD-ADD′ , ± →A A A      1I + 4M + 2S (1) 1I + 13M + 1S 1I + 10M + 4S 
      (1) Formula in affine coordinates from [OTV05]. P: projective coordinates (J, eJQ  or IE). 
In the following section, we introduce novel precomputation schemes for tables with the 
forms id P  and i ic P d Q±  that take advantage of the new conjugate formulas. We again consider 
all three precomputation scenarios, i.e., cases 1, 2 and 3. 
3.3.2. Precomputation Scheme for Table of the Form diP 
We propose a recursive scheme that first reaches a “strategic” point and then applies efficiently 
the conjugate addition technique described in the previous section. In the following, we define as 
“strategic” to those points that can be efficiently computed and from which it is possible to 
calculate the maximum possible number of precomputed points at the lowest cost. The steps of 
our scheme are detailed in the following.  
Step 1: Computation of precomputed points 
The main body of our scheme is detailed in Algorithm 3.1. In this step, points can be computed in 
projective coordinates using operations from Tables 2.2, 2.3 or 2.4 (case 1), or directly in A 








executed right after. 
Basically, Algorithm 3.1 first reaches certain “strategic” point and then computes all the 
points that are close to it by efficiently computing additions and conjugate additions. The 
“strategic” points S proposed in our scheme have the form 1 2i iP P+ = , for 0i ∈ ≥Z  and 0 3P P=  
(that is, max{6 ,12 ,24 , , , , }P P P rP r P= … …S ), which are computed using a combination of one 
tripling (performed at the beginning; step 2 of Algorithm 3.1) and a sequence of doublings (step 
11). Note that there is a minimum number of close points that makes the computation of a 
“strategic” point worthwhile. If that minimum is not fulfilled (evaluation in step 5) then the 
algorithm calculates the remaining points from the previous “strategic” point (loop in steps 6-8). 
The value of such a minimum depends on the particular costs of point operations. For J, eJQ  
and IE coordinates, we have determined that the lowest cost is achieved if the next “strategic” 
point is computed always that the value m is greater or equal to such a “strategic” point (i.e., if 
2m r≥ ), in which case steps 10-19 are executed. 
Let us illustrate the proposed scheme with the following example. 
Example 3.1. If m = 13, Algorithm 3.1 computes the first points as 3 6P P P→ → , where 6P is 
the first “strategic” point. From this, 5P and 7P (close points) are calculated by adding 
6 ( )P P+ −  and 6P P+ . Note that the latter operations can be calculated with a low cost 
addition/conjugate addition pair. Then, Algorithm 3.1 calculates the following “strategic” point 
(since m > 12) by doubling max6 12P P r P→ = , and finally computes close points 9P, 11P and 
13P by performing 12 ( 3 )P P+ − , 12 ( )P P+ −  and 12P P+ , respectively. Again the last two 
operations can also be computed with an addition/conjugate addition pair. 
In Appendix A4, we have sketched the derivation of points for tables with different values m. 
Note that the described method does not include the case m = 5. For a table with m = 5, eJQ  and 
J coordinates, it is more efficient to compute points by performing 2 4P P P→ → , and then 
obtaining 3P and 5P with an addition/conjugate addition pair (i.e., 4 ( )P P+ −  and 4P P+ ). For 
the case IE, we suggest to compute the table following the sequence 2 3 5P P P P→ → → .  
Step 2: Conversion to affine coordinates (case 2 only) 
If mixed addition (or mixed DBLADD) is significantly more efficient than general addition (or 
general DBLADD) in a given setting, then it could be convenient to express the precomputed 
table in A coordinates. 
It is known that conversion to A can be achieved by calculating 2 3( / , / )i i i iX Z Y Z , 
2( / , / )i i i iX Z Y Z  and ( / , / )i i i iZ X Z Y  for points in J, 
eJQ  and IE coordinates, respectively. For 








Algorithm 3.1.  Computation of precomputed points using the LG Scheme 
Input: a point P in affine coordinates, and 
           an odd value 5m ≠  to build a table of the form id P , where {3,5,7, , }id m∈ …  
Output: the precomputed table 1 ( 1) / 2{ 3 , , }mT T P T mP−= = =…  in P or A coordinates 
  1:  r = 3,  l = 1,  i = 2,  n = v = 0  
  2: 0T P= ,  1T rP=  
  3: 1R T=  
  4: While  n < (m – 3)/2              
  5:         If 2m r<  
  6:                 While n < (m – 3)/2 
  7:                         s lT R T= +  
  8:                          n = n + 1,  1l l= + ,  1s s= +  
  9:         Else 
10:                 t = 2
v
 
11:                 R = 2R,  v = v + 1,  r = 2r,   j = t −1,   first = 1 
12:                 While 0j ≥  do 
13:                          Ti = R – Tj ,  n  = n + 1 
14:                          If  first = 1, then 1l j= + , s r i= − ,  first = 0 
15:                          1i i= +  
16:                          If 2 1m r j≥ + + , then 
17:                                  T(r + 2j) / 2 = R + Tj ,  n  = n + 1 
18:                                  If  Tj = T0  then  1i i= +  
19:                          1j j= −  
20: Return 1 ( 1) / 2{ , , }mT T T −= …  
 
the Montgomery’s method of simultaneous inversion. In this way, the number of expensive 
inversions can be limited to only one. 
 First, we compute the inverse 
1
1 2( )tU u u u
−= … , where iu  are all distinct denominators of 
the conversion expressions above (without considering exponents) from all the non-trivial points 
in the table {3P, 5P, …, mP}. For J and eJQ , the number of such denominators reduces to only 
( 1) / 2t m c= − − , where c is the number of points computed via conjugate addition, since points 
computed with addition/conjugate addition pairs share the same Z coordinate (see Appendix A3). 
For IE, 1t m= −  as each point has two distinct denominators, namely iX  and iY .  
Then, individual denominators iu  are recovered from U and scaled with the corresponding 
exponent (if any), and the results are finally multiplied to their corresponding numerator 








Thus, the use of conjugate additions reduces the cost of the Montgomery’s method for J and 
eJQ . Following the details above, it can be verified that one saves (4 1 )M S+  and (3 1 )M S+  
per point computed with a conjugate addition using J and eJQ  coordinates, respectively.   
3.3.2.1. Cost Analysis  
The “generic” costs of the proposed scheme, cases 1-3 and case 2, are given by: 
LG Scheme, cases 1/3Cost 1TPL ( 2)DBL + (2 1)ADD + ( 1)ADD-ADDL Lω ε ε ′= + − − + − − ,         (3.9) 
LG Scheme, case 2Cost 1TPL ( 2)DBL + (2 1)ADD + ( 1)ADD-ADD CostL Lω ε ε →′= + − − + − − + P A ,                      
                                                                                                                                                  (3.10) 
respectively, where 5m > , ( 1) / 2L m= − , 
2
max 3 2r
ω−= ×  is the value of the highest “strategic” 
point, ( )max max max max(6 2 3) /(6 3) 1 2 /3 ( / 3) 1L r r L r rε = + − − + − + −    is the total number of 
regular additions and Cost →P A  denotes the cost of converting points from projective to affine 
coordinates and is defined by the following formulas for J, eJQ  and IE coordinates: 
                                         Cost 1 (6 4 3) ( )I L c M L c S→ = + − − + −J A ,                                    (3.11)           
                                       Cost 1 (5 3 3) (2 )e I L c M L c S→
= + − − + −
JQ A
,                               (3.12)         
                                         Cost 1 (6 ( 2) / 1)I L L L M→ = + + − −  IE A ,                                    (3.13) 
respectively, where 1c L ε= − −  represents the number of conjugate additions. Formulas (3.9) 
and (3.10) can be refined further for cases 1 and 2 with the use of mixed coordinates (case 2 
additionally includes the cost of conversion to affine, i.e., Cost →P A ):  
LG Scheme, case 1(2)Cost 1mTPL ( 2)DBL + ( 2)mADD-mADD +ω ω ′= + − − …                                                                   
                                    ( )1 ADD-ADD (2 1)ADD ( Cost )L Lε ω ε →′− − + + − + +… P A .         (3.14) 
Please, refer to Appendix A5 for the proof. We remark that cost formula (3.14) is generalized 
to any projective system. Hence, depending on the curve form selected, some additional speed-
ups are available. Let us discuss some of these optimizations in the context of J coordinates. 
First, when performing additions with a “strategic” point Q, the values 2QZ  and 
3
QZ  are calculated 
in the first mixed addition, say ( : : ) ( , )Q Q Q P PQ P X Y Z x y+ = + . Then, following general 
additions of the form ( : : ) ( : : )Q Q Q R R RQ R X Y Z X Y Z+ = +   can be executed using [1,1]ADD  in 
case 1 and save (1 1 )M S+
 
per operation. This can be optimized further by using [2,2]ADD  








employs additions with stored values and all values 
2
iZ  and 
3
iZ  need to be precomputed in case 
2. Also, one squaring can be saved every time a doubling 2 jP  is performed to get a “strategic” 
point since the value 2jZ  can be obtained from the initial tripling or the mixed addition preceding 
this doubling. Moreover, as observed before addition and conjugate addition formulas share the 
same Z coordinate. Hence, in case 2 we only require (1 1 )M S+  to get 2iZ  and 
3
iZ  for two points 
computed with an addition/conjugate addition pair. Similar savings apply to conversion to affine 
for case 1, where one saves (4 1 )M S+  per conjugate addition as discussed in the previous 
section. By applying these optimizations to (3.14) with (3.11), we obtain the following cost 
formulas for the LG Scheme, cases 1 and 2, using Jacobian coordinates:  
LG Scheme, , case 1Cost (9 2) + (3 5 4)L M L Sε ω ε ω= + + + + + −J ,                                              (3.15) 
LG Scheme, , case 2Cost 1 (13 3 5) + (4 4 1)I L M L Sε ε ω= + + + + + −J .                                          (3.16) 
Note that it is still possible to optimize further cost (3.16) for case 2 if every addition with 3P 
is computed with [1,1]ADD  by reusing values 
2
3PZ  and 
3
3PZ  computed in the tripling operation. 
This saves an extra (1 1 )M S+
 
per addition with 3P. 
The following optimizations to cost formula (3.14) using eJQ  coordinates are analogous to 
the ones described for J coordinates. First, one squaring can be saved every time a doubling 2 jP  
is performed to get a “strategic” point by noting that 
2
( )j jX Z+  can be obtained from the initial 
tripling or the mixed addition preceding this doubling. Also, when performing additions with a 
“strategic” point Q, the value 
2
( )Q QX Z+  is calculated in the first mixed addition. Then, each 
extra addition with the same point Q can be executed using [0,1]ADD  in case 1 and save 1S  per 
operation. This can be optimized further by using [0,2]ADD  instead and save 2S  per general 
addition if one assumes that the evaluation stage employs additions with stored values and all 
values 
2( )i iX Z+  need to be precomputed in case 2. Thus, the optimized costs of the LG 
Scheme, case 1 and case 2, using extended Jacobi quartic coordinates are given by:  
LG Scheme, , case 1
Cost (5 2 1) + ( 2 5 5)e L M L Sε ω ε ω= + + + + + −
JQ
,                                           (3.17) 
LG Scheme, , case 2
Cost 1 (8 4 1) + (3 2 4 1)e I L M L Sε ω ε ω= + + + + + + −
JQ
.                                 (3.18) 
Again, it is still possible to optimize further cost (3.18) for case 2 if every addition with 3P is 
computed with [0,1]ADD  by reusing the value 
2
3 3( )P PX Z+  computed in the tripling operation. 
This saves an extra squaring
 
per addition with 3P. 
In Table 3.3 we list the cost of the LG Scheme for various values L using the derived 
formulas (3.15), (3.16), (3.17), (3.18). Costs for IE coordinates can be obtained by simply 








affine are relatively expensive in extended Jacobi quartic and Twisted Edwards curves (see Table 
3.2), we only show the performance of case 3 in the setting of standard curves estimated with 
formula (3.9). In Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we carry out an exhaustive evaluation of this method’s 
performance. 
Table 3.3. Costs of the LG precomputation scheme: case 1 in projective coordinates using J, 
eJQ and IE; case 2 using one inversion; and case 3 in A. 
 
L 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
J eJQ  IE J eJQ  IE Standard curve 
3 17M + 17S 15M + 17S 22M + 8S 1I + 27M + 18S 1I + 24M + 20S 1I + 40M + 8S 3I + 13M + 8S 
7 40M + 32S 34M + 32S 51M + 14S 1I + 64M + 33S 1I + 57M + 37S 1I + 93M + 14S 6I + 23M + 14S 
15 85M + 57S 71M + 57S 108M + 22S 1I + 139M + 60S 1I + 122M + 68S 1I + 198M + 22S 11I + 41M + 24S 
 
3.3.3. Precomputation Scheme for Table of the Form ciP±diQ 
This scenario mainly applies to methods for computing multiple scalar multiplication such as 
those based on JSF [Sol01, OKN10, SEI10]. In this case, the application of our strategy of 
conjugate additions is straightforward since precomputed points have the form i ic P d Q±  and 
each point pair i ic P d Q+  and i ic P d Q−  with , 0i ic d ≠  can be computed with an addition/ 
conjugate addition pair. Points ic P  
and id Q  are computed using the chain P → P+2P = 3P → 
3P+2P = 5P → … → (m−2)P+2P = mP. Interestingly enough, we note that, for the case of 
Jacobian coordinates with 5m ≥ , this chain can be performed using the LM Scheme and, thus, 
reduce the costs further.   
In the following, we analyze the cost involved when precomputing points for the window-
based JSF [OKN10, SEI10]. Extension of the method to similar table forms easily follows.  
3.3.3.1. Cost Analysis  
First, a precomputed table i ic P d Q± , where { }, 0,1,3,5,...,i ic d D m
+∈ = , 1ic >  if 0id = , 1id >  
if 0ic =  and m odd, consists of 
2( 4 1) / 2L m m= + −  non-trivial points. For example, assuming 
that both P and Q are unknown before execution, if m = 3 one needs to precompute ten points: 
3P , 3Q , P Q± , 3P Q± , 3P Q±  and 3 3P Q± . Recall that the negative of these points can be 
computed on-the-fly at negligible cost and, hence, are not included in the table. 









LG Scheme, cases 1/3(2)
( 1) 1







′= − + − +   
P A ,           
                                                                                                                                                  (3.19) 
where 2( 4 1) / 2 1L m m= + − >  and again Cost →P A  (that only applies to case 2) denotes the cost 
of converting points from projective to affine coordinates and is defined by cost formulas (3.11), 
(3.12) and (3.13) for J, eJQ  and IE, respectively. For these formulas, 2( 1) / 4c m= + . Cost 
(3.19) assumes that points i ic P d Q±  for which ic  or 0id =  are computed using the chain P → 
P+2P = 3P → 3P+2P = 5P → … → (m−2)P+2P = mP. As mentioned before, one can apply the 
LM Scheme to this computation when using J coordinates. The cost of this combined LG/LM 
Scheme is given by ( 5)m ≥ : 
2
LG Scheme, ,cases 1(2) Co
( 1)






′= − + −J J A (3.20) 
where 2Cost2 [2 ( 4) 1] [( 1) / 4 2]m m M m S→ = + − + + +J A  applies to case 2 only and represents 
the cost of converting points from Jacobian to affine coordinates using a modified Montgomery’ 
simultaneous inversion method that has been adapted to case 2b of LM Scheme and the use of 
conjugate additions. Please, refer to Appendix A6 for the proof and extended details. 
We remark that further optimizations are possible, such as the use of mixed coordinates or 
efficient tripling formulas. Similarly, certain coordinate systems such as J and eJQ  allow again 
the use of efficient addition formulas with stored values, following the same optimizations 
described in Section 3.3.2.1. 
In Table 3.4, we show the cost performance of the proposed scheme for the curve forms 
under analysis and considering the discussed optimizations. As operations in affine are relatively 
expensive in eJQ  and IE coordinates, we only show the performance of case 3 in the setting of 
standard curves. We carry out the evaluation of this method’s performance in Section 3.4.3. 
Table 3.4. Cost of the LG precomputation scheme for tables of the form i ic P d Q± : case 1 in 
projective coordinates; case 2 using one inversion; and case 3 in affine coordinates. 
 
L 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 
J eJQ  IE J eJQ  IE Standard curve 
2 6M + 4S 6M + 8S 11M  1I + 10M + 4S 1I + 10M + 7S 1I + 22M 1I + 4M + 2S 
10 42M + 32S 41M + 35S 65M + 9S 1I + 80M + 35S 1I + 76M + 43S 1I + 125M + 9S 6I + 30M + 16S 








3.4. Performance Comparison 
3.4.1. Evaluation of LM and LG Schemes on Standard Curves 
There are different schemes to compute precomputed points on standard curves in the literature 
(see Section 3.1.1). The simplest approaches suggest performing computations in A or C 
coordinates using the chain P → 3P → 5P → … → mP. The latter requires one doubling and 
( 1)/2L m= −  additions, which can be expressed as follows in terms of field operations:  
                                         Cost ( 1) (2 2) ( 2)L I L M L S= + + + + +A ,                                      (3.21) 
                                                Cost (10 1) (4 5)L M L S= − + +C .                                             (3.22)  
Note that (3.22) shows a better performance than the estimated cost given by [DOS07] since 
we are considering that the initial doubling 2P is computed as 2A → C with a cost of 2M + 5S, 
the first addition P + 2P computed with a mixed addition as A + C → C (7 4 )M S+ , and the 
following ( 1)L −  additions as C + C → C (10 4 )M S+ . The new operation costs are obtained by 
applying the technique of replacing multiplications by squarings [LM08]. The memory 
requirements of the A- and C-based methods are (2 )L R+  and (5 )L R+  registers, respectively, 
where R is again the memory requirement of the most memory-demanding point operation used 
for scalar multiplication.  
Let us first compare the performance of the proposed methods with approaches using several 
inversions (case 3). In this case, we show in Table 3.5 the performance comparison of the LG 
Scheme, case 3, with the traditional A-based approach whose cost is given by (3.21). Also, the 
I/M ratios for which the traditional, LG and LM methods achieve the lowest cost are shown at the  
Table 3.5. Costs of different schemes using multiple inversions (case 3) and I/M ranges for 
which each scheme achieves the lowest cost on a standard curve form (1M = 0.8S). 
# Points (L) 2 3 (w = 4) 6 7 (w = 5) 14 15 (w = 6) 
LG Scheme (case 3) 3I + 12.8M 3I + 19.4M 6I + 31.4M 6I + 34.2M 11I + 57.4M 11I + 60.2M 
Traditional (3.21) 3I + 9.2M 4I + 12M 7I + 20.4M 8I + 23.2M 15I + 42.8M 16I + 45.6M 
I/M range (LM, case 2b) I > 8.4M I > 8.6M I > 8M I > 9M I > 9.6M I > 10.4M 
I/M range (LG, case 3) - 7.4M < I < 8.6M - 5.5M < I < 9M 3.7M < I < 9.6M 2.9M < I < 10.4M 








bottom of the table. Note that we are including in the comparison LM Scheme, case 2b, to 
determine the efficiency gained by using an approach based on only one inversion (case 2). 
An important result from Table 3.5 is that the LM Scheme, case 2b, outperforms approaches 
using several inversions for a wide range of I/M ratios. In general, this method is superior always 
that inversion is more than 8-10 times the cost of multiplication, which holds on the majority of 
implementations over prime fields. On the other hand, the LG Scheme, case 3, is only suitable for 
low/intermediate values I/M. 
Now, let us evaluate methods for case 1, and consider the C-based approach, whose cost is 
given by (3.22), for our comparisons. In this case, we should also consider the cost of scalar 
multiplication as the evaluation stage in C coordinates has a cost different to our methods. 
When precomputations are in C, Cohen et al. [CMO98] proposed the use of J + C → mJ  to 
perform additions (10M + 6S), 2 m →J J  (2M + 5S) to every doubling preceding an addition, 
and 2 m m→J J  (3M + 5S) to the rest of doublings. Again, we have reduced the cost of these 
operations by applying the technique discussed in [LM08] to trade multiplications for squarings. 
Using this scheme the scalar multiplication cost including precomputations (3.22) is as follows: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )Frac- NAF Frac- NAF12 11 1 3 5 10 1 4 5w wn M S n M S L M L Sδ δ ⋅ + + − + +  − + +    .       (3.23) 
In the case of LG and LM Schemes, case 1, we consider the use of addition with stored 
values. Thus, the approximated cost of scalar multiplication is given by: 
Frac- NAF Frac- NAF
[1,1] scheme, case 1
( 1) ( 1)
DBL mADD ADD Cost
( 1) ( 1)
w wn L nn
L L
δ δ    − −
⋅ + + +    
+ +    
,    (3.24) 
where 1DBL 3 5M S= + , 1mADD 7 4M S= + , [1,1]1ADD 10 4M S= +  (as in Table 2.2) and 
scheme, case 1Cost  is given by (3.4) or (3.15) for LM and LG Schemes, respectively.  
Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 show the costs of performing an n-bit scalar multiplication using the 
different methods above (case 1) for n = 160, 256 and 512 bits, respectively. We show results for  
Table 3.6. Performance comparison of LG and LM Schemes with the C-based method (case 1) in 
160-bit scalar multiplication on a standard curve form (1M = 0.8S). 
# Points (L) 2 3 (w = 4) 4 5 6  7 (w = 5) 
 LM Scheme, case 1 1573M 1546M 1540M 1534M 1529M 1524M 
 LG Scheme, case 1 1577M 1547M 1545M 1544M 1537M 1526M 








Table 3.7. Performance comparison of LG and LM Schemes with the C-based method (case 1) in 
256-bit scalar multiplication on a standard curve form (1M = 0.8S). 
# Points (L) 2 3 (w = 4) 4 5 6 7 (w = 5) 8 
 LM Scheme, case 1 2505M 2457M 2443M 2428M 2414M 2401M 2400M 
 LG Scheme, case 1 2509M 2458M 2448M 2438M 2422M 2403M 2407M 
 C-based [CMO98] 2607M 2541M 2521M 2503M 2489M 2476M 2477M 
 
# Points (L) 9 10  11  15 (w = 6) 
 LM Scheme, case 1 2399M 2398M 2397M 2397M 
 LG Scheme, case 1 2410M 2414M 2418M 2397M 
 C-based [CMO98] 2479M 2481M 2484M 2498M 
Table 3.8. Performance comparison of LG and LM Schemes with the C-based method (case 1) in 
512-bit scalar multiplication on a standard curve form (1M = 0.8S). 
# Points (L) 2 3 (w = 4) 4 5 6 7 (w = 5) 8 
 LM Scheme, case 1 4991M 4887M 4849M 4811M 4774M 4740M 4730M 
 LG Scheme, case 1 4995M 4887M 4854M 4821M 4783M 4742M 4736M 
 C-based [CMO98] 5184M 5040M 4986M 4938M 4895M 4857M 4846M 
 
# Points (L) 9 10 11 12 13 14  15 (w = 6) 
 LM Scheme, case 1 4719M 4709M 4700M 4690M 4681M 4673M 4665M 
 LG Scheme, case 1 4731M 4725M 4721M 4710M 4694M 4679M 4665M 
 C-based [CMO98] 4836M 4827M 4819M 4812M 4805M 4800M 4794M 
 
all the possible and practical values L. Also, note that all the methods considered exhibit the same 
memory requirement, namely, 5L + R.  
As we can see above, the LM method, case 1, achieves the highest performance in all the 








Also, it is important to note that LG Scheme’s performance is comparable (or equivalent) to that 
of LM Scheme in several cases. The latter especially holds for standard window values w (L = 3, 
7, 15).  
Let us now compare methods using one inversion only (case 2). Previous methods in this 
scenario perform computations in H, J or C coordinates and then convert the points to A by 
using Montgomery’ simultaneous inversion method to limit the number of inversions to one. 
Costs of these methods are extracted from [DOS07] (assuming that 1S = 0.8M): 
Cost 1 (16 3) (3 5) 1 (18.4 1)I L M L S I L M→ = + − + + = + +H A ,                                            (3.25) 
Cost 1 (16 5) (5 5) 1 (20 1)I L M L S I L M→ = + − + + = + −J A ,                                              (3.26) 
Cost 1 (16 4) (5 5) 1 (20 )I L M L S I L M→ = + − + − = +C A .                                                    (3.27) 
Recently, Dahmen et al. [DOS07] proposed a new scheme, known as DOS, whose 
computations are efficiently performed using formulae in affine solely. This scheme has a low 
memory requirement given by (2 4)L +  registers and computing cost: 
DOSCost 1 (10 1) (4 4) 1 (13.2 2.2)I L M L S I L M= + − + + = + + ,                                           (3.28) 
that shows its superiority when compared to methods (3.25), (3.26), (3.27) requiring only one 
inversion. However, the proposed LM Scheme achieves even lower computing costs given by 
LM, case 2aCost 1 (11.4 4)I L M= + +  and LM, case 2bCost 1 (10.6 4.8)I L M= + +  
(assuming that 1S 
= 0.8M in formulas (3.5) and (3.6)). Therefore, LM Scheme (specifically, case 2b) achieves the 
lowest cost in the literature when the number of inversions is limited to one. LM Scheme, case 
2a, also achieves high performance with the advantage of requiring less memory. 
The previous comparison applies to scenarios where memory is not limited. For applications 
with strict memory constraints, it would be more realistic to compare methods for a certain 
number of available registers. In Table 3.9, the cost of each method is restricted by the maximum 
number of registers available for the evaluation stage. For each method, we show the total cost of 
performing a 160-bit scalar multiplication and the optimal number of precomputed points L when 
considering that a maximum of (2 )ESL R+  registers are available for the evaluation stage (i.e., 
ESL L≤ ). For our analysis, we set R = 7. Also, to compare the performance of schemes using no 
inversions (case 1) with methods using one inversion (case 2), we include costs of the most 
efficient scheme found for case 1 (i.e., LM Scheme, case 1; see Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8) and show 
at the bottom of each table the I/M range for which LM Scheme, case 1, would achieve the 








Table 3.9. Performance comparison of LG and LM Schemes with the DOS method in 160-bit 
scalar multiplication for different memory constraints on a standard curve (1M = 0.8S). 
# Registers ( )
ES
L  11 (2) 13 (3) 15 (4) 17 (5) 19 (6) 
Method L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost 
LM, case 2b 2 1I + 1506M 3 1I + 1481M 3 1I + 1481M 4 1I + 1476M 4 1I + 1476M 
LM, case 2a 2 1I + 1507M 3 1I + 1483M 4 1I + 1479M 4 1I + 1479M 5 1I + 1476M 
LG, case 2 2 1I + 1511M 3 1I + 1486M 4 1I + 1489M 5 1I + 1494M 6 1I + 1489M 
DOS [DOS07] 2 1I + 1509M 3 1I + 1486M 4 1I + 1484M 5 1I + 1483M 5 1I + 1483M 
LM, case 1 1 1596M 1 1596M 1 1596M 2 1573M 2 1573M 
I/M range (LM, case1) I > 90M I > 115M I > 117M I > 97M I > 97M 
 
# Registers ( )
ES
L  23 (8) 27 (10) 29 (11) 39 (16) ≥ 41 (17) 
Method L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost 
LM, case 2b 5 1I + 1473M 6 1I + 1470M 7 1I + 1469M 7 1I + 1469M 7 1I + 1469M 
LM, case 2a 6 1I + 1474M 6 1I + 1474M 6 1I + 1474M 6 1I + 1474M 6 1I + 1474M 
LG, case 2 7 1I + 1481M 7 1I + 1481M 7 1I + 1481M 7 1I + 1481M 7 1I + 1481M 
DOS [DOS07] 5 1I + 1483M 5 1I + 1483M 5 1I + 1483M 5 1I + 1483M 5 1I + 1483M 
LM, case 1 3 1546M 4 1540M 4 1540M 6 1529M 7 1524M 
I/M range (LM, case1) I > 73M I > 70M I > 71M I > 60M I > 55M 
 
From results in Tables 3.9, A.1, and A.2 that target case 2, it can be seen that LM Scheme 
achieves the lowest cost for most cases for different security levels (lowest cost per register 
allowance is shown in bold). For n = 160 bits, the LM Scheme, case 2b, offers the lowest costs 
excepting for 4ESL = , in which case LM Scheme, case 2a, is slightly cheaper. For n = 256 bits, 
LM Scheme, cases 2a and 2b, again achieves the lowest cost for all cases, excepting for 5ESL = , 
for which the DOS method offers a slight advantage. In the case of n = 512 bits, the DOS method 
finds its best performance by achieving the lowest cost for 5,ESL =  6 and 8. Also, the LG 
Scheme, case 2, results more advantageous for 7ESL =  and 8. Nevertheless, for most cases the 
LM Scheme still achieves the highest performance. Also, in settings where memory is not 
constrained the highest speed-up is achieved with LM Scheme, case 2b, for any value n. 
Finally, when comparing methods for case 1 and case 2, it can be observed that LM Scheme, 
case 1, can be advantageous for n = 160 bits if the ratio I/M is at least 50-60 and there are a high 
number of registers available. For n = 256 bits, that margin reduces to ratios greater than 90-100. 








high ratios, which seem unrealistic in practical scenarios. 
3.4.2. Evaluation of LG Scheme for Extended Jacobi Quartic and 
Inverted Edwards Coordinates 
In this section, we analyze and compare the performance of the proposed LG Scheme (Section 
3.3) with extended Jacobi quartics and inverted Edwards coordinates. As we could not find any 
literature related to precomputation schemes on these settings, we have derived the cost formulas 
of precomputing points using the traditional chain P → 3P → 5P → … → mP. For the case 
without inversions (case 1), the cost of precomputation is given by (1 0.8 )S M= :   
, case 1Cost (9 2) (1 3) (9.8 4.4)L M L S L M= + + + = +IE ,                                                         (3.29) 
, case 1
Cost (7 1) (3 8) (9.4 5.4)e L M L S L M= − + + = +
JQ
,                                                       (3.30)   
for IE and eJQ  coordinates, respectively. These costs have been derived by adding the costs of 
performing one mixed doubling, one mixed addition and ( 1)L −  general additions. For eJQ  we 
consider the use of [0,1]ADD  to reduce costs during the evaluation stage. For case 2, the costs are 
given by (1 0.8 )S M= :  
, case 2Cost 1 (15.8 ( 2) / 3.4)I L L L M= + + − +  IE ,                                                                   (3.31) 
, case 2
Cost 1 (12 4) (5 7) 1 (16 1.6)e I L M L S I L M= + − + + = + +
JQ
,                                        (3.32)   
which have been derived by adding the cost of eq. (3.13) and (3.12) with c = 0 (for Montgomery’ 
simultaneous inversion method) to eq. (3.29) and (3.30), respectively. 
In Table 3.10, we compare the costs of these schemes with the LG Scheme for different 
standard windows w. Costs for LG Scheme are calculated with formulas (3.14), (3.17), (3.18). As 
can be seen, the LG Scheme outperforms the methods using traditional chains in all covered 
cases for both IE and eJQ  coordinates. Note also that the advantage increases with the window 
size. For instance, if 1I = 30M, w = 6, eJQ , the cost reduction is as high as 20% and 24% in 
cases 1 and 2, respectively.  
Let us now compare the performance of cases 1 and 2 of LG Scheme with the objective of 
determining the best method for each possible scenario. In this analysis we should also consider 
the scalar multiplication cost since different point operation costs apply to different cases. We 









Table 3.10. Performance comparison of LG Scheme with methods using a traditional chain for 




L = 1  
(w = 3)  
L = 3  
(w = 4) 
L = 7  
(w = 5) 
L = 15  
(w = 6) 
Case 1 
 LG Scheme 
e
JQ  10.6M 28.6M 59.6M 116.6M 
 Scheme (3.30) eJQ  14.8 M 33.6M 71.2M 146.4M 
 LG Scheme IE 9.4M 28.4M 62.2M 125.6M 
 Scheme (3.29) IE 14.2 M 33.8M 73.0M 151.4M 
Case 2 
 LG Scheme 
e
JQ  - 1I + 40.0M 1I + 86.6M 1I + 176.4M 
 Scheme (3.32) eJQ  - 1I + 49.6M 1I + 113.6M 1I + 241.6M 
 LG Scheme IE - 1I + 46.4M 1I + 104.2M 1I + 215.6M 
 Scheme (3.31) IE - 1I + 51.8M 1I + 115.0M 1I + 241.4M 
 
scalar multiplication is given by eq. (3.24), and for case 2, the cost is given by:  
[ ]Frac- NAF scheme, case 2DBL ( 1) mADD Costwn nδ⋅ + − ⋅ + ,                                                          (3.33)  
Tables 3.11 and 3.12 show the performance of scalar multiplication including the costs of the 
LG Scheme, cases 1 and 2. At the bottom of the table, we display the I/M range for which case 1 
is the most efficient approach. 
As can be observed from Tables 3.11 and 3.12, on IE and eJQ  coordinates LG Scheme, 
case 1, achieves the best performance for most common I/M ratios if n = 160 bits. This result 
differs from that for standard curves where the use of one inversion during precomputation is 
only efficient for high I/M ratios (see Table 3.9). For higher security levels (n = 512 bits), the 
difference between case 1 and case 2 reduces. Ultimately, the most effective approach would be 
determined by the particular I/M ratio of a given implementation. However, as the window size 
grows, case 1 would be again largely preferred. Therefore, for applications where memory is not 
scarce, LG Scheme, case 1, achieves the lowest cost in both eJQ  and IE coordinates. 
3.4.3. Evaluation of LG Scheme for a Table of the Form ciP±diQ 
In this section, we analyze and compare the performance of LG Scheme when targeting multiple 
scalar multiplication methods such as JSF (Section 3.3.3). In particular, we first compare our 
approach with the computation using traditional additions and then we evaluate performance of 










Table 3.11. Cost of 160-bit scalar multiplication using Frac-wNAF and the LG Scheme (cases 1 
and 2); and I/M range for which case 1 achieves the lowest cost on eJQ  and IE (1M = 0.8S).  
Method Curve 
# of Points (L) 
2 3 (w = 4) 6 ≥ 7 (w = 5) 
 LG Scheme, case 1  
e
JQ  
1305M 1280M 1272M 1265M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 1286M 1I + 1267M 1I + 1273M 1I + 1269M 
 I/M range (case 1) I > 19M  I > 13M I > 0M I > 0M 
 LG Scheme, case 1  
IE 
1351M 1324M 1316M 1311M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 1338M 1I + 1318M 1I + 1329M 1I + 1329M 
 I/M range (case 1) I > 13M  I > 6M I > 0M I > 0M 
 
Table 3.12. Cost of 512-bit scalar multiplication using Frac-wNAF and the LG Scheme (cases 1 
and 2); and I/M range for which case 1 achieves the lowest cost on eJQ  and IE (1M = 0.8S).  
Method Curve 
# of Points (L) 
2 3 (w = 4) 6 7 (w = 5) 
 LG Scheme, case 1  
e
JQ  
4126M 4036M 3951M 3922M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 4055M 1I + 3970M 1I + 3900M 1I + 3874M 
 I/M range (case 1) I > 71M  I > 66M I > 51M I > 48M 
 LG Scheme, case 1  
IE 
4273M 4179M 4090M 4061M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 4209M 1I + 4120M 1I + 4050M 1I + 4028M 
 I/M range (case 1) I > 64M  I > 59M I > 40M I > 33M 
 
Method Curve 
# of Points (L)  
14  ≥ 15 (w = 6)  
 LG Scheme, case 1  
e
JQ  
3879M 3870M  
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 3867M 1I + 3862M  
 I/M range (case 1) I > 12M  I > 8M  
 LG Scheme, case 1  
IE 
4018M 4011M  
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 4033M 1I + 4032M  









The “generic” cost of precomputation using ordinary additions is given by: 
scheme, cases 1(2)
( 4) 1 1





+ − −   
= +      
P A ,                              (3.34) 
where Cost →P A  applies to case 2 only and represents the cost of conversion from projective to 
affine coordinates given by eq. (3.11), (3.12), (3.13) with c = 0 for J, eJQ , IE coordinates, resp. 
For J and eJQ , cost (3.34) can again be optimized further by using mixed coordinates, tripling 
formulas and additions with stored values. In Table 3.13, we compare the performance of this 
scheme with the LG Scheme. The costs for the latter method are taken from Table 3.4.   
Table 3.13. Performance comparison of LG Scheme and a scheme using traditional additions for 
computing tables of the form i ic P d Q± , cases 1 and 2 (1M = 0.8S).  
Method Curve 
# of Points (L) 
L = 2 (m = 1) L = 10 (m = 3) L = 22 (m = 5) 
 LG Scheme, case 1  
J 
9M 68M 159M 
 Scheme (3.34), case 1 11M 102M 225M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 13M 1I + 108M 1I + 229M 
 Scheme (3.34), case 2 1I + 22M 1I + 154M 1I + 373M 
 LG Scheme, case 1  
e
JQ  
12M 69M 159M 
 Scheme (3.34), case 1 16M 88M 204M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 16M 1I + 110M 1I + 253M 
 Scheme (3.34), case 2 1I + 25M 1I + 145M 1I + 331M 
 LG Scheme, case 1  
IE 
11M 72M 173M 
 Scheme (3.34), case 1 14M 88M 212M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 22M 1I + 88M 1I + 305M 
 Scheme (3.34), case 2 1I + 25M 1I + 147M 1I + 343M 
 
As can be seen, the LG Scheme outperforms the method using traditional additions in all 
cases covered. For instance, if 1I = 30M, L = 22, eJQ , the cost reduction is as high as 22% for 
both case 1 and 2. Remarkably, the higher improvements are obtained with J coordinates due to 
the combined use of LG and LM Schemes (see Section 3.3.3), especially in case 2, where larger 
savings are obtained through both methods when converting points to affine coordinates. For 
instance, if 1I = 30M, L = 22, J, the cost reduction is as high as 38% in case 2. 
Assuming that points P and Q are unknown before execution and given in affine, a multiple 








JSF JSF scheme, case 1( /( 2))( 1)ADD (2/( 2))( 1)mADD] CostL L n L nδ δ+ − + + − +  and [ DBLn ⋅ +  
( )JSF scheme, case 21 mADD] Costnδ − +  for cases 1 and 2, respectively, where JSF 0.5δ =  if m = 1, 
JSF 0.3575δ =  if m = 3, JSF 0.31δ =  if m = 5 [SEI10], and scheme, case Cost x  represents the cost of 
precomputation given by formula (3.19). For J and eJQ , we use again [ , ]ADD M S  instead of 
ADD . The estimates using these cost formulas are displayed in Tables 3.14 and 3.15. 
Table 3.14. Cost of 160-bit multiple scalar multiplication using window-based JSF and LG 
Scheme (cases 1 and 2); and I/M ranges for which case 1 achieves the lowest cost; 1M = 0.8S. 
Method Curve 
# of Points (L) 
L = 2 (m = 1) L = 10 (m = 3) L = 22 (m = 5) 
 LG Scheme, case 1  
J 
2059M 1909M 1917M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 1944M 1I + 1808M 1I + 1851M 
 I/M range (case 1) I > 115M  I > 101M I > 66M 
 LG Scheme, case 1 
e
JQ  
1680M 1554M 1578M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 1643M 1I + 1548M 1I + 1627M 
 I/M range (case 1) I > 37M  I > 6M I > 0M 
 LG Scheme, case 1 
IE 
1742M 1612M 1644M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 1714M 1I + 1624M 1I + 1731M 
 I/M range (case 1) I > 28M  I > 0M I > 0M 
Table 3.15. Cost of 512-bit multiple scalar multiplication using window-based JSF and LG 
Scheme (cases 1 and 2); and I/M ranges for which case 1 achieves the lowest cost; 1M = 0.8S. 
Method Curve 
# of Points (L) 
L = 2 (m = 1) L = 10 (m = 3) L = 22 (m = 5) 
 LG Scheme, case 1 
J 
6583M 5972M 5794M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 6203M 1I + 5555M 1I + 5428M 
 I/M range (case 1) I > 380M  I > 417M I > 366M  
 LG Scheme, case 1 
e
JQ  
5358M 4828M 4707M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 5234M 1I + 4717M 1I + 4655M 
 I/M range (case 1) I > 124M  I > 111M I > 52M  
 LG Scheme, case 1 
IE 
5562M 5006M 4887M 
 LG Scheme, case 2 1I + 5445M 1I + 4914M 1I + 4874M 








Similarly to the case of single scalar multiplication (see Table 3.11), case 1 achieves the best 
performance for most common I/M ratios for n = 160 bits with eJQ  and IE coordinates. 
However, if n = 512 bits, the range of I/M ratios for which case 2 is more efficient increases 
significantly. Also, note that case 2 appears to be the best choice for J coordinates for a wide 
range of I/M ratios, especially for high levels of security, i.e., n = 512. 
3.5. Other Applications of Conjugate Additions 
We have discussed in detail the application of the conjugate addition strategy in the design of 
efficient precomputation tables with the forms id P  and i ic P d Q± . However, this technique can 
be easily applied to other table forms such as the one required by the generalized JSF [Pro03], 
which involves the precomputation of (3 1) / 2
k
k− −  non-trivial points. For instance, for k = 3 
scalars, the previous algorithm requires the precomputation of P Q± , P R± ,Q R± , P Q R+ ± ,
P Q R− ± , which costs about 10 general additions (case 1). By using conjugate additions, the 
latter is reduced to only 5 addition/conjugate addition pairs. Note that the advantage grows 
exponentially with the number of scalars. As mentioned in Section 3.1.3, Järvinen et al. [JFS07] 
also proposed a method to precompute points with the form dP lQ kR± ± . However, their 
approach makes use of Okeya’s conjugate addition in affine coordinates in combination with 
Montgomery’ simultaneous inversion method. Therefore, it is limited to the Weierstrass form and 
always requires one inversion (i.e., it only applies to case 2). Moreover, in its current format their 
scheme only applies to tables dP lQ kR± ±  where , , {0,1}d l k ∈ .  
Other obvious application is the extension of our strategy to other settings such as binary 
fields. Let us illustrate the latter with the addition formula due to [LD99] and later refined by 
[HT00]. The cost of adding two points P Q+  with the formula by [HT00] takes 13M + 4S. Then, 
if the value P Q−  is required right after, one can store most partial results from the original 
addition and obtain the previous value with a cost of only 5M by noticing that Q− =
2 2 2 2 2( , , )X X Z Y Z+   in Lopez-Dahab (LD) coordinates. Note that the partial term 
2
2 1Y Z  from the 
original formula is replaced by 2 2 2 22 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1( )Y Z X Z Y Z X Z Z Y Z− = + = + , which only cost one 
extra multiplication.  
We have also analyzed other relevant settings such as Twisted Edwards using / eE E . 
Unfortunately, conjugate additions in this case are relatively expensive. Accordingly, we use a 
traditional sequence to calculate precomputations on this system in the corresponding 
implementations of single scalar multiplication in Chapter 5 (see §5.6.1 and §5.6.2).  
In summary, generalizations of this technique and the derived precomputation schemes may 
be applied to other scalar multiplication methods, coordinate systems and/or elliptic curve forms, 
provided the corresponding conjugate formulas are efficient. For instance, Goundar, Joye and 








addition with the Co-ADD Z  operation in order to improve side-channel-protected scalar 
multiplication methods. 
A note on related work:  
After developing the LG Scheme, we became aware of other (virtually simultaneous) efforts 
based on similar ideas. Avanzi, Heuberger and Prodinger [AHP08] also noticed the savings 
introduced by computations with the form P Q±  when precomputing points in projective 
coordinates. They, however, analyzed the applicability of this idea in the context of Koblitz 
curves with τ–adic representations using LD coordinates. In a talk in ECC2008 [Sco08], Scott 
described an approach similar to the LG Scheme for the case of single scalar multiplication. He 
also proposed to exploit similarities between P + Q and P – Q during precomputation but using a 
slightly different sequence to compute points. After an analysis on the settings discussed in this 
chapter, we conclude that our calculation sequence achieves better performance.  
3.6. Conclusions 
This chapter introduced new schemes for precomputing points, a basic ingredient to accelerate 
the fastest variable-scalar-variable-point scalar multiplication methods which are based on 
window-based strategies.  
After presenting most relevant previous work in §3.1, we introduced in §3.2 the LM Scheme, 
which is intended for standard curves using Jacobian coordinates, and adapted it to two typical 
scenarios for precomputation: case 1, without using inversions; and case 2, using one inversion. 
For the latter, we presented two variants that have slightly different speeds and memory 
requirements. The theoretical costs for each case were derived (with the corresponding proofs in 
the appendix), exploiting state-of-the-art formulas and techniques for maximal performance. In 
particular, for a number L of non-trivial points, case 1 has a cost of (5 1) (2 5)L M L S+ + +  (or 
(6 1) (3 5)L M L S+ + +  when using operations with stored values) and case 2b has a cost of 
1 (9 ) (2 6)I L M L S+ + + , which are the lowest in the literature for tables id P . 
In §3.3, we introduced the highly-flexible LG Scheme, which is based on the concept of 
conjugate addition and that can be adapted to any curve form or type of scalar multiplication (i.e., 
single and multiple scalar versions). We also discussed its applicability to cases 1, 2 and 3, and 
analyzed its efficiency on three curve settings: standard curves using Jacobian coordinates, 
extended Jacobi quartics using extended Jacobi quartics coordinates and Twisted Edwards curves 
using inverted Edwards coordinates. Moreover, for the case of multiple scalar multiplication 
using Jacobian coordinates, we proposed a novel scheme combining the LG and LM approaches. 








exploiting state-of-the-art formulas and techniques for maximal performance.  
In §3.4, we carried out an extensive analysis of the proposed methods, presenting detailed 
comparisons with previously most efficient methods in terms of speed and memory consumption 
and for different security levels. We showed that for most cases the LM Scheme remains as the 
most efficient method on standard curves using Jacobian coordinates for the case of a table with 
the form id P  (implementers may consult Tables 3.9, A.1, and A.2 for the best scheme given the 
number of registers and precomputed points, I/M ratio and security level). This result is 
especially relevant for implementations following NIST recommendations. On the other hand, 
the LG Scheme was shown to achieve the lowest costs on the special curves under study for both 
table forms, id P  and i ic P d Q± . Also, the combined LG/LM approach for tables i ic P d Q±  using 
Jacobian coordinates was shown to provide substantial cost reductions with advantage growing 
with the number of precomputations. Implementers may consult Tables 3.11 and 3.12 (Tables 
3.14 and 3.15) for the best variant of the LG Scheme for a table id P  (for a table ,i ic P d Q± ) 
given the curve form, number of precomputations, I/M ratio and security level. Extensions of this 
work would enable the use of the LG Scheme on other curve forms and coordinate systems. This 
is left for future work.  
Finally, in §3.5 we discussed more possibilities for the use of conjugate addition. We detailed 
potential applications that could be fully explored in future work and discussed recent research 
that has already taken advantage of this idea.     




4 Chapter 4 
Scalar Multiplication using 
Multibase Chains 
In this chapter, we describe efficient methods based on multibase representations and analyze 
their performance to compute elliptic curve scalar multiplication at the evaluation stage. Our 
contributions can be summarized as follows:  
• We include a thorough discussion and analysis of the most relevant methods based on 
double- and multi-base representations in the literature. We categorize the different 
approaches and highlight their advantages and disadvantages.  
• We provide an improved and more thorough exposition of the original multibase NAF 
(mbNAF) method and its variants, which were introduced by the author in [Lon07]. In 
particular, we include the analysis of the average density of these methods when using 
bases {2,3} and {2,3,5} that was deferred in [Lon07].  
• We apply the concept of “fractional” windows to improve the flexibility of the windowed 
variant of mbNAF so that implementers can freely choose the optimal number of 
precomputations in a given application.  
• We apply the concept of operation cost per bit to the derivation of efficient multibase 
algorithms able to find cheaper multibase chains for scalar multiplication. We argue that 








given scalar. For practical scenarios, we present very compact algorithms that yield 
(conjecturally, close to optimal) multibase chains. 
• Finally, we perform an exhaustive performance evaluation of the various methods for 
different security levels and for three different curve forms: standard curves using 
Jacobian coordinates (J ), extended Jacobi quartics using extended Jacobi quartic 
coordinates ( eJQ ) and Twisted Edwards curves using inverted Edwards coordinates 
(IE). These results allow us to assess the state of affairs of the use of double bases and 
multibases in practice.    
For the remainder of this chapter, we assume that curve parameters can be chosen such that 
the cost of multiplying a curve constant can be considered negligible in comparison with a 
regular multiplication. Also, additions and subtractions are neglected when performing cost 
analysis. These assumptions greatly simplify our analysis without affecting the conclusions. 
This chapter is organized as follows. §4.1 discusses the most relevant previous work and 
categorizes the different approaches based on double- and multi-base representations. §4.2 
discusses the mbNAF method and its variants, and provides the zero and nonzero density 
formulas obtained with the use of Markov chains. §4.3 details the application of “fractional” 
windows to mbNAF. §4.4 presents the methodology based on the operation cost per bit to derive 
more efficient multibase chains. §4.5 evaluates the performance of the different methods in 
comparison with other works in the literature for different security levels and memory 
constraints. §4.6 discusses potential variants of the proposed methods and their application to 
other settings. This section also discusses the challenges still faced by methods using double- and 
multi-base representations. Finally, some conclusions are drawn in §4.7. 
4.1. Previous Work 
As discussed in Section 2.2.4.3, in the last few years there have appeared a plethora of works 
proposing efficient methods to compute scalar multiplication. In the case under study, namely, 
when the initial point P is not known in advance, well-known methods to efficiently execute kP 
are non-adjacent form (NAF) [Rei60] and width-w NAF (wNAF) [Sol00], which use short signed 
radix 2-based representations of the scalar to minimize the number of point operations, namely 
doubling of a point (2P) and addition of points (P+Q). In particular, wNAF offers very high 
performance at the cost of a few precomputations. 
Later, Möller [Möl03] generalized wNAF to any number of precomputations using 
“fractional” windows. The new recoding, called fractional width-w NAF (denoted by Frac-
wNAF; see Section 2.2.4.3), allows a better coupling between the scalar multiplication 








4.1.1. Double- and Multi-Base Number Representations 
Recently, there have been proposed new methods for scalar multiplication using number 
representations based on double- and multi-base number systems, which basically mix different 
bases to decrease the number of terms required in the representation of integers. Based on 
previous work by Dimitrov and Cooklev [DC95], the use of the so-called Double Base Number 
System (DBNS) for cryptographic applications was first proposed by Dimitrov et al. in [DJM98]. 
In this number system an integer k is represented as follows: 









= ⋅∑ ,                                                        (4.1)    
where { 1,1}is ∈ − .  
To enable the use of DBNS in the setting of ECC, Dimitrov et al. [DIM05] were the first to 
introduce the concept of double-base chains where ib  and ic  must decrease as i increases. This 
was later generalized to multi-base chains (i.e., using two or more bases) by the author in 
[Lon07] and Mishra and Dimitrov in [MD07]. Of particular interest are the facts that multibase 
chains are redundant and that some representations are highly sparse, which, as consequence, 
allow a reduction in the Hamming weight of the scalar expansion (that is, a reduction in the 
number of additions in the point multiplication). Let us illustrate the latter with the following 
example. 
Example 4.1. The representation of 9750k =  using NAF is given by 13 11 99750 2 2 2= + − +  
5 32 2 2− − , which requires 13DBL + 5ADD using Horner’s scheme for scalar multiplication 
(i.e., the computation uses the expansion 2 2 4 2 29750 2(2 (2 (2 (2 (2 ) ) ) ) )P P P P P P P= + − + − − ). 
If one, otherwise, uses the double-base chain 10 2 6 49750 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3= × + × − × + × , the scalar 
multiplication takes the form 3 2 49750 2 3 (2 (2 3(2 ) ) )P P P P P= × × + − +  and costs 10DBL + 
2TPL + 3ADD, which reduces the nonzero density in comparison with the NAF representation. 
Multibase chains using {2 3 }-i i
b c
terms or {2 3 5 }-i i i
b c d
terms are particularly attractive for 
ECC because operations associated with these bases (namely, point doubling, tripling and 
quintupling) are the cheapest-per-bit point operations available for some elliptic curves. 
Nevertheless, multibase chains are not unique and this poses the conjecturally hard problem 
of determining (in a reasonable amount of time and utilization of resources) the optimal 
multibase chain for a given integer. Hereinafter, we use the term optimal to define a multibase 
chain for a given scalar k that achieves the lowest cost when applied to the computation of the 
point multiplication kP. In contrast to radix 2-based representations, the complexity of this 
analysis is significantly higher as the point operations involved (e.g., doubling, tripling, 








curve. Hence, it does not necessarily hold that representations with the lowest nonzero density 
achieve the lowest cost. Note that this complexity increases with the number of bases in the 
representation. 
Although it remains an open problem to find the optimal double- or multi-base chains, there 
have appeared in the literature several efforts trying to find “efficient” multibase chains and using 
them advantageously in the computation of elliptic curve scalar multiplication. In general, there 
are two main approaches to find a double-base or multi-base representation for a given integer in 
the setting of elliptic curves: using a “Greedy” algorithm [DIM05, DI06] and using division 
chains [CJL+06, Lon07] (borrowing the term from [Wal98]). 
4.1.1.1. Multibase Methods based on a “Greedy” Algorithm 
The “Greedy”-based approach, first proposed in [DIM05], works as follows. To find a 
representation with the form (4.1) first establish “efficient” maximum bounds bmax and cmax for 
the powers of 2 and 3, respectively. Then search for the closest {2 3 }-termi i
b c
 to the scalar k, 
subtract it from k and search again for the closest {2 3 }-termi i
b c
 to the updated value. Repeat the 
procedure until k = 0. It can be easily deduced that ib  and ic  will form decreasing sequences 
max 1 2 0Kb b b b≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥…  and max 1 2 0Kc c c c≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ≥… , respectively. Later, Doche and 
Imbert [DI06] extended the “Greedy” algorithm to applications that can afford precomputations 
by allowing the precomputation of a table with the form 1 2
2 2{2,2 , ,2 ,3,3 , ,3 }w w P… … , where 1w  
and 2w  represent the maximum exponents expanding the search range in the “Greedy” 
algorithm, or a table with the form id P , where id  are odd digits coprime to 3 (for instance, 
{1,5,7,11, }id D∈ = … ). This approach was later optimized by [BBL+07] with the use of 
precomputed tables using the digit sets {1,2,3,5,7, , }m… , with m odd. Finally, Mishra and 
Dimitrov [MD07] extended the “Greedy”-based approach to chains using bases {2,3,5}.  
The use of a “Greedy” algorithm has several drawbacks. First, from a theoretical point of 
view, double-base chains found with a “Greedy” algorithm cannot (until today) be defined 
adequately. Hence, the expected number of zero and nonzero terms for an n-bit scalar is 
estimated empirically. Also, looking for closest {2 3 }-termsi i
b c
 implies having a table storing 
many powers of 2, 3 and combinations of these. This is directly impractical in constrained 
environments. One can trade memory for speed and store only part of the required table. 
However, this leads to higher conversion times (to double-base representation), lower 
performance and/or very expensive precomputation stages [BPP07]. This issue obviously 
worsens with expanded digit sets and more bases.    
4.1.1.2. Multibase Methods based on Division Chains 
This approach consists in the derivation of scalar representations by consecutive division with 








base then a particular rule defines how to approximate the value to a close number that is again 
divisible by one or more bases. Note that methods using division chains are apparently easier to 
analyze by using, for instance, Markov chains. Moreover, they do not rely on pre-stored tables 
for conversion, immediately enabling their use in memory-constrained applications. In the 90’s 
several algorithms with different division rules were proposed for reducing the cost of 
exponentiation [DC95, CCY96, Wal98] (the term “division chain” was coined by Walter in 
[Wal98]). Walter [Wal02] also exploited these ideas to develop an exponentiation method with 
random selection of bases to protect against certain SCA attacks. Nevertheless, it seems that the 
binary/ternary algorithm by Ciet et al. [CJL+06] was the first method using division chains that 
was intended for ECC applications. In this case, a partial result obtained after dividing by bases 2 
and 3 is approximated to the closest term that is congruent to 0(mod6) . Since this approximation 
gives roughly equivalent “weight” to bases 2 and 3, the method has some efficiency limitations 
especially in most common ECC settings where doubling is much faster than tripling and 
addition. In fact, if one does not take into account the memory/conversion overhead, it can be the 
case that “Greedy”-based approaches achieve better performance (see, for example, Table 2 in 
[DH08]). In [Lon07] (see also [LM08c]), the author  introduced  new algorithms able to find 
generalized multi-base chains, solving efficiently for first time the problem of memory penalty 
and difficulty to analyze the zero and nonzero density of a multibase expansion. Remarkably, it 
also achieves better cost performance than the “Greedy” approach. The new method finds 
multibase chains by creating a “window” with a fixed width with one of the bases (referred to as 
“main base”) and then approximates the partial scalar value to it. The latter guarantees the 
execution of a minimum number of operations with the “main base” before the following 
addition happens, similar to the way NAF of a scalar is generated with base 2. Moreover, the 
nonzero density is further reduced because, once an addition is performed, not only doublings but 
also triplings, quintuplings, and so on, can be used. This new approach is called multibase NAF 
(denoted by mbNAF). Its window-based version using an extended digit set appears as a natural 
extension and is referred to as width-w multibase NAF (wmbNAF).  
NOTE: one does not need to restrict the “window” in mbNAF to only one base. In fact, in 
[Lon07] (see also [LM08c, Section 5.3]), the author proposed an extended wmbNAF method that 
generalizes the use of windows, such that the approximation after the divisibility tests is 
performed to the generic value 1 21 2
Jww w
Ja a a a= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅…  for a set of bases 1 2{ , , , }Ja a a… , where 




was shown to be especially efficient on 
the elliptic curves with degree 3 isogenies proposed in [DIK06] and known as DIK curves (see 
Table 8 in [LM08c]). Note that this method was recently rediscovered by Adikari, Dimitrov and 
Imbert in [ADI10, Section 3.1] and [Adi10, Chapter 5] for the case of bases {2,3}. Also, note that 








More recently, Doche et al. [DH08] introduced a new method that also finds double-base 
chains using division chains, although using a somewhat more complex tree-based approach in 
comparison with multibase NAF. Their method basically divides by 2 and 3 values ( 1)ik +  and 
( 1)ik −  for B distinct values ik  that are coprime to 6, and keeps the B division sequences that 
reach the lowest values. This procedure is repeated with the new values until reaching 1. 
Initialization proceeds as above although in this case the algorithm keeps all the possible 
sequences until B distinct values ik  are obtained. As will be evident later, the disadvantage of 
this method is that the division sequences that are chosen at each iteration are the ones whose 
final values are the lowest ones. However, a long sequence of divisions alone does not guarantee 
optimal cost. This drawback is somewhat minimized by keeping up to B values at each iteration 
(and then the probability that a long sequence is also among the cheapest ones increases). 
However, it is evident that one may avoid storing unnecessary sequences by applying an 
operation cost analysis instead.   
In Section 4.4, we introduce a methodology to derive algorithms able to find more efficient 
multibase chains. Our technique is based on the careful analysis of the operation cost per bit, 
which helps to choose the most efficient division sequence per iteration. We argue that the 
inclusion of this analysis in the design of any multibase algorithm potentially enables the 
derivation of the fastest multibase chains.  
4.2. Multibase NAF (mbNAF) and Width-w Multibase NAF 
(wmbNAF) 
Determining and finding the optimal multibase chain in the setting of ECC seems to be a hard 
problem, mainly due to the fact that an optimal multibase chain is not necessarily the shortest one 
(with the minimal number of additions), but the one that requires the "right" balance in the 
number of additions and all other point operations (which depends on the chosen elliptic curve 
form). Although finding such optimal multibase chains remains an open problem, the author 
[Lon07] proposed a representation that adjusts more efficiently to most ECC settings, in which 
one of the point operations is usually significantly more efficient than the others. Such a generic 
multibase representation, known as mbNAF, has the form: 








= ∑ ∏                                                          (4.2) 
where:  1 Ja a≠ ≠…  are prime integers from a set of bases 1{ , , }Ja a= …A  ( 1:a main base),   
             K is the length of the expansion, 
             is are signed digits from a given set \ {0}D , i.e., 1 and \{0}i is s D≥ ∈ , 








             (1)ic  are decreasing exponents for the main base 1a (i.e., j = 1), s.t. 1(1) (1) 2 2i ic c +≥ + ≥    
             for 1 1i K≤ ≤ − . 
Note that the last two conditions above guarantee that an expansion of the form (4.2) is 
efficiently executed by a scalar multiplication using Horner’s method as follows: 
( )1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1
i K K
J J J JK
c j d j d j d j
i j j j j K K
i j j j j
kP s a P a a a s P s P s P s P− −
= = = = =
     
= = + + + +∑  ∏ ∏ ∏ ∏           
… …         (4.3) 
where (1) 0Kd ≥ , and (1) 2id ≥  for 1 1i K≤ ≤ − . The latter is equivalent to the last condition in 
(4.2) and incorporates the non-adjacency property in the multibase representation. Basically, it 
fixes the minimal number of consecutive operations with the “main base” (i.e., 1a ) between any 
two additions to two. Note that an operation with the main base refers to doubling if 1 2a =  or 
tripling if 1 3a = , and so on.     
On the other hand, if we relax the previous condition and allow larger window sizes (i.e., 
allowing 3, 4, or more, consecutive operations with the main base between any two additions) we 
can reduce further the average number of nonzero terms in the scalar representation at the 
expense of a larger digit set D and, consequently, a larger precomputed table. The previous 
technique is known as wmbNAF.  





0, 1, 2, , \ 1 , 2 , ,
2 2
w wa a
D a a a
−      − −   
= ± ± ± ± ± ±      
          
… …                                                 (4.4) 
where 2w +≥ ∈Z  ( 2w =  for mbNAF). Without considering { , }PO , the digit set (4.4) implies 
that a scalar multiplication would require precomputing id P , where \{0,1}id D
+∈  (note that 
only positive values id P  need to be stored in the table as the negative of points can be computed 
on-the-fly at negligible cost). Thus, the precomputation table consists of 11 1( 2) / 2
w wa a −− −  
points. Note that if 2w =  (mbNAF case), the requirement of precomputations is minimal. For 
instance, in the case 1 2a =  we do not need to store any points besides { , }PO . 
It can be easily seen that selecting the main base according to the relative efficiency of its 
corresponding operation will guarantee that more of these operations are used in average, which 
potentially could decrease the computational cost of scalar multiplication. In the remainder (and 
following what is observed in most common ECC settings over prime fields), we will assume 
that doubling is the most efficient point operation available, and hence, 1 2a = .  
It is important to remark that, obviously, eq. (4.2) does not involve unique representations. 
For instance, both expressions 10 2 6 2 42 3 2 3 2 3 2 3× + × − × + ×  and 
9 3 7 3 5 3
2 3 2 3 2 3× − × − × +
3 3 2 2








following (4.2). In [Lon07], the author provided algorithms based on division chains that 
efficiently find an (w)mbNAF chain of the form (4.2) and, given a window width and set of bases, 
is unique for each integer. Note that we have integrated algorithms for finding mbNAFs and 
wmbNAFs in Algorithm 4.1. 
 
Algorithm 4.1.  Computing an mbNAF (wmbNAF) of a positive integer  
Input:  scalar k, bases 1 2{ , , , }Ja a a= …A , where 
+
ja ∈Z  are primes for 1 j J≤ ≤ , 
            window 2w =  for mbNAF, and window 2w >  for wmbNAF, where +w∈Z  
Output:  2 1( ) ( )1 2 2 1( , ,..., )NAF ( ) = (..., , )
b b
J wa a a k k k , where ib ∈A  
    1:  i = 1  
    2: While k > 0 do 
    3:         If 1mod 0k a =  or 2mod 0k a =  or … or mod 0Jk a = , then 0ik =  
    4:         Else              
    5:                 1mods
w
ik k a=  
    6:                 ik k k= −  
    7:         If 1mod 0k a = , then 
( ) ( )1
1/ ,
ib a
i ik k a k k= =  
    8:         Elseif 2mod 0k a = , then 
( ) ( )2
2/ ,
ib a
i ik k a k k= =  
                 
J+6:         Elseif mod 0Jk a = , then 
( ) ( )
/ , i J
b a
J i ik k a k k= =  
J+7:         i = i + 1    
J+8: Return 2 1( ) ( )2 1(..., , )
b b
k k  
 
( )ib
ik in Algorithm 4.1 represent the digits in the multibase NAF representation, where 
,ik D∈  see (4.4); and the superscript ( )ib  represents the base ib ∈A  associated to the digit in 
position i. The function mods represents the following computation: 
( )1 1 1 1
1
If  mod / 2, then mod
Else,  mod   




k a a k k a a
k k a
 ≥ = −

=  
Let us illustrate the method using Algorithm 4.1 with the following example. 
Example 4.2. The mbNAF representation of 9750 obtained with Algorithm 4.1 using the division 
sequence 9750 4875 1624 204 51 161625 1 203 1 17 1 1
2 3 8 4 3 16
→ → − → → + → → → − → →  is 
(2) (2)
2(2,3)NAF (9750) 1 0=   
(2) (2) (2) (3) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (2)0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0− , which allows us to compute the corresponding scalar 
multiplication 9750P as 
3 2 42 3 (2 (2 3(2 ) ) )P P P P× × + − + , using Horner’s method. The latter 








9750P costs 107.2M. Compare this to the cost using NAF: NAF(9750) 1010 10= −
0010 10 10− − , given by 1mDBL + 12DBL + 5mADD = 119.6M. 
For brevity (and whenever understood in the context), we will refer as the multibase NAF of 
an integer k to the unique representation found through Algorithm 4.1.  
4.2.1. Zero and Nonzero Density of Multibase NAF Methods  
One of the attractive properties of multibase NAF representations found with Algorithm 4.1 is 
that the average number of operations can be precisely determined by using Markov chains. The 
following theorems are presented on this regard. With a slight abuse of notation, density refers to 
the number of certain point operation relative to the total number of zero and nonzero digits in a 
given representation.  
Theorem 4.1.  The average densities of additions, doublings and triplings for the (w)mbNAF 
using bases ={2,3}A  are approximately: 
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(2 1) / 3
w
s
− = +   
and 2w
+≥ ∈Z  ( 2w =  for mbNAF).  
Proof. The method can be modeled as a Markov chain with three states in the case of bases 
{2,3}: (2)"0 ",  
(3)






 , with the following probability matrix: 
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This Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic, and hence, it has stationary distribution, 
which is given by:  
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Therefore, nonzero digits ik  appear 2








which proves the assertion about the nonzero density. Doublings and triplings (i.e., number of 
zero and nonzero digits with bases 2 and 3, respectively) appear 2 2w ww⋅ +  and 
( )2 23 2 (2 1) /3w w− − − +   out of ( )2 22 2 3 2 (2 1) /3w w w ww − − ⋅ + + − +   digits, respectively. This 
proves assertion about the average density of doublings and triplings.                                           □ 
Theorem 4.2.  The average densities of additions, doublings, triplings and quintuplings for the 
(w)mbNAF using bases = {2,3,5}A  are approximately:
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⋅ − − − + +
,  
respectively, where 2(2 2) /5wr − = +  , 
2(2 1) / 3ws − = +   and 
2(2 7) /15wt − = +  . 
Proof. For the case of bases {2,3,5}=A , this method can be modeled with four states: (2)"0 " , 
(3)






 . The probability matrix in this case is as follows: 
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This Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic with stationary distribution: 
             
( ) ( )2 13 3
(2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (5)
-1
24 2 5 22 2
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where 149 2 5 24 5w r s tω −= ⋅ − − − . Therefore, nonzero digits ik  appear 
32w+  out of 32w w+ ⋅ +  
( ) ( )3 2 12 24 2 5 2w w ws r t+ − −+ − + − −  digits, which proves our assertion about the nonzero density. 
Doublings, triplings and quintuplings (i.e., number of zero and nonzero digits with bases 2, 3 and 
5, respectively) appear 3 32 2w ww+ +⋅ + , ( )224 2w s− −  and ( )15 2w r t− − −  out of 3 32 2w ww+ +⋅ + +
( ) ( )2 124 2 5 2w ws r t− −− + − −  digits, respectively. This proves our assertion about the average 
density for the aforementioned operations.                                                                                      □ 








help of the presented theorems. First, it is known that the expected number of doublings, triplings 
and additions is given by 2#DBL
x
digitsδ= ⋅ , 3#TPL
x
digitsδ= ⋅  and 1#ADD digitsδ= ⋅ , where 
digits represents the total number of (zero and nonzero) digits in the expansion (note that a 
nonzero digit involves one doubling and one addition). Then, we can assume that 
#DBL #TPL 1
2 3 2
n−⋅ ≈ , where n represents the average bitlength of the scalar k. Thus, 
#DBL log2 #TPL log3 ( 1)log2n⋅ + ⋅ ≈ − , and replacing #DBL and #TPL, we can estimate digits 
with the following: 











,                                               (4.5) 
which allow us to determine #DBL, #TPL and #ADD using the expressions above and Theorem 
4.1. For instance, in the case of mbNAF, bases ={2,3}A  and w = 2, the average densities for 
doublings, triplings and additions derived from Theorem 4.1 are 4/5, 1/5 and 4/15. If n = 160 bits, 
we determine that digits = 142.35 using (4.5). Then, the average cost of a scalar multiplication 
using Table 2.4 ( eJQ , 1 0.8S M= ) is approximately 113.88DBL + 28.47TPL + 37.96mADD = 
1321M. Similarly, if we use bases = {2,3,5}A , the average cost can be estimated as 
approximately 97.06DBL + 24.27TPL + 10.11QPL + 32.35mADD = 1299.82M. Compare the 
previous costs to that one offered by NAF: 159DBL + 53mADD = 1399.2M (in this case, 
NAF 1/3δ = ). Hence, theoretically, it is determined that (2,3)NAF and (2,3,5)NAF surpasses NAF 
(case with no precomputations, eJQ ) by about 5.6% and 7.1%, respectively.  
It is still possible to find more efficient multibase chains at the expense of some increment in 
the complexity of the original multibase NAF. The improved algorithms will be discussed in 
Section 4.4. Following, we optimize the basic multibase NAF methods using a recoding based on 
fractional windows. 
4.3. The Fractional Width-w Multibase Non-Adjacent Form 
(Frac-wmbNAF) 
One disadvantage of wmbNAF is that it restricts the allowed number of non-trivial precomputed 
points to 
2(2 1)w− −  for > 2w +∈Z , following the same restriction of its analogous counterpart in 
the radix-2 domain, namely wNAF. In some settings, it is possible that the optimal performance 
is achieved by precomputing a number of points that do not follow such a standard window size. 
Also, some applications could have memory constraints different to the ones dictated by the 
standard windows. In this section, we apply the concept of “fractional” windows due to Möller 
[Möl03] to the multibase NAF method to allow a flexible number of points in the precomputed 








For the remainder, we will assume that the main base 1a  is 2. First, let us establish our ideal 
table with unrestricted number of non-trivial points id P , where { }\{0,1} 3, 5, ,id D m
+∈ = …  and 
3m
+≥ ∈Z  is an odd integer. If we define m in terms of the standard windows w, it would be 
expressed as: 
                                                                 22wm h−= + ,                                                            (4.6)                                                                  
where 2 12 2w wm− −< <  and 1h +≥ ∈Z  is odd.  
We define the rules of the recoding scheme for bases 2{2, , , }Ja a= …A  in Algorithm 4.2. 
 
Algorithm 4.2.  Recoding rules for “fractional” windows ( mod2
wr k= ) 
1: If ( mod 2 0k =  or 2mod 0k a =  or … or mod 0Jk a = ), then 0ik =  
2: Elseif 0 < r m≤ , then ik r=  
3: Elseif  < (3 4 )m r m h< − , then 12wik r
−= −  
4: Elseif (3 4 )  2
wm h r− ≤ < , then 2wik r= −  
5: ik k k= −  
 
Basically, the proposed recoding first detects if k is divisible by one of the bases. Else, it 
establishes a window w and checks if k can be approximated to the closest extreme of the 
window using any of the digits id  available. It can be verified that the latter will be accomplished 
if steps 2 or 4 are satisfied. Otherwise, the established window is too large and, hence, it is 
“reduced” to the immediately preceding window size to which k can be approximated (condition 
in step 3).  
An algorithm to convert any integer to Frac-wmbNAF representation can be easily derived by 
replacing steps 3-6 in Algorithm 4.1 by steps 1-5 of Algorithm 4.2. In this case, we will denote 
the Frac-wmbNAF of an integer k by 2 1( ) ( )2 2 1(2, ,..., )NAF ( ) = (..., , )
b b
J w,La a k k k , where w is the 
standard window width according to (4.6) and L represents the number of precomputed points, 
that is, ( 1)/ 2L m= − . 
Let us illustrate the new recoding with the following example.  
Example 4.3.  If 9750k =  and 5m = , then \{0,1} {3,5}id D
+∈ = , and 4w =  and 1h =  by means 
of eq. (4.6). Then, the Frac-wmbNAF of 9750 is (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2)4,2(2,3)NAF (9750) 1 0 0 0 3 0= −
(2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (2)0 0 5 0 0 1 0 0− , and the conversion process can be visualized as the division 
chain 9750 4875 1624 208 161625 1 203 5 13 3 1
2 3 8 16 16
→ → − → → + → → + → → . 
Observe that, when 1625 is obtained, it requires an addition with 7 to approximate the value 
to 1632 (which is the closest number 40 (mod2 )≡ , as required by a standard window 4w = ). 








3w =  and the value 1625 is approximated to the closest value in the new window (i.e., 1624) 
using an addition with −1.  
We now present the following theorem regarding the average density of this method for the 
case {2,3}=A . 
Theorem 4.3.  The average densities of nonzero terms, doublings and triplings of the Frac-
wmbNAF using bases {2,3}=A , window size w and L available points (represented by
,(2,3)NAFw L ) are approximately: 
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2
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, 
respectively, where ( 2) / 3u L= +    and 
2(2 ) / 3wv L− = −  . 
Proof. Let us consider the following states to model this fractional window method using Markov 
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This Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic with the stationary distribution:  
    
2 2
(2) (3) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2)
-2 -1
16 12(2 ( )) 16(2 ) 16
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where 16 12( ) 7 2
wt u vµ = − + + ⋅  and 1t L= + . Therefore, the nonzero digits ik  appear 2
w  out of 
( ) ( )28 3 2 4 1wt u v w−− + + −  digits, proving the assertion about the nonzero density. Doublings 
and triplings (i.e., the number of zero and nonzero digits with bases 2 and 3, respect.) appear 
( )8 2 1wt w+ −  and ( )( )23 2w u v− − +  out of ( ) ( )28 3 2 4 1wt u v w−− + + −  digits, respectively. This 








With Theorem 4.3, it is possible to theoretically estimate the expected number of doublings, 
triplings and additions using this method. For instance, following the procedure detailed in 
Section 4.2.1, we can estimate the cost of scalar multiplication (without including 
precomputation cost) for 160n =  bits using L = 2 points (w = 4) as 132.7DBL + 16.6TPL + 
29.5mADD = 1229.9M ( eJQ , 1 0.8S M= ). Compare to the cost achieved by Frac-wNAF, 
namely 159DBL + 35.3mADD = 1250.5M ( Frac- NAF 1/ 4.5wδ =  when using m = 5; see Section 
2.2.4.3). Further cost reductions are observed for the case of {2,3,5}=A . 
4.4. A Methodology to Find Faster Multibase Chains 
The multibase NAF method and its variants are simple and straightforward to implement and 
analyze theoretically. However, if we increase the complexity of the derivation algorithms it is 
still possible to find more efficient multibase chains. In this section, we propose a new 
methodology based on the operation cost per bit for deriving multibase algorithms. The method 
is illustrated in detail for the case of bases {2,3}. 
Definition 4.1. The operation cost per bit of an elliptic curve point operation is given by 
ς(operation) = cost(operation)/bitlength(operation). 
Following a common practice in the literature, we express operation costs in terms of field 
multiplications and squarings, assuming the approximation 1S = 0.8M. For instance, a point 
doubling in Jacobian coordinates costs 2(DBL) DBL / log 2 7ς = =  field multiplications per bit, 
where DBL = 3M + 5S (see Table 2.2). 
Note that the definition above can be readily extended to division sequences. In this case, one 
should take into account the cost of all the operations involved and their corresponding 
bitlengths. 
Corollary 4.1. From all possible chains using a given set of bases A , the optimal chains for a 
given integer k are the ones with the lowest cost per bit. 
If, for instance {2,3}=A , Corollary 4.1 implies that the optimal chains for a given integer k 
have ( )chainς = # DBL DBL #TPL TPL+ #ADD ADD
# DBL (DBL) #TPL (TPL) # ADD (ADD)bitlength bitlength bitlength
× + × ×
× + × + ×
 minimal, where OP 
and #OP denote the cost of certain operation and the number of times this operation is used, 
respectively. With a slight abuse of notation, bitlength(ADD) represents the number of bits added 
or subtracted from the total bitlength after addition with a digit from a given digit set.  
Obviously, an exhaustive search evaluating costs per bit of all possible division sequences 
from k would yield the optimal chains for this scalar. Nevertheless, for cryptographic purposes, 








cost-per-bit evaluation to sequences between additions.  
The following proposition slightly relaxes the definition of an optimal chain while simplifies 
significantly the cost analysis.     
Proposition 4.1. Let a digit set \{0} { 1, 3, 5, , }D m= ± ± ± ±… , where m k<<  for a scalar 
multiplication kP. Then, the “bitlength” of an addition with any digit \ {0}id D∈  (i.e., the bit 
reduction or increase due to the addition operation) is negligible in comparison with the total 
bitlength and approximates to zero in average.  
Following Proposition 4.1, we can eliminate bitlength(ADD) from the denominator of 
( )chainς  without losing too much precision in our cost approximations. For the remainder, we 
focus our analysis on “measuring” costs between additions. As stated, nothing really deters from 
extending the cost analysis to wider ranges of division sequences, in which case cheaper 
multibase chains could be found at the expense of a more complex “searching” algorithm.   
Proposition 4.2. Let 1 2{ , , , }Ja a a= …A  be a set of bases where ja ∈A  are all primes and 
1
1 | ( )
Jww
iJa a k k⋅ ⋅ −…  for an integer k, a digit {0, 1, 3, 5, , }ik D m∈ = ± ± ± ±…  and integers 0jw ≥ . 
Then, for given values , ( )i pkP k P E∈ F , the cost per bit of computing 11 ( )
Jww
iJa a kP k P⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −… , 
which is denoted by ( )ik kς − , can be estimated as follows:  
                                1 1 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 2 2






w a P w a P w a P v
k k
w a w a w a
ς





,                           (4.7) 
where ja P  represents the cost of the point operation corresponding to base ja  (for instance, 
DBLja P =  if 2ja = ) and v represents the number of additions such that 2v =  if 0ik ≠  and 
1v =  if 0ik = .   
Equation (4.7) employs the function cost( )/bitlength( )operations operations  to determine the 




Ja a⋅ ⋅…  between an addition with a digit ik  and the next addition. 
There are different ways of exploiting this tool for finding efficient multibase chains. For 
instance, the costs per bit of the possible sequences can be calculated and compared on-the-fly. 
Another approach would involve the use of on-line congruency tests with pre-determined 
combinations of bases for which the costs per bit are known [LG09]. In this case, the evaluated 
congruencies are fixed off-line according to the chosen curve, window size w and set of bases .A  
In this thesis, we choose to implement the second approach based on on-line congruency 








4.4.1. Refined Multibase Chains 
 In this section we propose a new algorithm that has been derived by rewriting the original 
multibase NAF and adding a few conditional statements. The refined multibase algorithm is 
shown as Algorithm 4.3. In the remainder, we will refer to chains obtained from this algorithm as 
refined multibase chains. 
 
Algorithm 4.3.  Computing “refined” multibase chains of a positive integer  
Input:  scalar k, bases 1 2{ , , , }Ja a a= …A , where 
+
ja ∈Z  are primes for 1 j J≤ ≤ , 
            window 2w ≥ , where +w∈Z  
Output:  a multibase chain 2 1( ) ( )2 1(..., , )
b b
k k , where ib ∈A  
1:             i = 1   
  2: While k > 0 do 
   3:         If 1 1mod 0, 0,i ik a k b a= = =  
   4:         Elseif 2mod 0k a =  
4.1:                 If CONDITION2.1 = true, 1,i i ik d b a= =  
4.2:                 Else 20,i ik b a= =  
                          
J+2:         Elseif mod 0Jk a =                
(J+2).1:                 If CONDITION2.(J−1) = true, 1,i i ik d b a= =  
(J+2).2:                 Else 0,i i Jk b a= =  
J+3:         Else 
J+4:                 1 1, mods
w
i ib a k k a= =  
J+5:                 If CONDITION1 = true,  i ik d=  
J+6:         ( )/i ik k k b= −  
J+7:         i = i + 1    
J+8: Return 2 1( ) ( )2 1(..., , )
b b
k k  
 
We remark that Algorithm 4.3 is a straightforward generalization of the Refined mbNAF 
algorithm introduced by the author and Gebotys in PKC2009 [LG09] to a generic set of bases 
1 2{ , , , }Ja a a= …A . Moreover, statements have been reordered and modified to improve 
readability. To add the capability of using fractional windows, one should simply replace 
1mods
w
ik k a=  in step (J+4) of Algorithm 4.3 by steps 2-4 of Algorithm 4.2. 
Similar to multibase NAF, Algorithm 4.3 evaluates congruency with a pre-ordered set of 
bases 1 2{ , , , }Ja a a= …A , which again is chosen according to the targeted setting and fixes 1a  as 








evaluating division sequences according to the cost per bit function (4.7). 
Now, let k be a partial value of the scalar during execution of Algorithm 4.3, , 0j jw w′ ≥  be 
integers, 1, {0, 1, 3, 5, , (2 1)}wi id k D
−∈ = ± ± ± ± −… , 0id ≠ , with a standard window width w, e be 
a parameter > 0 and ,φ µ  be odd integers such that 1 2{ , , , } | ,Ja a a φ µ/… . The conditional 
statements to be inserted in Algorithm 4.3 follow the next criteria: 
• CONDITION1: given an approximation 21 2
Jwww
i Jk k a a a φ− = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅…  using a standard 




i Jk d a a a µ
′′ ′
− = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅… , i id k≠ , 
and its associated cost per bit ( )ik dς −  is lower than the cost per bit ( )ik kς −  associated 
to the sequence guaranteed by the standard window w, that is, if ( ) ( )i ik d e k kς ς− + < − , 
the approximation ik d−  replaces ik k− .   
• CONDITION2.j, for 1 1j J≤ ≤ − : given the partial scalar value 22
Jww
Jk a a φ= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅… , if 
there is a nonzero digit \{0}id D∈  such that 1 21 2
Jww w
i Jk d a a a µ
′′ ′
− = ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅…  and its 
associated cost per bit ( )ik dς −  is lower than the cost per bit ( )kς , that is, if 
( ) ( )ik d e kς ς− + < , the approximation ik d−  replaces the zero digit 0ik = . 
CONDITION1 aims at reducing the length of the expansion by using more expensive point 
operations (i.e., operations with bases ja , where 1j > ) that yield cheaper-per-bit chains than the 
usual sequence of operations with base 1a , after each nonzero term. Similarly, CONDITION2 
determines if there is a chain involving an addition that is cheaper-per-bit than the sequence 
directly dividing by the bases.   
Note that if one assumes that values after executing a given sequence followed by an addition 
are approximately uniformly distributed over odd numbers, then choosing the cheapest-per-bit 
sequence for a partial value k would ultimately yield a multibase chain for the full point 
multiplication that is cheaper in average. However, Algorithm 4.3 does not necessarily execute 
the full sequence that was chosen. It instead re-evaluates and analyzes the costs of new sequences 
after each doubling, tripling or quintupling. Hence, CONDITION1 and 2 above include a security 
parameter, namely e, to guarantee that the chosen sequence is significantly better than the usual 
one.    
Although the number of divisibility tests with different combinations of bases A  that can be 
evaluated in CONDITION1 and 2 of Algorithm 4.3 is potentially high, we show in the following 
that only a few tests are necessary to achieve performance (conjecturally) close to optimal.       
Next, we illustrate the design of efficient CONDITION1 and 2 for the case {2,3}=A . Since 
extension to other cases easily follows, we simply sketch the design for the case {2,3,5}=A  (see 








4.4.1.1. Refined Multibase Chains with Bases {2,3} 
We discuss next the design of CONDITION1 and 2 for the case {2,3}=A . 
CONDITION1: 
Following the criteria discussed previously and given a partial scalar k, standard window width w 
and set of bases 1 2{ , } {2,3}a a= =A , where 
+
ja ∈Z , we propose the following format for 
CONDITION1 in Algorithm 4.3:  
 
 









1 : if (( )mod 2 3 0 and ( )mod 2 0) or
2 : (( )mod 2 3 0 and ( )mod 2 0) or





w w w C
i C i
k d k k
k d k k




− ⋅ = − ≠
− ⋅ = − ≠




              (4.8) 
 
 
where , 0j cw′ ≥  
are integers, mods2wik k= , c is the condition number such that 1 c C≤ ≤  and 
1
, \ {0} { 1, 3, 5, , (2 1)}
w
i cd D
−∈ = ± ± ± ± −… . In order to guarantee a cheaper-per-bit sequence at 
each evaluation of CONDITION1 it is required that ,( ) ( )i c c ik d e k kς ς− + < − , which compares 
the sequence costs up to the next addition using positive values ce  for 1 c C≤ ≤ . Using function 
(4.7), this is roughly equivalent to the following comparison: 
                           
1, 2,
1, 2, 2





w w w c
e
w w w c
′ ′⋅ + ⋅ + + − ⋅ +
+ <
′ ′+ + −
.                   (4.9)                                       
We next illustrate the procedure for selecting values ,j cw′  and ce  for format (4.8) using eq. 
(4.9) when 2w = . The procedure can be easily extended to other window sizes. 
First, we build two tables: one with the costs per bit corresponding to sequences containing 
exactly d doublings (for congruency of ( )ik k− ) and another with the costs per bit corresponding 
to sequences divisible by 1, 2,2 3c c
w w′ ′
⋅  (for congruency of ,( )i ck d− ). Note that since 2w =  it 
always holds that 1, 1cw′ = . We show in Table 4.1 the results for Jacobian coordinates using costs 
from Table 2.2 (assuming that 1 0.8 )S M= . Since 2w =  calculations are performed with mixed 
additions (the cost of one mixed addition is obtained as ADD DBLADD DBLm m= − ). 
Using Table 4.1, it is easy to see  that ( ) mod 4, ( ) mod8i ik k k k− ≡ − ≡  yields a sequence 
that is more expensive per bit than, at least, ,( ) mod3i ck d− ≡ ; ( ) mod8, ( ) mod16i ik k k k− ≡ − ≡  
yields a sequence that is more expensive per bit than, at least, ,( ) mod9i ck d− ≡ ; 
( ) mod16, ( ) mod32i ik k k k− ≡ − ≡  yields a sequence that is more expensive per bit than, at 
least, ,( ) mod27i ck d− ≡ ; and so on. This analysis gives a close idea about the statements that 








Table 4.1. Cost-per-bit for statements in CONDITION1, bases {2,3}, w = 2, J coordinates. 
Congruency of  ( )
i















mod 4, mod 8≡ ≡  2 16.6 mod3≡  (1, 1) 15.0 
mod 8, mod16≡ ≡  3 13.4 mod9≡  (1, 2) 12.3 
mod16, mod 32≡ ≡  4 11.8 mod27≡  (1, 3) 11.1 
mod 32, mod 64≡ ≡  5 10.8 mod81≡  (1, 4) 10.4 
mod 64, mod128≡ ≡  6 10.2 mod243≡  (1, 5) 10.0 
mod128, mod 256≡ ≡  7 9.7 mod729≡  (1, 6) 9.7 
mod 256, mod 512≡ ≡  8 9.4    
 
to (4.8) for conditions c = 1, 2, 3, and so on (in that order), the multibase chains obtained are 
expected to be cheaper in average than those produced by the case without conditions (i.e., 
mbNAF, given by Algorithm 4.1). Nevertheless, choosing the minimal condition for which 
congruency with ( )ik k−  is more expensive is not necessarily optimal. In other words, it is still 
possible to do better by choosing the optimal parameter ce  for each case.     
For the latter, it is necessary to perform an analysis of costs of the possible combinations. For 
instance, consider the evaluation “ ,1if (( )mod 3 0 and ( ) mod8 0)
t
i ik d k k− = − ≠ ” with 2w = , 
1t ≥ ∈Z  and 1C c= =  in (4.8) to implement CONDITION1. The cost per bit in this case is 
approximately given by: 
 
2 2
1 2DBL 1TPL 2ADD 1 3DBL 2ADD 3DBL 1TPL 2ADD
4 2 log 3 4 3 3 log 3
α
   + + + + +
+ + +   
+ +   
,                   (4.10) 
 
where 
( 1) ( 1)
2
1 1 2DBL 2ADD 1 3DBL 2ADD 1 1DBL TPL 2ADD
1






+ + + ⋅ +
= − × + × +
+ ⋅
   
    
    
. 
 
It can be seen from (4.10) that optimality is achieved with min( )α . For example, for J, eJQ
 and IE coordinates (using operation costs from Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 and assuming 
1 0.8 )S M= , min( )α  is obtained with 2t = . Notice that analysis in α  can go deeper and include 
a higher number of consecutive doublings and triplings. However, the occurrence decreases 
rapidly with the number of consecutive operations and so their impact in the cost. A similar 
analysis can be carried out to determine optimal values for following conditions c in (4.8).   
Additionally, it is necessary to determine the influence of C in the cost performance. A 
probability analysis similar to the one performed above can be carried out to determine the 








tests to evaluate the cost performance of full 160-bit scalar multiplications. The results are 
discussed in the subsection “Analysis of Multiple Conditions”, pp. 90. 
CONDITION2: 
Following the criteria discussed previously and given a partial scalar k, standard window width w 
and set of bases 1 2{ , } {2,3}a a= =A , where 
+
ja ∈Z , we propose the following format for 
CONDITION2 in Algorithm 4.3:  
 
 










1 : if (( )mod 2 0 and mod3 0) or
2 : (( )mod 2 0 and mod3 0) or



















                         (4.11) 
 
 
where again , 0j cw′ ≥  are integers, c is the condition number s.t. 1 c C≤ ≤ , and , \ {0}i cd D∈ =  
1{ 1, 3, 5, , (2 1)}w−± ± ± ± −… . To guarantee a cheaper-per-bit sequence at each evaluation of 
CONDITION2 it is required that ,( ) ( )i c ck d e kς ς− + < , which compares the sequence costs up to 
the next addition using positive values ce  for 1 c C≤ ≤ . Using function (4.7), this is roughly 
equivalent to the following comparison: 
               1, 1,
1, 1, 2
DBL 2ADD ( 1) DBL 2ADD1 ( 1)TPL+1ADD







′ ′ ⋅ + + ⋅ + +
+ + <  ′ ′ + + ⋅ 
.        (4.12)                                       
Let us now illustrate the procedure for selecting values ,j cw′  and ce  for format (4.11) using 
eq. (4.12) when 2w = .  
Similarly to the case with CONDITION1, we first build two tables: one with the costs per bit 
corresponding to sequences divisible by 1,2 c
w′
 (for congruency of ,( )i ck d− ) and another with the 
costs per bit corresponding to sequences with exactly t triplings (for congruency of k). In Table 
4.2, we show the results for Jacobian coordinates using costs from Table 2.2 (assuming that 
1 0.8 )S M= . Again, we assume that 2w = , calculations are performed with mixed additions and 
the cost of one mixed addition is obtained as ADD DBLADD DBLm m= − .   
Using Table 4.2, we can see that mod3, mod9k k≡ ≡  yields a sequence that is more 
expensive per bit than, at least, ,( ) mod8i ck d− ≡ ; mod9, mod 27k k≡ ≡  yields a sequence that 
is more expensive per bit than, at least, ,( ) mod32i ck d− ≡ ; mod27, mod81k k≡ ≡  yields a 
sequence that is more expensive per bit than, at least, ,( ) mod128i ck d− ≡ ; and so on. If these 
congruency evaluations are directly plugged into (4.11) for conditions c = 1, 2, 3, and so on (in 








Table 4.2. Cost-per-bit for statements in CONDITION2, bases {2,3}, w = 2, J coordinates. 











mod 3, mod 9≡ ≡  1 14.0 mod 4≡  2 15.0 
mod 9, mod 27≡ ≡  2 11.0 mod8≡  3 12.6 
mod 27, mod 81≡ ≡  3 10.0 mod16≡  4 11.3 
mod81, mod 243≡ ≡  4 9.5 mod32≡  5 10.5 
mod 243, mod 729≡ ≡  5 9.2 mod64≡  6 10.0 
mod 729, mod 2187≡ ≡  6 9.0 mod128≡  7 9.6 
   mod256≡  8 9.3 
 
by the case without conditions (i.e., mbNAF; Algorithm 4.1). However, choosing the minimal 
condition for which congruency with k is more expensive is not necessarily optimal. In this case, 
it is necessary to perform a more in detail analysis of costs of the possible combinations. For 
instance, consider the evaluation “ ,1if (( )mod 2 0 and mod 9 0)
d
ik d k− = ≠ ” with 2w = , 
1d > ∈Z  and 1C c= =  in (4.11) to implement CONDITION2 in Algorithm 4.1. The cost per bit 
in this case is approximately given by: 
                                                         
2
2 1 2TPL 1ADD









1 2 1TPL 1ADD 1 2TPL 1ADD 1 1 DBL 2ADD 1 ( 1) DBL 2ADD
1





 + + ⋅ + + ⋅ +   
= − × + × + × + ×    
+    
. 
By analyzing (4.13), it can be seen that optimality is achieved with min( )β . For instance, for 
J, eJQ  and IE coordinates (using operation costs from Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 and assuming 
1 0.8 )S M= , min( )β  is obtained with 4d = . Although analysis in β  can go deeper and include 
higher numbers of consecutive doublings and triplings, the occurrence decreases rapidly with the 
number of consecutive operations and so the impact in the cost. A similar analysis can be carried 
out to determine optimal values for following conditions c in (4.11).   
 
In the following example, we illustrate the derivation of a multibase chain using Algorithm 
4.3 with an efficient selection of parameters for CONDITION1 (4.8) and CONDITION2 (4.11), as 
discussed in this section. In the remainder, conditions from (4.8) and (4.11) are denoted by 
pairing values 1, 2,2 3c c
w w′ ′
⋅  and 2w c+ , and values 1,2 c
w′
 and 13c+ , respectively, as follows: 
      1,1 2,1 1,2 2,2 1, 2, 1,1 1,2 1,1 2 2 3 1(2 3 - 2 ,2 3 - 2 , ,2 3 - 2 | 2 - 3 ,2 - 3 , ,2 - 3 )C C C








where paired values for CONDITION1 and 2 are separated by “|”. For instance, in Example 4.4 
conditions denoted by (9-8|32-9) mean that Algorithm 4.3 includes the evaluation                         
“ ,1if (( )mod9 0 and ( )mod8 0)i ik d k k− = − ≠ ” as CONDITION1 and the evaluation                    
“ ,1if (( )mod32 0 and mod9 0)ik d k− = ≠ ” as CONDITION2.  
Example 4.4.  Using Algorithm 4.3, we find the following refined multibase chain for computing 
8821P by using bases {2,3}, w = 2 and conditions (9-8|32-9): (3) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2)8821 1 0 0 0 1 0= −  
(2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (2) (2)
0 0 0 1 0 0 1− , which has been derived using the division sequence 88208821 1
2
− → →
4410 2205 736 368 184 92 46 24 12 6 3
735 1 23 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 33
→ → + → → → → → → + → → → → → .                                                                                       
Notice that, for instance, the partial value 735 is conveniently approximated to 736, by means 
of CONDITION1, instead of dividing it by 3, allowing the efficient insertion of several 
consecutive doublings that ultimately reduce the nonzero density of the expansion. If we compare 
the performance of this multibase chain when computing 8821P against the basic multibase NAF 
approach using the same window size, we can observe that the cost reduces from 8DBL + 3TPL 
+ 4mADD = 115.2M to only 10DBL + 2TPL + 3mADD = 107.6M ( eJQ , 1S = 0.8M). 
Finally, a probability analysis can be carried out to determine the optimal C for 
CONDITION1 and 2. As stated before, this analysis increases in complexity very rapidly, so 
instead we have run many tests to evaluate the cost performance of full 160-bit scalar 
multiplications. The results are discussed in the following subsection. 
Analysis of Multiple Conditions 
The use of multiple conditions in CONDITION1 (4.8) and CONDITION2 (4.11) enable a wider 
search for cheaper multibase chains. However, as the number of conditions C increases the 
impact on the cost decreases. We have run several tests with 160-bit point multiplications to 
explore empirically the behavior of Algorithm 4.3 when increasing C. The results are displayed 
in Fig. 4.1-4.2. 
In our tests, we average the cost of 1000 point multiplications using 160-bit random scalars. 
To determine the conditional statements in each case, we performed the analysis described in the 
previous section. We also carried out multiple tests to confirm our parameter selection and when 
analysis got excessively complex.  
In Figures 4.1 and 4.2, x and y in (x|y) denote the number of conditions C for CONDITION1 
and 2, respectively. 
As can be seen, selection (1|1) achieves the higher relative speed up. As C increases the gain 
also decreases. In general, for 2C ≥  the costs do not vary significantly. On the negative side, this 
implies that even deeper searching for efficient sequences will only provide smaller speed ups. 








Figure 4.1. Cost of 160-bit point multiplication without precomputations using refined multibase chains. Conditional 
statements: nc = no conditions, (1|1) = (9-8|32-9), (2|2) = (9-8,27-16|32-9,64-27), (3|3) = (9-8,27-16,81-32|32-9,64-
27,128-81) ,(4|4) = (9-8,27-16,81-32,243-64|32-9,64-27,128-81,256-243). 
Figure 4.2. Cost of 160-bit point multiplication with w = 5 using refined multibase chains. Conditional statements: nc 
= no conditions, (1|1) = (144-64|64-9), (2|2) = (144-64,324-128|64-9,512-27), (3|3) = (144-64,324-128,648-256|64-
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conjecturally, close to optimal performance. 
Highly Compact Multibase Algorithms, Bases {2,3} 
The generalized formats for conditions (4.8) and (4.11) allow one to perform a relatively simple 
and scalable analysis of Algorithm 4.3. However, following observations by Walter [Wal11] it is 
obvious that much more compact algorithms can be easily derived once the design parameters 
(i.e., conditional statements, window width and bases) are fixed. The following examples 
illustrate how the original algorithm for finding refined multibase chains can be rearranged to 
obtain very compact algorithms with fixed parameters. 
Example 4.5. If we select conditions (9-8|32-9), window size w = 2 and bases {2,3}, then it is 




if mod 2 0, 0
elseif mod3 0 and ~ ( )mod32 0 and mod9 0 , 0, 3




i i i i
k k b
k k
k k k k k b





= − = ≠ = =
 + = − ≠ = −
 
 
Example 4.6. If we select conditions (144-64|64-9), window size w = 5 and bases {2,3}, then 




if mod 2 0, 0
elseif mod3 0 and ~ ( )mod64 0 and mod9 0 , 0, 3







k k k k k b





= − = ≠ = =




Modified algorithms above are obtained by removing redundancy in the evaluations and 
rearranging conditional statements once design parameters are fixed. We remark that these 
algorithms are equivalent to Algorithm 4.3 and yield the same output for a given scalar when 
using the same design parameters. As consequence, we observe that the refined multibase 
methodology described in this section can achieve (conjecturally) close to optimal performance 
with highly compact algorithms.   
4.4.1.2. Refined Multibase Chains with Bases {2,3,5} 








Suggested formats for CONDITION1 and 2 in this case are provided below. 
CONDITION1: 
Given a partial scalar k, standard window width w and set of bases 1 2 3{ , , } {2,3,5}a a a= =A , 
where +ja ∈Z , we propose the following format for CONDITION1 in Algorithm 4.3:  
 
 









1 : if (( )mod 2 3 5 0 and ( )mod 2 0) or
2 : (( )mod 2 3 5 0 and ( )mod 2 0) or
: (( )mod 2 3 5 0 and ( )mod 2 0)C C C
w w w w
i i
w w w w
i i
w w w w C
i C i
k d k k
k d k k
C k d k k
′ ′ ′ +
′ ′ ′ +
′ ′ ′ +
− ⋅ ⋅ = − ≠
− ⋅ ⋅ = − ≠




       (4.14) 
 
 
where , 0j cw′ ≥  
are integers, mods2
w
ik k= , c is the condition number such that 1 c C≤ ≤  and 
1
, \ {0} { 1, 3, 5, , (2 1)}
w
i cd D
−∈ = ± ± ± ± −… .  
CONDITION2: 
Given a partial scalar k, standard window width w and set of bases 1 2 3{ , , } {2,3,5}a a a= =A , 
















1 : if ( mod5 0) and
1.1 : [if (( )mod 2 0 and mod3 0) or
1. : (( )mod 2 0 and mod3 0)] or
2 : if ( mod5 0) and
2.1 : [if (( )mod 2 0 and mod3 5 0) or













B k d k
k
k d k









− = ⋅ ≠












where , ,, , , 0j b j cw w u v′ ′′ ≥  are integers, b and c are the condition numbers such that 1 b B≤ ≤ , 
1 c C≤ ≤ , and 1, ,, \ {0} { 1, 3, 5, , (2 1)}
w
i b i cd d D
−∈ = ± ± ± ± −… . Note that the upper section of 
(4.15) evaluates conditions when sequences are not divisible by 5, whereas the lower section 
evaluates conditions when sequences are divisible by both 3 and 5.  




















1 : if (( )mod 2 0 and mod5 0) or
2 : (( )mod 2 0 and mod5 0) or



















                         (4.16) 
 
 
where again , 0j cw′ ≥  are integers, c is the condition number s.t. 1 c C≤ ≤ , and , \{0}i cd D∈ =  
1{ 1, 3, 5, , (2 1)}w−± ± ± ± −… .  
4.5. Performance Comparison 
We have carried out extensive tests to evaluate the performance of the multibase algorithms 
discussed in this chapter when applied on standard, extended Jacobi quartic and Twisted Edwards 
curves using Jacobian (J ), extended Jacobi quartic ( eJQ ) and inverted Edwards (IE) 
coordinates, respectively. We implemented the traditional wNAF, wmbNAF (Algorithm 4.1) and 
the refined multibase method (Algorithm 4.3) in Matlab, and ran the algorithms with different 
window sizes for 1000 160- and 256-bit scalars chosen randomly. In the case of multibase 
algorithms, we evaluated the methods when using the sets of bases {2,3} and {2,3,5}.  
We distinguish two cases: scenarios with minimal storage (without precomputations) and 
scenarios with no memory constraints (with optimal number of precomputations). 
To estimate costs for each method, we first counted the required number of point operations 
per scalar, averaged the results and then calculated the cost using Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 (costs 
labeled as “Using S-M tradings”), ignoring costs of additions and multiplications by curve 
parameters for simplification purposes. Also, for scenarios with no memory constraints we 
included in the overall cost the cost of calculating the precomputed points. For computing these 
points, we consider two cases (see Chapter 3): points are left in projective coordinates (case 1), 
and points are converted to affine using one inversion (case 2). As observed in Section 3.4.1 
(Table 3.9, 17ESL = ; and Table A.1, 27ESL = ), n = 160 and 256 bits, case 2 is advantageous 
using Jacobian coordinates for low and intermediate I/M ratios, whereas case 1 is more efficient 
for high I/M values. Thus, the particular I/M ratio of an implementation will decide which case is 
more effective on a standard curve. In the case of eJQ  and IE  coordinates, we only consider 
case 1 as this scheme should be largely preferred because of the minimal difference of costs 
between general and mixed additions (see Section 3.4.2, Table 3.11, 5w = ; and Table 3.12, 
6w = ). Following the analysis in Section 3.4, for Jacobian coordinates, we use the LM Scheme, 
case 1 and case 2b, whose costs are given by formulas (3.4) and (3.6), respectively, and for eJQ  








The costs using the different methods are summarized in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 for n = 160 and 
256 bits, respectively. We have sped up further the proposed multibase methods by saving some 
initial computations. This technique is similar to that proposed in [Elm06, Section 4.2.2] plus 
some additional savings gained with the use of composite operations (i.e., tripling, quintupling). 
Note that for Jacobian coordinates we use the efficient doubling-addition (DBLADD) 
operation instead of traditional addition for all the proposed methods. This operation has also 
been used to improve the performance of the tree-based approach by Doche et al. [DH08].    
As can be seen, in the scenario without precomputations, the new refined multibase chains 
obtained from Algorithm 4.3 achieve the lowest costs for all curves under analysis and security 
levels. For instance, our results reduce costs in 3% and 10% in comparison with the tree-based 
method and NAF, respectively, on both eJQ  and J coordinates with 160n =  bits. On the other 
hand, the basic multibase NAF using bases {2,3} and {2,3,5} achieves better performance than 
the original double-base method based on the “Greedy” algorithm [DIM05]. That is in addition to 
the attractive features of mbNAF such as simplicity, memory efficiency and easiness to be 
analyzed theoretically. The tree-based method achieves slightly lower costs than mbNAF for 
bases {2,3} when using IE coordinates. However, mbNAF with bases {2,3,5} surpasses the 
performance of this method in all the remaining cases. We remark that the tree-based method 
also finds double-base chains using division chains, although using a search-based approach that 
consumes more memory than the basic multibase NAF.  
Remarkably, in some scenarios using J , refined multibase chains with bases {2,3,5} and no 
precomputations surpasses the performance of the fastest NAF-based method using an optimal 
number of precomputed points. For instance, if n = 160 bits the multibase method is superior 
always when 1I > 19M. 
For comparison in the scenario with optimal number of precomputations, we include results 
by Bernstein et al. [BBL+07]. This work uses a double-base method based on the “Greedy” 
algorithm that has been optimized for the use of precomputations. We can see that both the basic 
wmbNAF and the refined multibase chains offer lower computing costs for all the cases under 
analysis. Note that in this case the performance gap is due to a combination of superior multibase 
chains and precomputation schemes, faster point operations (e.g., we use the doubling-addition 
operation in Jacobian coordinates) and the inclusion of the technique to save initial computations. 
A more serious competition is brought by the recent work by Meloni and Hasan [MH09], 
which proposes the use of DBNS representations in combination with Yao’s algorithm. This 
method, denoted by Yao-DBNS, is not based on division chains and has been shown to be 
efficient when using DBNS representations obtained with the “Greedy” algorithm. Therefore, it 
is intended for platforms where memory is not scarce.  






Table 4.3. Comparison of double-base and triple-base scalar multiplication methods (n = 160 bits; 1S = 0.8M). 
Method  # pts 




Jacobian (J ) 
Precomp Total Precomp Total Precomp Total 
 Refined multibase  (this work)  0 0      1261M  (2) 0 0     1351M  (1) 0 0     1451M  (2) 
 mbNAF  (this work)  0 0      1292M  (2) 0 0     1380M  (1) 0 0     1485M  (2) 
 Tree-based double-base, Doche et al. [DH08]  0 0 1303M 0 0 1377M 0 0 1493M 
 Double-base (Greedy), Dimitrov et al. [DIM05]  0 0 1328M 0 0 1403M 0 0     1545M  † 
 NAF  0 0 1394M 0 0 1448M 0 0 1616M 
 Refined multibase  (this work)  7 59.6M      1214M  (2) 7 62.2M     1267M  (1) 
6 55.4M     1427M  (2) 
6 1I+68.4M     1I + 1388M  (2) 
 (Frac-)wmbNAF  (this work)  7 59.6M      1222M  (2) 7 62.2M      1274M  (1) 
6 55.4M    1432M  (2) 
6 1I+68.4M     1I + 1397M  (2) 
 Yao-DBNS (Greedy), Meloni et al. [MH09]  N/A N/A 1211M N/A N/A 1259M N/A N/A 1475M 
 Double-base (Greedy), Bernstein et al. [BBL+07]   7 N/A 1311M 7 N/A 1290M 7 N/A    1504M  † 
 (Fractional) wNAF  7 59.6M 1246M 7 62.2M 1291M 
6 55.4M 1476M 
6 1I+68.4M 1I + 1432M 
† Without using doubling-addition operation [LM08b].  
(1) Bases {2,3}. 







Table 4.4. Comparison of double-base and triple-base scalar multiplication methods (n = 256 bits; 1S = 0.8M). 
Method  # pts 




Jacobian (J ) 
Precomp Total Precomp Total Precomp Total 
 Refined multibase  (this work)  0 0     2026M  (2) 0 0      2174M  (1) 0 0     2330M  (2) 
 mbNAF  (this work)  0 0     2077M  (2) 0 0      2218M  (1) 0 0     2387M  (2) 
 Tree-based double-base, Doche et al. [DH08]  0 0 2084M 0 0 2202M 0 0 2388M 
 Double-base (Greedy), Dimitrov et al. [DIM05]  0 0 2125M 0 0 2244M 0 0    2472M  † 
 NAF  0 0 2244M 0 0 2329M 0 0 2601M 
 Refined multibase  (this work)  8 69M     1925M  (2) 8 72M       2013M  (1) 
8 72.2M    2277M  (2) 
8 1I+89.6M   1I + 2204M  (2) 
 (Frac-)wmbNAF  (this work)  8 69M     1940M  (2) 8 72M      2025M  (1) 
8 72.2M   2291M  (2) 
8 1I+89.6M   1I + 2219M  (2) 
 Yao-DBNS (Greedy), Meloni et al. [MH09]  N/A N/A 1911M N/A N/A 1993M N/A N/A 2316M 
 Double-base (Greedy), Bernstein et al. [BBL+07]   8 N/A 2071M 8 N/A 2041M 7 N/A    2379M  † 
 (Fractional) wNAF  8 69M 1954M 8 72M 2023M 
8 72.2M 2326M 
8 1I+89.6M 1I + 2235M 
† Without using doubling-addition operation [LM08b]. 
(1) Bases {2,3}. 









DBNS achieve very close performance for all cases and security levels under analysis. The gap 
when using eJQ  and IE  coordinates is between ~0%-1% in favor of Yao-DBNS. Given the 
small theoretical gap and because factors such as cache performance and operation cost 
variations influence computing time in practice, both methods are expected to achieve equivalent 
performance for all practical purposes. When using J coordinates the refined multibase chains 
remain faster than Yao-DBNS with an advantage between 2%-3%. 
Comparison with High-Speed Curves using Radix-2 Methods 
Recently, new special curve forms with very efficient group arithmetic have been proposed. 
These curves achieve high performance in part because they have very efficient doubling and 
addition formulas. Among them, Twisted Edwards curves (2.12) with parameter 1a = −  using 
mixed /
e
EE  coordinates seem to currently offer the best operation count over prime fields 
[HWC+09]. Unfortunately, there are no known efficient formulas for tripling and quintupling 
and, hence, these curves cannot benefit from multibase methods.  
A performance comparison with the best results from this chapter is relevant. Table 4.5 
shows the results using NAF and wNAF for Twisted Edwards with mixed /
e
EE  coordinates, 
refined multibase chains with bases {2,3} for Twisted Edwards using IE coordinates and refined 
multibase chains with bases {2,3,5} for extended Jacobi quartics using eJQ  coordinates. Since 
curve settings using eJQ  and IE  involve formulas with multiplications by curve parameters 
and /
e
EE  coordinates do not, in this case we consider three scenarios: 1 0.1D M= , 1 0.5D M=  
and 1 1D M= . Operation costs are taken from Tables 2.3 and 2.4 and cost of precomputation is 
not included for simplification purposes.  
It can be seen that the fastest curve using refined multibase chains (ExtJQuartic, eJQ ) with 
no precomputations outperforms the best performer using radix-2 methods (TEdwards, /
e
EE ) if 
curve parameters do not introduce a significant overhead. For other cases, / eEE  using (w)NAF is  
Table 4.5. Comparison of lowest costs using multibase and radix-2 methods for scalar 
multiplication, n = 160 bits (cost of precomputation is not included). 
Curve Method 
Cost (0 pts) Cost (7 pts) 
1 0.1D M= 1 0.5D M= 1 1D M=  1 0.1D M= 1 0.5D M= 1 1D M=  
ExtJQuartic, d = 1, eJQ   refined (2,3,5) 1281M 1346M 1428M 1186M 1254M 1339M 
TEdwards, a = 1, IE refined (2,3) 1372M 1444M 1534M 1233M 1303M 1390M 
TEdwards, a = −1, /
e









the clear winner given the significant overhead introduced by extra multiplications by constants 
and/or the reduced gain margin obtained with the use of multibases.  
In conclusion, if curve parameters are suitably chosen then curves using multibase methods 
(which otherwise would be slower) may become competitive and even faster than the fastest 
known curves using radix-2 in memory-constrained devices. For other applications with no 
memory constraints, it is suggested the use of the fastest curves using (Frac-)wNAF. 
4.6. Other Applications, Variants and Challenges 
In this chapter, we have argued that an analysis based on the operation cost per bit should allow 
one to find the optimal multibase chain(s) for a given scalar. We showed that constraining that 
analysis to a “portion” of the chain at a time still enables efficient performance. Nevertheless, 
there are many unexplored possibilities that arise from this new approach. In particular, we have 
used Algorithm 4.3 for evaluating the different sequences using the operation cost per bit. 
However, the same methodology can be applied to different variants of this algorithm that could 
achieve better performance in settings with different relative operation costs.  
As stated before, provided formats for CONDITION1 and 2 evaluate sequences up to the next 
addition only. However, expanding the “range” of testing could improve performance further. 
The study of the potential improvement is left as future work. 
Also, as discussed in Section 4.4, Algorithm 4.3 employs an on-line congruency testing 
approach to select the division sequences. An alternative approach would involve on-the-fly 
calculation and comparison of the costs per bit of the possible sequences. This on-the-fly 
approach would lead to alternative algorithms different to the ones proposed here.  
Remarkably, other methods in the literature can take advantage of the proposed method. For 
instance, the tree-based approach by [DH08] can be optimized by employing the operation cost 
per bit to select division sequences instead of simply selecting the sequences that reach the lowest 
values. This could potentially allow one to select only one node (and to avoid keeping B nodes 
each time, saving memory). In this case, the method would take the form of the on-the-fly 
approach described above. Similar ideas apply to the case of multiple scalar multiplication 
[DKS09]. 
In the proposed algorithms, the congruency testing is performed after every performed 
(doubling, tripling, quintupling) operation (see Algorithm 4.3). In this case the number of 
iterations for conversion is determined by the total number of doublings, triplings and 
quintuplings. A simplified variant with faster conversion to multibase would involve the full 









the number of iterations required to the number of additions. The impact in the cost of scalar 
multiplication is left as future work. 
Closely following developments for single scalar multiplication, there have appeared recent 
efforts for speeding up multiple scalar multiplication with the form kP lQ+  using double-base 
chains. See for instance [DKS09] that presents the analogous of the original tree-based approach 
[DH08], or [ADI10]. All these works employ division chains and can be improved by exploiting 
the methodology based on the operation cost per bit exposed in this chapter. The different 
variants discussed in this subsection could also be adapted to this case. 
A note on recent work in the literature:  
Very recently and working on top of our techniques published in PKC2009 [LG09], Walter 
[Wal11] also proposed the use of the cost per bit to derive multibase algorithms based on division 
chains. Although his methodology is based on a slightly more elaborated cost function, results 
are expected to be similar to the ones obtained with the methodology in Section 4.4.1.1. 
Algorithms in [Wal11] are similar (with some variations) to the ones proposed in PKC2009 and 
revisited here. Although [Wal11] presented slightly better results, we implemented and tested the 
modified algorithms under the same conditions in which all our algorithms were tested and they 
achieved equivalent or slightly lower performance than our results. Walter proposed to simplify 
algorithms to obtain much more compact versions. Following these suggestions, we derived 
compact versions for our algorithms in the subsection “Highly Compact Multibase Algorithms, 
Bases {2,3}”, pp. 92.     
4.6.1. Open Challenges 
It has been shown in this chapter that the use of double- and multi-base representations enables 
faster scalar multiplication in terms of field multiplications and squarings. However, the 
conversion step in double-base and multi-base methods is more time consuming than using 
methods based on radix 2. This may or may not be a limiting factor depending on the 
characteristics of a particular implementation and the chosen platform.  
If scalar conversion to multibase representation is expensive, then it must be performed off-
line, limiting the applicability of these methods to scenarios in which the same scalar k is reused 
several times or the conversion can be carried out during an idle time (e.g., between the first and 
second phases of the ECDH scheme during data transmission). To overcome this restriction, 









platforms, accompanied by stringent benchmarking strategies (an inefficient implementation with 
an “optimized” binary-to-multibase conversion function would obviously lead to misleading 
conclusions).  
Another challenge relates to the efficiency gain that these methods provide. Following results 
from Section 4.5, theoretical estimates indicate that cost reductions for constrained and non-
constrained devices are in the ranges 7%-10% and 1%-3% in comparison with (w)NAF, 
respectively. The gain margin is expected to reduce further on certain platforms or even vanish in 
the case of non-constrained devices when considerations such as cache performance are taken 
into account; see illustrative test results on x86-64 processors in Section 5.6.4, subsection 
“Timings using Multibase Methods”. These observations are confirmed by recent results in the 
literature that achieve very close theoretical performance at the cost of highly expensive 
conversion steps [SEI11]. Moreover, for non-constrained devices there are curves that offer 
higher performance using classical radix 2 methods (see Table 4.5). In conclusion, implementers 
would probably prefer the adoption of multibase strategies when conversion (if expensive) can be 
performed off-line and the platform is a memory-constrained device, for which the cost 
reductions are non-negligible in comparison with radix-2 methods. 
A more somber horizon is envisioned for multiple scalar multiplication methods using double 
bases in the literature. A popular application of the operation uP vQ+  is signature verification 
(as needed for ECDSA; see §2.2.3). However, in this case integers u and v are calculated on-line 
as part of the verification process and, hence, conversion time from binary to double-base must 
be included in the computing cost. This reduces drastically (or completely eliminates) the 
possible gain obtained with these methods in multiple scalar multiplication.    
4.7. Conclusions 
This chapter discussed the efficient design of scalar multiplication algorithms based on double 
and multibase chains.   
In §4.1, we categorized and analyzed the most relevant methods using double-base and multi-
base representations in the literature, highlighting advantages and disadvantages. Then in §4.2 we 
formally described the original (width-w) multibase NAF method, presenting the theoretical 
analysis of the different variants using Markov chains. In §4.3, we applied the fractional window 
recoding to multibase NAF. The revised method allows any number of precomputations, 
enabling lower costs and/or better coupling to memory-constrained environments.  
In §4.4, we introduced a novel methodology based on the analysis of point operation cost per 









implicitly used in Longa and Gebotys [LG09] to derive refined mbNAF chains, although an 
explicit description of the algorithm derivation was missing. We have filled the gap in this 
chapter. Intuitively, given unlimited resources this approach is expected to lead to optimal 
multibase chains. We demonstrated that very compact algorithms are still able to achieve high 
performance. We derived algorithms for the case of bases {2,3} and {2,3,5}, and analyzed the 
performance gain with the increase in the complexity of the multibase evaluation. For illustration 
purposes, we focused the analysis on three scenarios: standard curves using Jacobian coordinates, 
extended Jacobi quartics using extended Jacobi quartics coordinates and Twisted Edwards curves 
using inverted Edwards coordinates.  
In §4.5 we carried out a detailed comparison of the studied methods with the best approaches 
in the literature. For further cost improvement, we applied the best precomputation method 
developed in Chapter 3 for each scenario. After extensive comparisons with the most efficient 
methods in the literature, we concluded that the refined multibase chains achieve the highest 
performance on all scenarios with no precomputations, introducing cost reductions in the range 
7%-10% in comparison with NAF. For the case of optimal use of precomputations, we show that 
the proposed algorithms are among the fastest ones, achieving practically equivalent performance 
to recent methods such as Yao-DBNS [MH09]. In this case, the theoretical cost reductions are in 
the range 1%-3% in comparison with (Frac)-wNAF.     
Finally, in §4.6 we discussed many potential possibilities for the multibase approach based on 
the analysis of the operation cost per bit. We detailed how this tool could potentially lead to 
different variants of the proposed multibase algorithms and how it could even improve existent 
methods in the literature. Other possible applications such as multiple scalar multiplications were 
also covered, as well as a discussion of open problems that challenge the practicality of double-
base and multi-base methods in real applications. In conclusion, we suggested the use of 
multibases for memory-constrained devices when the conversion step (if expensive) can be 
performed off-line. When precomputations are allowed, the gain may be negligible and faster 





5 Chapter 5 
Efficient Techniques for 
Implementing Elliptic Curves in 
Software 
In this chapter, we analyze and present experimental data evaluating the efficiency of several 
techniques for speeding up the computation of elliptic curve point multiplication on emerging 
x86-64 processor architectures. Our approach is based on a careful optimization of elliptic curve 
operations at all arithmetic layers in combination with techniques from computer architecture. 
Our contributions can be summarized as follows: 
• We analyze the efficient combination of two well-known techniques: elimination of 
conditional branches and incomplete reduction (IR), to achieve high-speed field 
arithmetic over pF . Specifically, we apply these techniques to the optimization of field 
arithmetic modulo a pseudo-Mersenne prime. 
• We study the impact of true data dependencies on elliptic curve operations. Moreover, to 
reduce the number of pipeline stalls, memory reads/writes and function calls in the 
execution of field and point arithmetic operations, we propose three generic techniques: 
field arithmetic scheduling, merging of point operations and merging of field operations.  









subtractions and small constants and maximizing the use of operations exploiting IR. 
• We study the extension of all the previous techniques to field arithmetic over 2pF , which 
has several applications in cryptography including its use as underlying field by the 
recently proposed Galbraith-Lin-Scott (GLS) method.  
• We explicitly state the improved explicit formulas using IR, with minimal number of 
operations and reduced number of data dependencies between contiguous field 
operations for two relevant cases: standard curves using J coordinates and Twisted 
Edwards curves using mixed homogeneous/extended homogeneous ( /
e
E E ) coordinates.   
• Finally, to illustrate the significant savings obtained by combining all the previous 
techniques with state-of-the-art ECC algorithms we present high-speed implementations 
of point multiplication that are up to 34% faster than the best previous results on x86-64 
processors. Our software takes into account results from Chapter 3 and includes the best 
precomputation scheme corresponding to each setting. 
Analysis and tests presented in this chapter are carried out and applied on emerging x86-64 
processors, which are getting widespread use in notebooks, desktops, workstations and servers. 
The reader should note, however, that some techniques and analysis are generic and can be 
extended to other computing devices based on 32-, 16- or 8-bit architectures. Whenever relevant, 
we briefly discuss the applicability of the techniques under analysis to other architectures.  
This chapter is organized as follows. After discussing some relevant previous work and 
background related to x86-64 processors in §5.1, we describe the techniques for optimizing 
modular reduction using a pseudo-Mersenne prime, namely incomplete reduction and elimination 
of conditional branches, in §5.2. Then, in §5.3 we study data dependencies between field 
operations and analyze some efficient countermeasures when their effect is potentially negative 
to performance. In §5.4, we describe our optimizations to explicit formulas that enable a 
reduction in the number of additions and other “small” operations. The extension of the 
techniques above to quadratic extension fields is presented in §5.5. Our high-speed 
implementations with and without exploiting the GLS method that illustrate the performance gain 
obtained with the techniques under analysis are presented in §5.6. Some conclusions are drawn in 
§5.7.    
5.1. Previous Work and the x86-64 Processor Family 
Since the 80’s and 90’s there have appeared an increasing number of studies focused on the 
optimization of the arithmetic of elliptic curves with application to cryptography. For example, 
some works have proposed methods using efficient arithmetic representations for scalars [Mor90, 









the number of point operations required for computing scalar multiplication. Other approaches 
have focused on constructing curve forms with fast group arithmetic and/or improved resilience 
against certain side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks [Sma01, BJ03b, Edw07], complemented by 
research studying efficient projective systems and optimized explicit formulas for point 
operations [CC86, CMO98, HWC+08, LM08b, HWC+09]. Yet another important aspect refers to 
the efficient implementation of long integer modular arithmetic [Kar95, Mon85, Com90, 
YSK02]. Given the myriad of possibilities, it is a very difficult task to determine which methods, 
once combined for the computation of scalar multiplication, are the most efficient ones for a 
specific platform. Notorious efforts in this direction are the efficient implementations on 
constrained 8-bit microcontrollers by [GPW+04, UWL+07], on 32-bit embedded devices by 
[XB01, GAS+05], on Graphical Processing Units (GPUs) by [SG08], on processors based on the 
Cell Broadband Engine Architecture (CBEA) by [CS09], on 32-bit processors by [BHL+01, 
Ber06], among others. In this work, we try to cover this analysis for the increasingly popular x86-
64-based processors.  
Elliptic Curve Scalar Multiplication on x86-64 Processors  
Modern CPUs from the notebook, desktop and server classes are decisively adopting the 64-bit 
x86 instruction set (a.k.a. x86-64) developed by [AMD]. The most relevant features of this new 
instruction set are the expansion of the general-purpose registers (GPRs) from 32 to 64 bits, the 
execution of arithmetic and logical operations on 64-bit integers and an increment in the number 
of GPRs, among other enhancements. In addition, these processors usually exhibit a highly 
pipelined architecture, improved branch predictors and complex execution stages that offer 
parallelism at the instruction level. Thus, this increasingly high complexity brings new paradigms 
to the software and compiler developer.      
It seems that the move to 64 bits, with the inclusion of a powerful 64-bit integer multiplier, 
favors prime fields. Although the analysis becomes complex and processor dependent, our tests 
on the targeted processors suggest that SSE2 and its extensions [Intel] are apparently not 
advantageous by themselves for the prime field arithmetic. This is probably due to the lack of 
carry handling and the fact that SSE2 multipliers can perform vector-multiplication with 
operands up to 32 bits only [HMS08]. However, this outcome could change in the near future 
with improved SIMD extensions, such as the upcoming Advanced Vector Extensions (AVX) that 
supports 256-bit SIMD vector registers.  
As consequence, it is still expected that a traditional approach for computing multiplication 
such as the “schoolbook” method performs better in this case. Methods such as Karatsuba 
multiplication theoretically reduce the number of integer multiplications but increase the number 









platforms, the cost of addition and other similar operations becomes non-negligible. Another 
aspect from this observation is that it now becomes relevant for the targeted 64-bit platforms the 
optimization of these usually neglected “small” operations.  
Another important feature is the highly pipelined architectures of these processors. For 
instance, experiments by [Fog2] suggest that Intel Atom, Intel Core 2 Duo and AMD 
architectures have pipelines with 16, 15 and 12 stages, respectively. Although sophisticated 
branch prediction techniques exist, it is expected that the “random” nature of cryptographic 
computations, specifically of modular reduction, causes expensive mispredictions that force the 
pipeline to flush.  
In this work, we analyze the performance of combining incomplete reduction (IR) and the 
elimination of conditional branches to obtain high-speed field arithmetic for performing 
operations such as addition, subtraction and multiplication/division by small constants using a 
very efficient pseudo-Mersenne prime. This effort puts together in an optimal way techniques by 
[YSK02], which only provided IR algorithms targeting primes of general form, with branchless 
field arithmetic recently adopted by some cryptographic libraries [mpFq, MIR]. In the process, 
we present experimental data quantifying the performance improvement obtained by eliminating 
branches in the field arithmetic. 
We also analyze the influence of deeply pipelined architectures in the ECC point 
multiplication execution. In particular, the increased number of pipeline stages makes (true) data 
dependencies between instructions in contiguous field operations expensive because these can 
potentially stall the execution for several clock cycles. These dependencies, also known as read-
after-write (RAW), are typically found between several field operations when the result of an 
operation is required as input by a following operation. In this work, we demonstrate the 
potentially high cost incurred by these dependencies, which is hardly avoided by compilers and 
dynamic schedulers in processors, and propose three techniques to reduce its effect: field 
arithmetic scheduling, merging of field operations and merging of point operations.  
The techniques above are first applied to modular operations using a prime p, which are used 
for performing the pF  arithmetic in ECC over prime fields. However, some of these techniques 
are generic and can also be extended to different scenarios using other underlying fields. For 
instance, Galbraith et al. [GLS09] recently proposed a faster way to do ECC that exploits an 
efficiently computable endomorphism to accelerate the execution of point multiplication over a 
quadratic extension field (a.k.a. GLS method); see Section 2.2.6. Accordingly, we extend our 
analysis to 2
p
F  arithmetic and show that the proposed techniques also lead to significant gains in 
performance in this case.  
Our extensive tests assessing the techniques under analysis cover at least one representative 









netbook class, 2.66GHz Intel Core 2 Duo E6750 from the desktop class, and 2.6GHz AMD 
Opteron 252 and 3.0GHz AMD Phenom II X4 940 from the server/workstation class. 
Finally, to assess their effectiveness for a full point multiplication, the proposed techniques 
are applied to state-of-the-art implementations using Jacobian (J ) and mixed Twisted Edwards 
homogeneous/extended homogeneous ( /
e
E E ) coordinates on the targeted processors. Our 
measurements show that the proposed optimizations (in combination with state-of-the-art point 
formulas/coordinate systems, precomputation schemes and exponentiation methods) significantly 
speed up the execution time of point multiplication, surpassing by considerable margins best 
previous results. For instance, we show that a point multiplication at the 128-bit security level 
can be computed in only 181000 cycles (in about 60µsec.) on an AMD Phenom II X4 when 
combining  with GLS. This represents a cost reduction of about 29% over the closest 
previous result; see Section 5.6.4 for complete details. 
5.2. Optimizing Modular Reduction using a Pseudo-
Mersenne Prime 
In this section, we evaluate the performance gain of two techniques, namely incomplete reduction 
and elimination of conditional branches, and combine them to devise highly efficient field 
arithmetic with very fast modular reduction for operations such as addition, subtraction and 
division/multiplication by constants. We also show that incomplete reduction is not exclusive to 
addition/subtraction and can be easily extended to other operations, and that subtraction does not 
necessarily benefit from incomplete reduction when p is a suitably chosen pseudo-Mersenne 
prime. All tests described in this section were performed on our assembly language module 
implementing the field arithmetic over pF  and compiled with GCC version 4.4.3.  
5.2.1. Incomplete Reduction (IR)  
This technique was introduced by Yanik et al. [YSK02] for the case of primes of general form. 
Given two numbers in the range [0, 1]p − , it consists of allowing the result of an operation to 
stay in the range [0,2 1]s −  instead of executing a complete reduction, where 2 2 1sp p< < − , 
s n w= ⋅ , w is the basic wordlength (typically, 8,16,32,64w = ) and n is the number of words. If 
the modulus is a pseudo-Mersenne prime of the form 2m c−  such that m s=  and 2wc < , then 
the method gets even more advantageous. In the case of addition, for example, the result can be 
reduced by first discarding the carry bit in the most significant word and then adding the 
correction value c, which fits in a single w-bit register. Also note that this last addition does not 
produce an overflow because 2 (2 1) (2 ) 2m m mc c× − − − − < . The procedure is illustrated for the 










performed in steps 4-8. In contrast, it can be seen in Algorithm 5.1(a) that a complete reduction 
requires additionally the execution of steps 9-14 that perform a subtraction r p−  in case 
2mp r≤ < , where r is the partial result from step 3.  
Yanik et al. [YSK02] also shows that subtraction can benefit from IR when using a prime p 
of arbitrary form. However, we show in the following that for primes of special form, such as 
pseudo-Mersenne primes, that is not necessarily the case.  
 
Algorithm 5.1.  Modular addition with a pseudo-Mersenne prime 
Input:  integers , [0, 1]a b p∈ − , 2mp c= − , m n w= ⋅ , where +, ,n w c ∈ Z  and 2wc <    
  Output: (a) (mod )r a b p= + ; (b) [0,2 1]mr a b= + ∈ −  
           (a) With complete reduction           (b) With incomplete reduction  
  1:   carry = 0 1:   carry = 0 
  2:   For  i  from  0  to 1n −  do 2:   For  i  from  0  to 1n −  do 
  3:       ( , [ ]) [ ] [ ]carry r i a i b i carry← + +  3:       ( , [ ]) [ ] [ ]carry r i a i b i carry← + +  
  4:   If 1carry =  4:   If 1carry =  
  5:        carry = 0 5:        carry = 0 
  6:       ( , [0]) [0]carry r r c← +  6:       ( , [0]) [0]carry r r c← +  
  7:        For  i  from  1  to 1n −  do            7:        For  i  from  1  to 1n −  do            
  8:             ( , [ ]) [ ]carry r i r i carry← +  8:             ( , [ ]) [ ]carry r i r i carry← +  
  9:   Else 9:   Return r 
10:        borrow = 0   
11:        For  i  from  1  to 1n −  do   
12:             ( , [ ]) [ ] [ ]borrow R i r i p i borrow← − −    
13:        If  borrow = 0     
14:              r R←    
15:   Return r   
 
Modular Subtraction:  
Let us consider Algorithm 5.2. After step 3 we obtain the completely reduced value r a b= −  if 
0borrow = . If, otherwise, 1borrow =  then this bit is discarded and the partial result is given by 
2
m
r a b= − + , where b a> . This value is incorrect, because it has the extra addition with 2m . 
Step 6 performs the computation r p+  = ( 2 ) (2 )
m ma b c− + + −  = 12ma b c +− − + , where 
1 12 2 2m m ma b c + +< − − + <  since 2 0m c a b− + < − < . Then, by simply discarding the final carry 
from this result (i.e., by subtracting 2m ) we obtain the correct, completely reduced result 









correct result without evaluating both values of borrow after step 3 (similarly to the case of carry 
in Algorithm 5.1(b)), there is no need for incomplete reduction in this case. 
 
Algorithm 5.2.  Modular subtraction with a pseudo-Mersenne prime and complete reduction  
Input:  integers , [0, 1]a b p∈ − , 2mp c= − , m n w= ⋅ , where +, ,n w c ∈ Z  and 2wc <  
Output:  (mod )r a b p= −  
1:   borrow = 0 
2:   For  i  from  0  to 1n −  do 
3:       ( , [ ]) [ ] [ ]borrow r i a i b i borrow← − −  
4:   If 1borrow =  
5:        carry = 0 
6:        For  i  from  1  to 1n −  do            
7:             ( , [ ]) [ ]carry r i r i carry← +  
8:   Return r 
 
 
Nevertheless, there are other types of “small” operations that may benefit from the use of IR. 
Next we analyze the cases that are useful to the setting of ECC over prime fields.  
Modular Addition with IR, [0,2 1]ma b+ ∈ − , where [0, 1]a p∈ −  and [0,2 1]mb ∈ − :  
In this case, after addition we get 10 2 2ma b c+≤ + ≤ − − , where 1 12 2 2 2m m mc+ +< − − <  for 
practical values of m. Thus, if there is no final carry the result r is incompletely reduced such that 
[0, 2 1]mr ∈ − , as wanted. Otherwise, for the case 12 2 2m ma b c+≤ + ≤ − −  we discard the carry 
and add the correction value c such that 0 2 2 2 2m m mc a b c< ≤ + − + ≤ − <  to obtain an 
incompletely reduced result [0, 2 1]mr ∈ − . Consequently, Algorithm 5.1(b) also allows adding 
two terms where one of them can be in incompletely reduced form.  
Modular Multiplication by 3 with IR, 3 [0,2 1]
ma ∈ −  , where [0, 1]a p∈ − :  
If this operation is performed by executing a a a+ + , internally, the first addition r a a= +
 
can 
be left incompletely reduced using Algorithm 5.1(b). Then, following the previous subsection, 
we can again use Algorithm 5.1(b) to perform the addition of the incompletely reduced value r 
with the completely reduced operand a to obtain the final result [0, 2 1]mr a+ ∈ − .  
Modular Division by 2 with IR, /2 [0,2 1]
ma ∈ − , where [0,2 1]ma ∈ − :  
This operation is illustrated when using IR by Algorithm 5.3(b). If the value a is even, then a 
division by 2 can be directly applied through steps 5-7, where ( , [ ]) ( , [ ]) / 2carry r i carry r i←  









In this case, if [0,2 2]ma ∈ −  then the result 1[0,2 1]mr −∈ −  is completely reduced since 
12 1 2m m c− − << −  for practical values of m, such that 2wc <  and 1w m< − . If, otherwise, the 
operand a is odd, we first add p to a in steps 3-4 to obtain an equivalent from the residue class 
that is even. Then, 12 1 2 1m mc p a c+− + < + < − − , where the partial result has 1m +  bits 
maximum and is stored in ( , )carry r . The operation is then completed by dividing by 2 through 
steps 5-7, where the final result 12 ( 1) / 2 ( ) / 2 2 ( 1) / 2m mc p a c− − − < + < − + . Hence, the result is 
incompletely reduced because 2 2 ( 1) / 2 2 1m m mc c− ≤ − + ≤ − . If the result needs to be 
completely reduced then, for the case that ( ) / 2 [ ,2 ( 1) / 2 ]mp a p c+ ∈ − +   , one needs to 
additionally compute a subtraction with p such that 0 ( ) / 2 ( 1) / 2 2mp a p c c≤ + − < − < − , as 
performed in steps 9-12 of Algorithm 5.3(a).  
It is also interesting to note that in the case that input a is in completely reduced form, i.e., if 
, after steps 6-7 in Algorithm 5.3(b) we get 12 ( 1) / 2 ( ) / 2 2m mc p a c− − + < + < − , 
which is in completely reduced form. 
 
Algorithm 5.3.  Modular division by 2 with a pseudo-Mersenne prime 
Input:  integer [0,2 1]ma ∈ − , 2mp c= − , m n w= ⋅ , where +, ,n w c ∈ Z  and 2wc <    
  Output: (a) / 2(mod )r a p= ; (b) / 2 [0,2 1]mr a= ∈ −  
           (a) With complete reduction           (b) With incomplete reduction  
  1:   carry = 0 1:   carry = 0 
  2:   If  a  is odd 2:   If  a  is odd 
  3:        For  i  from  0  to 1n −  do            3:        For  i  from  0  to 1n −  do            
  4:            ( , [ ]) [ ] [ ]carry r i a i p i carry← + +  4:            ( , [ ]) [ ] [ ]carry r i a i p i carry← + +  
  5:  ( , [ 1]) ( , [ 1]) / 2carry r n carry r n− ← −  5:  ( , [ 1]) ( , [ 1]) / 2carry r n carry r n− ← −  
  6:   For  i  from 2n −  to  0  do            6:   For  i  from 2n −  to  0  do            
  7:        ( , [ ]) ( , [ ]) / 2carry r i carry r i←  7:        ( , [ ]) ( , [ ]) / 2carry r i carry r i←  
  8:   borrow = 0 8:   Return r 
  9:   For  i  from  0  to 1n −  do   
10:        ( , [ ]) [ ] [ ]borrow R i r i p i borrow← − −    
11:   If  borrow = 0     
12:              r R←    
13:   Return r   
 
To evaluate in practice the advantage of using incomplete reduction, we implemented in 
assembly language both versions with and without IR of each operation discussed in this section. 
In Table 5.1, we summarize our results on the targeted Intel and AMD processors. 









Table 5.1. Cost (in cycles) of modular operations when using incomplete reduction (IR) and 
complete reduction (CR); 2562 189p = − . 
Modular Operation 










 Addition 31 45 31% 20 25 20% 13 20 35% 
 Multiplication by 2 27 40 33% 19 24 21% 10 17 41% 
 Multiplication by 3 43 69 38% 28 43 35% 15 23 35% 
 Division by 2 57 61 7% 20 25 20% 11 18 39% 
 
As can be seen, in our experiments using the pseudo-Mersenne prime 2562 189p = −  we 
obtain significant reductions in cost ranging from 7% to up to 41% when using IR.    
It is important to note that, because multiplication and squaring may accept inputs in the 
range [0, 2 1]m − , an operation using IR can precede any of these two operations. Thus, the 
reduction process (which is left “incomplete” by the operation using IR) is fully completed by 
these multiplications or squarings without any additional cost. If care is taken when 
implementing point operations, virtually all additions and multiplications/divisions by small 
constants can be implemented with IR because most of them have results that are later required 
by multiplications or squarings only. See Appendix B1 for details about the scheduling of field 
operations pF  suggested for point formulas using J and /
e
E E  coordinates. 
5.2.2. Elimination of Conditional Branches  
Conditional branches may be expensive in several modern processors with deep pipelines if the 
prediction strategy fails in most instances in a particular implementation. Recovering from a 
mispredicted branch requires the pipeline to flush, wasting several clock cycles that may increase 
the overall cost significantly. In particular, the reduction portion of modular addition, subtraction 
and other similar operations is traditionally expressed with a conditional branch. For example, let 
us consider the evaluation in step 4 of Algorithm 5.1(b) for performing a modular addition with 
IR. Because , [0, 1]a b p∈ −  and 2m p c− =  (again considering 2mp c= −  and m s= ), where c 
is a relatively small number such that 2m p≈  for practical estimates, the possible values for 
carry after computing a b+  in steps 2-3, where ( ) [0,2 2]a b p+ ∈ − , are (approximately) equally 
distributed and describe a “random” sequence for all practical purposes. In this scenario, only an 
average of 50% of the predictions can be correct in the best case. Similar results are expected for 
conditional branches in other operations (see Algorithms 5.1, 5.2, 5.3). 









such as look-up tables or branch predication. In Figure 5.1, we illustrate the replacement of the 
conditional branch in step 4 of Algorithm 5.1(b) by a predicated move instruction (Figure 5.1(a)) 
and by a look-up table with indexed indirect addressing (Figure 5.1(b)). In both cases, the 
strategy is to perform an addition with 0 if there is no carry-out (i.e., the reduction step is not 
required) or an addition with 189c = , where 2562 189p = − , if there is carry-out and the 
computation 256( 2 ) 189a b+ − +  is necessary. On the targeted CPUs, our tests reveal that branch 
predication performs slightly better in most cases. This conclusion is platform-dependent and, in 
the case of the targeted processors, may be due to the faster execution of cmov in comparison to 
the memory access required by the look-up table approach. 
 
(a) (b) 
 >    >   
 > cmovnc %rax,%rcx  > adcq $0,%rax 
 > addq %rcx,%r8  > addq (%rcx,%rax,8),%r8
 > movq %r8,8(%rdx)   > movq %r8,8(%rdx)  
 > adcq $0,%r9  > adcq $0,%r9 
 > movq %r9,16(%rdx)   > movq %r9,16(%rdx)  
 > adcq $0,%r10  > adcq $0,%r10 
 > movq %r10,24(%rdx)   > movq %r10,24(%rdx)  
 > adcq $0,%r11  > adcq $0,%r11 
 > movq %r11,32(%rdx)   > movq %r11,32(%rdx)  
 > ret  > ret 
Figure 5.1. Steps 4-9 of Alg. 5.1(b) for executing modular addition using IR, where 
256
2 189p = − . The conditional 
branch is replaced by (a) cmov instruction (initial values %rax=0, %rcx=189) and (b) look-up table using indexed 
indirect addressing mode (preset values %rax=0, (%rcx)=0, 8(%rcx)=189). Partial addition a b+  from step 3 is 
stored in registers %r8-r11 and final result is stored in x(%rdx). x86-64 assembly code uses AT&T syntax. 
To quantify in practice the difference in performance obtained by implementing modular 
arithmetic with and without conditional branches, we tested both schemes on the targeted Intel 
and AMD processors. The results are summarized in Table 5.2. For addition, subtraction and 
division by 2, we use Algorithms 5.1(a), 5.2 and 5.3(a), respectively. In the case of addition and 
division by 2 using IR, we use Algorithms 5.1(b) and 5.3(b), respectively. Multiplication by 2 is a 
variation of the addition operation for which 2a  is computed as (mod )a a p+ .  
In Table 5.2, the cost reductions obtained by eliminating CBs can be as high as 50%. 
Remarkably, the greatest performance gains are obtained in the cases of operations exploiting IR. 
For instance, on Core 2 Duo, an addition using IR reduces its cost in 46% when CBs have been 
eliminated in comparison to only the 36% reduction obtained by an addition with complete 









Table 5.2. Cost (in cycles) of modular operations without conditional branches (w/o CB) against 
operations using conditional branches (with CB); 2562 189p = − . 
Modular Operation 



















  Subtraction 34 37 8% 21 37 43% 16 23 30% 
  Addition with IR 31 35 11% 20 37 46% 13 21 38% 
  Addition 45 43 −4.4% 25 39 36% 20 23 13% 
  Mult. by 2 with IR 27 34 21% 19 38 50% 10 19 47% 
  Mult. by 2 40 42 5% 24 38 37% 17 20 15% 
  Div. by 2 with IR 57 66 14% 20 36 44% 11 18 39% 
  Div. by 2 61 70 13% 25 39 36% 18 27 33% 
 
due to the fact that modular operations exploiting IR allow very compact implementations that 
are even easier to schedule efficiently when branches are removed. It is also interesting to note 
that, when comparing Core 2 Duo’s and Opteron’s performances, gains are higher for the former 
processor, which has more stages in its pipeline. Roughly speaking, the gain obtained by 
eliminating (poorly predictable) CBs on these architectures grows proportionally with the number 
of stages in the pipeline. In contrast, the gains on Intel Atom are significantly smaller since the 
pipeline execution and Instruction-Level Parallelism (ILP) on this in-order processor are much 
less efficient and, hence, the relative cost of misprediction penalty reduces.  
Following the conclusions above, we have implemented ECC point formulas such that the 
gain obtained by combining IR and the elimination of CBs is maximal. The reader is referred to 
Appendix B1 for details about the cost of point formulas in terms of field operations when using 
J  and /
e
E E  coordinates.  
Next, we evaluate the cost of point doubling and doubling-addition (using Jacobian 
coordinates) when their “small” field operations are implemented with complete or incomplete 
reduction and with or without conditional branches. For the analysis, we use the revised doubling 
formula (5.2), Section 5.4, and the doubling-addition formula introduced in [Lon07, formula 
(3.5), Section 3.2]. The results are shown in Table 5.3. 
As can be seen, the computing costs of point doubling and doubling-addition on the AMD 
processor reduce in 12% and 9%, respectively, by combining the elimination of conditional 
branches with the use of incomplete reduction. Without taking into account precomputation and 
the final inversion to convert to affine, these reductions represent about 11% of the computing 









Table 5.3. Cost (in cycles) of point operations with Jacobian coordinates when using incomplete 
reduction (IR) or complete reduction (CR) and with or without conditional branches (CB); 
2562 189p = − .  
Point operation 

















IR and no  
CBs 
Doubling (DBL)  3480 3430 3381 1184 1094 1051 910 824 803 
Relative reduction (%) - 1% 3% - 8% 11% - 9% 12% 
Doubling-addition 8828 8697 8663 2656 2468 2443 2037 1851 1849 
Relative reduction (%) - 1% 2% - 7% 8% - 9% 9% 
Estimated relative 
reduction for 256-bit 
point multiplication (%) 
- 1% 3% - 8% 10% - 9% 11% 
 
and doubling-addition are reduced by approx. 11% and 8%, respectively. These savings represent 
a reduction of about 10% in the cost of point multiplication (again, without considering 
precomputation and the final inversion). In contrast, following previous observations (see Table 
5.2) the techniques are less effective on architectures such as Intel Atom, where the ILP is less 
powerful and branch misprediction penalty is relatively less expensive. In this case, the cost 
reduction of point multiplication is only about 3%.     
We remark that the algorithms discussed in this section combining completely and 
incompletely reduced numbers are generic and can be applied to different platforms. Also, the 
gain obtained by eliminating conditional branches is strongly tied to the pipeline length. So in 
general it is expected to provide a performance improvement on any architecture with high 
number of pipeline stages such as most AMD and Intel processors.  
5.3. Minimizing the Effect of Data Dependencies 
In this section, we analyze (true) data dependencies between “close” field operations and propose 
three techniques to minimize their effect in the point multiplication performance.  
Definition 5.1. Let i and j be the computer orders of instructions iI  and jI  in a given program 
flow. We say that instruction jI  depends on instruction iI  if: 









where ( )xR I  is the set of memory locations or registers that are read by xI  and ( )xW I  is the set 
of memory locations or registers written by xI .  
Modern out-of-order processors and compilers deal relatively well with anti-dependencies 
( ( ) ( )i jR I W I∩ , i.e., if iI  reads a location later updated by jI ) and output dependencies 
( ( ) ( )i jW I W I∩ , i.e., if both iI  and jI  write on the same location) through register renaming. 
However, true or RAW dependencies ( ( ) ( )i jW I R I∩ , i.e., if jI  reads something written by iI ) 
cannot be removed in the strict sense of the term and are more dangerous to the performance of 
architectures exploiting ILP.  
Corollary 5.1. Let iI  and jI  be write and read instructions, respectively, holding true data 
dependence, i.e., ( ) ( )i jW I R I∩ ≠ ∅ , where i j<  and iI  and jI  are scheduled to be executed at 
the thi  and thj  cycle, respectively, in a non-superscalar pipelined architecture. Then, if 
writej iρ δ= − <  the pipeline is to be stalled for at least ( )writeδ ρ−  cycles, where writeδ  specifies 
the number of cycles required by the write instruction iI  to complete its pipeline latency after 
instruction fetching.  
Although Corollary 5.1 considers an ideal non-superscalar pipeline, it allows us to simplify 
the analysis on more complex processors. In particular, the value writeδ , which strongly depends 
on the particular characteristics of a given architecture, can be considered for practical purposes 
roughly equal to the pipeline size. There are two approaches to minimize the appearance of 
pipeline stalls due to RAW dependencies: by instruction scheduling and using data forwarding. 
Although modern compilers and out-of-order schedulers of processors have powerful 
capabilities, in our targeted application these still have great limitations to calculate addresses so 
that rescheduling of instructions between neighboring field operations is possible. On the other 
hand, hardware techniques such as data forwarding allow a significant reduction in the value 
writeδ  by sending back the result of an operation into the decode stage so that this result is 
immediately available to a coming instruction before the current instruction commit/store the 
output. Unfortunately, in our application most field operations are not able to efficiently exploit 
forwarding in case the result is required by the following operation because several consecutive 
writings to memory are involved in the process.  
The problems above are illustrated by the execution of two consecutive field additions in 
Figure 5.2. For the remainder, given a field operation “ ∗ ”, the computation ← ∗res op1 op2  is 










       
  > addq %rcx,%r8 
  > movq %r8,8(%rdx)  
  > adcq $0,%r9 
  > movq %r9,16(%rdx)  
  > adcq $0,%r10 
  > movq %r10,24(%rdx)  
            > adcq $0,%r11 
 > Add(op1,op2,res1)  > movq %r11,32(%rdx)  
 > Add(res1,op3,res2)  > xorq %rax,%rax 
            > movq $0xBD,%rcx 
  > movq 8(%rdi),%r8 
  > addq 8(%rsi),%r8 
  > movq 16(%rdi),%r9 
  > adcq 16(%rsi),%r9 
  > movq 24(%rdi),%r10 
  > adcq 24(%rsi),%r10 
  > movq 32(%rdi),%r11 
  > adcq 32(%rsi),%r11 
       
Figure 5.2. Field additions with RAW dependencies on an x86-64 CPU (
256
2 189p = − ). High-level field operations 
are in the left column and low-level assembly instructions corresponding to each field operation are to the right. 
Destination x(%rdx) of first field addition = source x(%rdi) of second field addition. RAW dependencies are 
indicated by arrows. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.2, results stored in memory in the last stage of the first addition 
are read in the beginning of the second addition. First, if a compiler or out-of-order scheduler is 
unable of identifying the common addresses then it will not be able of exploiting rescheduling to 
prevent pipeline stalls due to inter-field operation dependencies. Moreover, four consecutive 
writings to memory and then four consecutive readings need to be performed because operands 
are 256-bit long distributed over four 64-bit registers. This obviously complicates the extraction 
of any benefit from data forwarding. If write xδ ρ>  for at least one of the dependences x indicated 
by arrows then the pipeline is expected to stall for at least ( )write xδ ρ−  cycles. Thus, for the 
writing/reading sequence in Figure 5.2, the pipeline is roughly stalled by  for 
0 4x≤ < .   
Definition 5.2. Two field operations ( , , )i m n pOP op op res  and ( , , )j r s tOP op op res  are said to be 
data dependent at the field arithmetic level if i j<  and p rres op=  or p sres op= , where iOP  
and jOP  denote the field operations performed at positions 
thi  and thj  during a program 
execution, and op  and res  are registers holding the inputs and result, respectively. Then, this is 
called a contiguous data dependence in the field arithmetic if 1j i− = , i.e., iOP  and jOP  are 
consecutive in the execution sequence. When understood in the context we refer to these 









dependencies happening at the field arithmetic level as simply contiguous data dependencies for 
brevity. 
For the applications targeted in this work all field operations follow a similar writing/reading 
pattern to that one shown in Figure 5.2, and hence, two contiguous, data dependent field 
operations hold several data dependencies x between their internal write/read instructions. 
Following Definition 5.2 and Corollary 5.1, contiguous data dependencies pose a problem when 
write xδ ρ>  in a given program execution, in which case the pipeline is stalled by roughly 
max( )write xδ ρ−  cycles for all dependencies x. Note that at fewer dependent write/read 
instruction pairs (i.e., at smaller field sizes) the expression max( )write xδ ρ−  grows as well as the 
number of potential stalled cycles. Similarly, at larger computer wordlengths w the value
max( )write xδ ρ−  is expected to increase, worsening the effect of contiguous data dependencies. 
For instance, neglecting other architectural factors and assuming a fixed pipeline length, these 
dependencies are expected to affect performance more dramatically in 64-bit architectures in 
comparison with 32-bit architectures.  
Closely following the analysis above, we propose three techniques that help to reduce the 
number of contiguous data dependencies and study several practical scenarios in which this 
would allow us to improve the execution performance of point multiplication. As a side effect 
our techniques also reduce the number of function calls and memory accesses. The reader should 
note that these additional benefits are processor-independent.  
5.3.1. Field Arithmetic Scheduling 
A straightforward solution to eliminate contiguous data dependencies is to perform a careful 
scheduling of field operations inside point formulas in such a way that data-dependent field 
operations are not contiguous. For all practical purposes, we can consider that any field operation 
has an executing latency insδ  that is longer than the latency of a write instruction, i.e., 
ins writeδ δ> . Hence, by inserting any “independent” field operation between two consecutive 
operations holding contiguous data dependence we guarantee that the new relative positions 
,new xρ  of the data-dependent instructions accomplishes ,new x x ins writeρ ρ δ δ= + >  for all data 
dependencies x, where xρ  denotes the original relative positions between data-dependent 
write/read instructions. 
We have tested several field operation “arrangements” to observe the latter behavior on 
different processors. We detail here a few of our experiments with field multiplication on an Intel 
Core 2 Duo. For example, let us consider the field multiplication sequences given in Table 5.4. 
As can be seen, Sequence 1 involves a series of “ideal” data-independent field multiplications, 









this case, the execution reaches its maximal performance with an average of 110 cycles per 
multiplication because for any pair of data-dependent multiplications we have x writeρ δ>> . In 
contrast, Sequence 2 is highly dependent because each output is required as input in the 
following operation. In this case, write xδ ρ>  for at least one dependence x. This is the worst-case 
scenario with an average of 128 cycles per multiplication, which is about 14% less efficient than 
the “ideal” case. We have also studied other possible arrangements such as Sequence 3, in which 
operands of Sequence 2 have been reordered. This slightly amortizes the impact of contiguous 
data dependencies because xρ  is increased, improving the performance to 125 cycles/mult.  
Table 5.4. Various sequences of field operations with different levels of contiguous data 
dependence. 
  Sequence 1   Sequence 2    Sequence 3 
> Mult(op1,op2,res1)  > Mult(op1,op2,res1)  > Mult(op2,op1,res1)  
> Mult(op3,op4,res2)   > Mult(res1,op3,res2)   > Mult(op3,res1,res2)  
 > Mult(res1,op5,res3)   > Mult(res2,op4,res3)   > Mult(op4,res2,res3)  
 > Mult(res2,op6,res4)   > Mult(res3,op5,res4)   > Mult(op5,res3,res4)  
 
Similarly, we have also tested the effect of contiguous data dependencies on other field 
operations. In Table 5.5, we summarize the most representative field operation “arrangements” 
and their costs. As can be seen, the reductions in cost obtained by switching from an execution 
with strong contiguous data dependence (worst-case scenario with Sequence 2) to an execution  
Table 5.5. Average cost (in cycles) of modular operations using best-case (no contiguous data 
dependencies, Sequence 1) and worst-case (strong contiguous data dependence, Sequence 2) 
“arrangements” ( 2562 189p = − , on a 2.66GHz Intel Core 2 Duo E6750).  
Modular Operation 
Core 2 Duo E6750 
Sequence 1 Sequence 2 
Cost 
reduction (%) 
  Subtraction  21 23 9% 
  Addition with IR 20 24 17% 
  Multiplication by 2 with IR 19 23 17% 
  Multiplication by 3 with IR 28 34 18% 
  Division by 2 with IR 20 30 33% 
  Squaring 101 113 11% 









with no contiguous data dependencies (best-case scenario with Sequence 1) range from 
approximately 9% to up to 33% on an Intel Core 2 Duo. Similar results were observed for the 
targeted AMD Opteron and Phenom II processors, where the high performance of their 
architectures significantly reduce relative positions xρ  between their data-dependent write/read 
instructions, increasing the value max( )write xδ ρ− . Thus, minimizing contiguous data 
dependencies is expected to improve the execution of point multiplication on all these processors. 
In contrast, Sequence 1 and Sequence 2 perform similarly on processors such as Intel Atom, in 
which the much less powerful architecture tends to increase values xρ  such that write xδ ρ<  for 
all dependencies x. 
5.3.2. Merging Point Operations 
This technique complements and increases the gain obtained by scheduling field operations. As 
expected, in some cases it is not possible to eliminate all contiguous data dependencies in a point 
formula. A clever way to increase the chances of eliminating more of these dependencies is by 
“merging” successive point operations into unified functions.  
For example, let us consider the following sequence of field operations for computing a point 
doubling using Jacobian coordinates, 1 1 1 1 1 12( : : ) ( : : )X Y Z X Y Z→  (DblSub(b,c,a) represents 
the operation 2 (mod )a b c p← − ; see Section 5.3.3):
 
 
   > Sqr(Z1,t3)   > Mult(X1,t2,t4)   > Sqr(t1,t2) 
   > Sqr(Y1,t2)  > Mult(t1,t0,t3)   > DblSub(t2,t4,X1)  •  
   > Add(X1,t3,t1)        > Sqr(t2,t0)  > Sub(t4,X1,t2)     •  
   > Sub(X1,t3,t3)    > Div2(t3,t1) > Mult(t1,t2,t4)    •   
 > Mult3(t3,t0)   •       > Mult(Y1,Z1,Z1) > Sub(t4,t0,Y1)     •  
 
In total, there are five contiguous data dependencies between field operations (denoted by 
" ")•  in the sequence above. Note that the last stage accounts for most dependencies, which are 
very difficult to eliminate. However, if another point doubling follows, one could merge both 
successive operations and be able to reduce the number of contiguous data-dependent operations. 
Consider, for example, the following arrangement of two consecutive doublings: 
 
 > Sqr(Z1,t3)   > Mult(t1,t0,t3)   > DblSub(t2,t4,X1)  > Mult3(t3,t1)  
 > Sqr(Y1,t2)  > Sqr(t2,t0)   > Sub(t4,X1,t2) •   > Sqr(Y1,t2) 
 > Add(X1,t3,t1)   > Div2(t3,t1)  > Add(X1,t3,t5)  > Mult(t1,t5,t3)  
 > Sub(X1,t3,t3)   > Mult(Y1,Z1,Z1)  > Mult(t1,t2,t4)  > Mult(t2,X1,t4)  
 > Mult3(t3,t0)  •          > Sqr(t1,t2)   > Sub(X1,t3,t3)  > Div2(t3,t1)  









As can be seen, the sequence above (instructions from the second doubling are in bold) 
allows us to further reduce the number of dependencies from five to only two.  
In ECC implementations, it appears natural to merge successive doubling operations or a 
doubling and an addition. Efficient elliptic curve point multiplications kP  use NAF in 
combination with some windowing strategy to recode the scalar k (see Section 2.2.4.3). For 
instance, wNAF guarantees at least w  successive doublings between point additions. Also, one 
could exploit the efficient doubling-addition operation by [Lon07] for Jacobian coordinates or the 
combined (dedicated) doubling-(dedicated) addition by [HWC+08] for mixed Twisted Edwards 
homogeneous/extended homogeneous coordinates (see Table 2.4). Hence, an efficient solution 
for these systems is to merge ( 1)w −  consecutive doublings (for an optimal choice of w) in a 
separate function and merge each addition with the precedent doubling in another function. On 
the other hand, if an efficient doubling-addition formula is not available for certain setting, then it 
is suggested to merge w  consecutive doublings in one function and have the addition in a 
separate function. Note that for different coordinate systems/curve forms/point multiplication 
methods the optimal merging strategy may vary or include different operations.  
Remarkably, a side-effect of this technique is that the number of function calls to point 
formulas is also reduced.  
5.3.3. Merging Field Operations 
This technique consists in merging various field operations with common operands to implement 
them in a joint function. There are two scenarios where this approach becomes attractive: 
• The result of a field operation is required as input by a following operation: merging 
reduces the number of memory reads/writes and eliminates directly potential contiguous 
data dependencies. 
 
• Operands are required by more than one field operation: merging reduces the number of 
memory reads/writes. 
We remark that the feasibility of merging certain field operations strictly depends on the 
chosen platform and the number of general purpose registers available to the programmer/ 
compiler. Also, before deciding on a merging option implementers should analyze and test the 
increase in the code size and how this affects the performance of the cache for example. 
Accordingly, in the setting of ECC over prime fields, multiplication and squaring are not 
recommended to be merged with other operations if multiple functions containing these 









Example 5.1. Taking into account the considerations above, the following merged field 
operations can be advantageous on x86-64-based processors using J and /
e
E E  coordinates: 
2 (mod )a b p− , (mod )a a a p+ + , and the merging of (mod )a b p−  and ( ) 2 (mod )a b c p− − .  
We remark that the list in the example above is not exhaustive. Different platforms with more 
registers may enable a much wider range of merging options. Also, other possibilities for 
merging could be available for different coordinate systems and/or underlying fields (for 
instance, see Section 5.5.2 for the merging options suggested for ECC implementations over 
quadratic extension fields).  
To illustrate the impact of scheduling field operations, merging point operations and merging 
field operations, we show in Table 5.6  the cost of point doubling using Jacobian coordinates 
when using these techniques in comparison with a naïve implementation with a high number of 
dependencies. As can be seen, by reducing the number of dependencies from ten to about one per 
doubling, minimizing function calls and reducing the number of memory reads/writes, we are 
able to reduce the cost of a doubling by 12% and 8% on Intel Core 2 Duo and AMD Opteron 
processors, respectively. It is also important to note that on a processor such as AMD Opteron, 
which has a smaller pipeline and consequently less lost due to contiguous data dependencies 
(smaller writeδ  with roughly the same values xρ  as Intel Core 2 Duo), the estimated gain 
obtained with these techniques in the point multiplication is lower (5%) in comparison with the 
Intel processor (9%). Finally, following our analysis in previous sections, Intel Atom only 
obtains a very small improvement in this case because contiguous data dependencies do not affect 
the execution performance significantly (see Section 5.3.1).  
 
Table 5.6. Cost (in cycles) of point doubling using Jacobian coordinates with different number of 
contiguous data dependencies and the corresponding reduction in the cost of point multiplication. 
“Unscheduled” refers to implementations with a high number of dependencies (here, 10 
dependencies per doubling). “Scheduled and merged” refers to implementations optimized 
through the scheduling of field operations, merging of point operations and merging of field 
operations (here, 1.25 dependencies per doubling); 2562 189p = − . 
Point Operation 








  Scheduled 
and merged 
Doubling 3390 3332 1115 979 786  726 
Relative reduction (%) - 2% - 12% - 8% 
Estimated reduction for 
256-bit point mult. (%) 
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1
 Mul = multiplication, Sqr = squaring, Add = addition, Sub = subtraction, Mulx = multiplication 
by x, Divx = division by x. 
122 
The reader is referred to Appendix B1 for the explicit formulas optimized by scheduling or 
merging field operations and merging point operations for the case of J  and /
e
E E . 
5.4. Minimizing the Cost of Point Operations 
Several explicit formulas in the literature can be further optimized with the insertion of divisions 
by 2 by means of the equivalence relation (2.9) of projective coordinates. This trick helps to 
eliminate constants or reduce their value, which minimizes the need of multiple additions.  
Let us illustrate this technique with point doubling. Consider, for example, the doubling 
formula using Jacobian coordinates in pp. 90-91 of [HMV04] that has a cost of 4Mul 4Sqr ++
1Add + 4Sub + 2Mul2 +1Mul3 +1Div2
 
1
. If we fix 1 *2 pλ
−= ∈F  in the projective equivalence 
relation (2.10) that formula can be modified as follows: 
2
2 2X α β= − ,  ( )
4
2 2 1Y X Yα β= − − ,  2 1 1Z Y Z= ,         (5.2)               
where 2 21 1 1 13( )( ) 2X Z X Zα = + −  and 
2
1 1X Yβ = . With formula (5.2), the operation count is 
reduced to 4Mul 4Sqr +1Add + 5Sub +1Mul3 +1Div2+ , replacing two multiplications by 2 with 
one subtraction. Moreover, because constants are minimized, there are greater chances that 
more “small” operations are executed using incomplete reduction. In Algorithm 5.4, we show an 
efficient implementation of point doubling (5.2) with optimal use of incomplete reduction (every 
addition and multiplication/division by constant precedes a multiplication or squaring), 
minimized number of contiguous data dependencies between field operations and exploiting the 
use of merged field operations. This execution costs IR4Mul 4Sqr +1Add + 3Sub +1DblSub ++
IR IR1Mul3 +1Div2   (where operationIR represents an operation using incomplete reduction) and 
has 5 contiguous data dependencies. In Algorithm 5.4, operators ⊕, ⊗ and  represent addition, 
multiplication by constant and division by constant using incomplete reduction, respectively. 
These operations are computed with Algorithm 5.1(b) for addition and multiplication by 3, and 
with Algorithm 5.3(b) for division by 2 (see Section 5.2.1 for details). 
In certain formulas, another optimization is possible. If 1Mul 1Sqr 4Add− >  and the values 
2
a  and 
2
b  are available, one can compute a b⋅  as . See for example 
addition and doubling-addition formulas, option 1, of the online database EPAF [Lon08].  
We remark that the optimizations above are not limited to 64-bit architectures and that are in 
general advantageous on any platform whenever division by 2 is approximately as efficient as 
field addition. 
Finally, we observe that in some settings field subtraction is more efficient than addition with 
complete reduction (see for example Table 5.2, when using a pseudo-Mersenne prime). Thus,  









Algorithm 5.4.  Point doubling using Jacobian coordinates    
Input:  point 1 1 1( : : ) ( )pP X Y Z E= ∈ F   
  Output:  2 ( : : ) ( )out out out pP X Y Z E= ∈ F  
  1: 
  
2 2
4 31 1,t Z t Y← ←   
  2: 
  1 1
t X← ⊕ 4t                                                                                         (use Algorithm 5.1(b)) 
  3: 
  4 1 4
t X t← −  
  4: 
  0
3t ← ⊗ 4t                                                                                           (use Algorithm 5.1(b))                                                                                         
  5: 
  5 1 3
t X t← ×                                                                                                       
  6: 
  4 0 1
t t t← ×                                                                                                       
  7: 
  
2
0 3t t←                                                                                                       
  8: 
  1 4
t t←  2                                                                                          (use Algorithm 5.3(b))                                                                
  9: 
  
2
3 1 11 , outt t Z Y Z← ← ×                                                                                                       
10: 
  3 5
2outX t t← − ×                                                                                                       
11: 
  3 5 out
t t X← −                                                                                                       
12: 
  5 1 3
t t t← ×                                                                                                       
13: 
  5 0out
Y t t← −                                                                                                       
14:    Return 2 ( : : )out out outP X Y Z=  
 
whenever possible, one can convert those additions that cannot exploit IR to subtractions. For this 
case, one applies 
*
1 pλ = − ∈F  to the corresponding formula.  
5.5. Optimizations for the Quadratic Extension Field 
Arithmetic 
The techniques and optimizations described so far are not exclusive to the popular 
pF  
field 
arithmetic. In fact, the scheduling/merging of field operations and merging of point operations 
are generic and can be extended to different finite fields with similar benefits and results. In this 
section, we analyze how the aforementioned techniques can be applied to the arithmetic over a 
quadratic extension field 2
p
F . This application has gained sudden importance thanks to the 
recently proposed GLS method [GLS09], which exploits an efficiently computable 
homomorphism to speed up the execution of point multiplication over 2
p
F . 
For our study, we consider the highly-optimized assembly module of the field arithmetic over 
2
p
F  written by M. Scott [MIR]. This module exploits the “nice” Mersenne prime 1272 1p = − , 
which allows a very simple reduction step with no conditional branches. Although IR can also be 
applied to this scenario, in practice we observe that the gain is negligible on the platforms under 









5.5.1. Scheduling of Field Operations 
As described in Section 2.2.6.1, each 2
p
F  operation consists of a few field operations over . 
Thus, the analysis of data dependencies and scheduling of operations should be performed taking 
into account this underlying layer. For instance, let us consider the execution of a 2
p
F  
multiplication followed by a subtraction shown in Figure 5.3. Note that multiplication is 
implemented using Karatsuba with 3 pF  multiplications and 5  additions/subtractions. 
As can be seen in Figure 5.3, the scheduling of the internal  operations of the 2
p
F  
multiplication has been performed in such a way that contiguous data dependencies are minimal 
between 
pF  operations (there is only one dependency between DblSub and Sub in the last stage 
of multiplication). A similar analysis can be performed between contiguous higher-layer 2
p
F
operations. In Figure 5.3, the last 
pF  
operation of the multiplication and the first 
 
operation of 
the subtraction hold contiguous data dependence. There are different solutions to eliminate this 
problem. For example, it can be eliminated by rescheduling the  subtraction and addition, as 
shown in Figure 5.4(a). Note that addition does not hold any dependence with the multiplication 
or subtraction, as required. Alternatively, if internal pF  field operations of the subtraction in 
 are rescheduled, as shown in Figure 5.4(b), the contiguous data dependence is also 
eliminated.  
These strategies can be applied to point formulas to minimize the appearance of such 
dependencies. The reader is referred to Appendix B2 for details about the scheduling of  
operations suggested for point formulas using J  and /
e
E E  coordinates. 
5.5.2. Merging of Point and Field Operations 
In the case of the GLS method, merging of point doublings is not as advantageous as in the 
traditional scenario of ECC over  because most contiguous data dependencies can be 
eliminated by simply rescheduling field operations inside point formulas using the techniques 
from the previous subsection (see Appendix B2). Moreover, GLS employs point multiplication 
techniques such as interleaving, which do not guarantee a long series of consecutive doublings 
between additions. Nevertheless, it is still advantageous the use of the merged doubling-addition 
operation (when applicable), which is a recurrent operation in interleaving.  
On the other hand, merging field operations is more advantageous in this scenario than over 
There are two reasons for this to happen. First, arithmetic over  works on top of the arith- 
metic over , which opens new possibilities to merge more  operations. Second, operations 
are on fields of half size, which means that fewer registers are required for representing field 


























           
  > Add(op1[1],op1[2],t1) 
  > Add(op2[1],op2[2],t2) 
  > Mult(op1[2],op2[2],t3) 
  > Mult(t1,t2,res1[2]) 
  > Mult(op1[2],op2[1],res1[1]) 
       > DblSub(res1[2],res1[1],t3) 
 > Mult(op1,op2,res1)       > Sub(res1[1],t3,res1[1]) 
 > Sub(res1,op3,res2)  > Sub(res1[1],op3[1],res2[1]) 
 > Add(op4,op5,res3)  > Sub(res1[2],op3[2],res2[2]) 
             
Figure 5.3. 2pF  operations with contiguous data dependencies. High-level 2pF  operations are in the left column and 
their corresponding low-level pF  operations are in the right column. 2pF
 
elements ( )a bi+  are represented as 
(op[1],op[2]). Dependencies are indicated by arrows. 
 
(a) 
          
  > Add(op1[1],op1[2],t1) 
  > Add(op2[1],op2[2],t2) 
  > Mult(op1[2],op2[2],t3) 
  > Mult(t1,t2,res1[2]) 
  > 
       > DblSub(res1[2],res1[1],t3) 
 > Mult(op1,op2,res1)       > Sub(res1[1],t3,res1[1]) 
 > Add(op4,op5,res3)  ... 
 > Sub(res1,op3,res2)  > Sub(res1[1],op3[1],res2[1]) 
      > Sub(res1[2],op3[2],res2[2]) 
                
(b) 
      
  > Add(op1[1],op1[2],t1) 
  > Add(op2[1],op2[2],t2) 
  > Mult(op1[2],op2[2],t3) 
  > Mult(t1,t2,res1[2]) 
  > Mult(op1[2],op2[1],res1[1]) 
       > DblSub(res1[2],res1[1],t3) 
 > Mult(op1,op2,res1)        > Sub(res1[1],t3,res1[1]) 
 > Sub(res1,op3,res2)  > Sub(res1[2],op3[2],res2[2]) 
 > Add(op4,op5,res3)  > Sub(res1[1],op3[1],res2[1]) 
        
Figure 5.4. (a) Contiguous data dependencies eliminated by scheduling 2pF  field operations; (b) Contiguous data 









Example 5.2. The following merged field operations can be advantageous on x86-64-based 
processors using J and  coordinates over quadratic extension fields: , 
, , the merging of  and , the merging 
of  and , and the merging of  and (mod )a a a p+ + .  
Again, we remark that the list above is not intended to be exhaustive and different merging 
options could be more advantageous or be available on different platforms with different 
coordinate systems or underlying fields. The reader is referred to Appendix B2 for the explicit 
formulas optimized with the proposed techniques for the case of J and  coordinates using 
the GLS method.       
5.6. Performance Evaluation 
In this section, we combine and demonstrate the efficiency of the techniques described in this 
chapter to accelerate the computation of a full point multiplication. For our implementations, we 
use the well-known MIRACL library by M. Scott [MIR], which contains an extensive set of 
cryptographic functions that simplified the development and optimization process of our 
cryptographic routines. Comparisons focus on implementations of variable-scalar-variable-point 
elliptic curve point multiplication with approximately 128 bits of security.  
5.6.1. Details of the “Traditional” Implementations 
Field Arithmetic 
As previously described, the field arithmetic over  using the pseudo-Mersenne prime 
 was written using x86-64 compatible assembly language and optimized by 
exploiting incomplete reduction and elimination of conditional branches for modular addition, 
subtraction and multiplication/division by constants (see Section 5.2). For the case of squaring 
and multiplication, there are two methods that are commonly preferred in the literature for 
implementation on general purpose processors: schoolbook (or operand scanning method) and 
Comba [Com90] (or product scanning method) (see Section 5.3 of [EYK09] or Section 2.2.2 of 
[HMV04]). Both methods require 2n  w-bit multiplications when multiplying two n-digit 
numbers. However, we choose to implement Comba’s method since it requires approx. 23n  w-bit 
additions, whereas schoolbook requires 24 .n  Modular reduction for both operations was 
performed exploiting the fact that 2562 189≡  so 256( % 2 ) 189( 256)r r r≡ + >> , where r is the 
result of integer multiplication or squaring. Our code was aggressively optimized by carefully 
scheduling instructions to exploit the instruction-level parallelism.  
/
e
E E 2 (mod )a b p−
( )/ 2 (mod )a a a p+ + (mod )a b c p+ − (mod )a b p+ (mod )a b p−
(mod )a b p− (mod )c d p− (mod )a a p+
/ eE E
pF










For our implementations, we chose J  and / eE E  coordinates and used the execution patterns 
based on doublings and doubling-additions proposed by [Lon07] and [HWC+08] for J  and 
/ eE E , respectively. The costs in terms of multiplications and squarings can be found in Tables 
2.2 and 2.4. Note that we use general additions (or general doubling-additions) because inversion 
is relatively expensive and its inclusion during precomputation cancels any gain using addition 
with mixed coordinates during the evaluation stage.  
This arithmetic layer was optimized through the use of the techniques described in Sections 
5.3 and 5.4, namely field arithmetic scheduling, merging of field and point operations and 
minimization of field operations. Because the maximal performance was found with a window of 
size 5 for the scalar recoding using wNAF (see next subsection), we merged four consecutive 
doublings into a joint function and every addition with the precedent doubling into another 
function. Please refer to Appendix B1 for complete details about the employed formulas 
exhibiting minimal number of field operations, different merged field operations and reduced 
number of contiguous data dependencies.    
Point Multiplication and Precomputation   
For scalar recoding we use wNAF, which offers minimal nonzero density among signed binary 
representations for a given window width (i.e., for certain number of precomputed points) 
[Ava05]. In particular, we use Alg. 3.35 of [HMV04] for conversion from integer to wNAF 
representation. Although left-to-right conversion algorithms exist [Ava05], which save memory 
and allow on-the-fly computation of point multiplication, they are not advantageous on the 
targeted CPUs. In fact, our tests show that converting the scalar to wNAF and then executing the 
point multiplication achieves higher performance than interleaving conversion and point 
multiplication. That is because the latter approach “interrupts” the otherwise smooth flow of 
point multiplication by calling the conversion function at every iteration of the double-and-add 
algorithm. Our choice is also justified because there are no stringent constraints in terms of 
memory in the targeted platforms.   
For precomputation on J coordinates, we choose the variant of the LM scheme that does not 
require inversions, whose cost is given by formula (3.4) (Section 3.2.2). This method achieves 
the lowest cost for precomputing points, given by (6 2) (3 4)L M L S+ + + , where L represents the 
number of non-trivial points (note that we avoid here the S-M trading in the first doubling). On 
/ eE E , we precompute points in the traditional way using the sequence 2 2 2P P P P+ + + +… , 
adding 2P with general additions. Because precomputed points are left in projective form no 
inversion is required and the cost is given by (8 4) 2L M S+ + . This involves computing 2P as 









is required to compute T coordinate of 2P), one mixed addition to compute 2P P+  as 
e e+ →A E E  that costs 7M and ( 1)L −  general additions 
e e e+ →E E E  that cost 8M each. For 
both coordinate systems, we chose a window width w = 5 (i.e., precomputing {3 ,5 , ,15 }P P P… , 
L = 7), which is optimal and slightly better than fractional windows using L = 6 or 8.  
5.6.2. Details of the GLS-based Implementations 
For this case we make use of the optimized assembly module of the field arithmetic over 2
p
F  
written by M. Scott [MIR], which exploits the Mersenne prime 1272 1p = −  allowing the use of a 
very simple reduction step with no conditional branches.  
For the point arithmetic, we slightly modify formulas for the “traditional” implementations 
since in this case these require a few extra multiplications with the twisted curve parameter µ  (see 
Section 2.2.6). For example, the (dedicated) addition using extended Twisted Edwards 
coordinates with cost 8M (pp. 332 of [HWC+08]) cannot be used in this case and has to be 
replaced by a formula that costs 9M (also discussed in pp. 332 of [HWC+08] as “9M+1D”), 
which is one multiplication more expensive (“1D” is avoided because parameter a is still set to 
−1). Accordingly (and also following our discussions in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.5.1), the scheduling 
of the field arithmetic slightly differs. Moreover, different merging options for the field and point 
arithmetic are exploited (see Section 5.5.2). The reader is referred to Appendix B2 for complete 
details about the revised formulas exhibiting minimal number of field operations, different 
merged operations and reduced number of contiguous data dependencies.    
For point multiplication, each of the two scalars 0k  and 1k  in the multiple point multiplication 
0 1( )k P k Pλ+  is converted using fractional wNAF [Möl05], and then the evaluation stage is 
executed using interleaving (see Alg. 3.51 of [HMV04]). Similarly to our experiments with the 
“traditional” implementations, we remark that the separation of the conversion and evaluation 
stages yields better performance in the targeted platforms.  
For precomputation on J, we use the LM scheme that has minimal cost among methods 
using only one inversion. The cost in this case is given by eq. (3.6). We avoid here the S-M 
trading in the first doubling, so the precomputing cost is 1 (9 1) (2 5)I L M L S+ + + + , where L 
represents the number of non-trivial points. A fractional window with L = 6 achieves the optimal 
performance in our case. 
Again, on / eE E  coordinates we precompute points using general additions in the sequence 
2 2P P P+ + +… . Precomputed points are better left in projective coordinates, in which case the 
cost is given by (9 4) 2L M S+ + . This cost involves the computation of 2P as 2 e→A E , which 
costs 5 2M S+  (one squaring is saved because 1PZ = ; one extra multiplication is required to 
compute T coordinate of 2P), one mixed addition to compute 2P P+  as e e+ →A E E  that costs 









window of size w = 5 (i.e., L = 7) achieves optimal performance. As pointed out by [GLS09], 
precomputing { ,[3] ( ),[5] ( ), ,[2 1] ( )}P P P L Pψ ψ ψ+…  can be done on-the-fly at low cost.  
5.6.3. The Curves  
Next, we detailed the curves used for our implementations. These curves provide approximately 
128 bits of security and were found with a modified version of the Schoof’s algorithm provided 
with MIRACL.  
• For the implementation on short Weierstrass form over  using J, we chose the curve 
2 3: 3WE y x x B= − + , where 2562 189p = − , 0 fd63c3319814da55e88e9328e962B = ×  
73c483dca6cc84df53ec8d91b1b3e0237064  and # ( ) 10W pE r=F  where r is the 253-bit 
prime: 
      11579208923731619542357098500868790785394551372836712768287417232790500318517 .  
The implementation corresponding to this curve is referred to as jac256189 in the 
remainder. 
 
• For Twisted Edwards over  using / eE E  coordinates, we chose the curve :TEE
2 2x y− + = 2 21 358 x y+ , where 2562 189p = −  and # ( ) 4TE pE r=F  where r is the 255-
bit prime:    
28948022309329048855892746252171976963381653644566793329716531190136815607949 . 
The implementation corresponding to this curve is referred to as ted256189 in the 
remainder. 
 
• Let 2 3: 3 44W GLSE y x x− = − +  be defined over pF , where 
1272 1p = − . For the case of 
Weierstrass form using GLS, we use the quadratic twist 2 3: 3 44W GLSE y x xµ µ−′ = − +  of  
2/W GLS pE − F , where 22 piµ = + ∈F  is non-square. 2# ( )W GLS pE −′ F  is the 254-bit prime: 
28948022309329048855892746252171976962649922236103390147584109517874592467701 .  
The same curve is also used in [GLS09]. Our implementation corresponding to this curve 
is referred to as jac1271gls in the remainder. 
 
• Let 2 2 2 2: 1 109TE GLSE x y x y− − + = +  be defined over , where 1272 1p = − . For the 
case of Twisted Edwards using the GLS method, we use the quadratic twist 
2 2 2 2: 1 109TE GLSE x y x yµ µ−′ − + = +  of 2/TE GLS pE − F , where 22 piµ = + ∈F  is non-
square. In this case, 2# ( ) 4TE GLS pE r−′ =F  where r is the 252-bit prime:  
7237005577332262213973186563042994240709941236554960197665975021634500559269 . 














Here we summarize the timings obtained by the “traditional” implementations labeled as 
ted256189 and jac256189 and the implementations using GLS labeled as ted1271gls and 
jac1271gls, when running them on a single core of Intel and AMD processors based on the x86-
64 ISA. For verification of each implementation, the results of 10
4
 point multiplications with 
“random” scalars were all validated using MIRACL. Several “random” point multiplications 
were also verified with Magma. 
All the tested programs were compiled with GCC v4.3.4 on the AMD Opteron 252 and with 
GCC v4.4.3 on the AMD Phenom II X4, Intel Core 2 Duo E6750 and Intel Atom N450 
processors. For measuring computing time, we follow [GT07b] and use a method based on cycle 
counts. To obtain our timings, we ran each implementation 10
5
 times with randomly generated 
scalars, averaged and approximated the results to the nearest 1000 cycles. Table 5.7 summarizes 
our results, labeled as ted1271gls, jac1271gls, ted256189 and jac256189. All costs include scalar 
conversion, the point multiplication computation (precomputation and evaluation stages) and the 
final normalization step to affine. For comparison purposes, Table 5.7 also includes the cycle 
counts that we obtained when running the implementations by M. Scott (displayed as gls1271-
ref4 and gls1271-ref3 [MIR]) on exactly the same platforms. Finally, the last 5 rows of the table 
detail cycle counts of several state-of-the-art implementations as reported in the literature. 
However, these referenced results are used only to provide an approximate comparison since the 
processor platforms are not identical (though they use very similar processors). 
As can be seen, our fastest implementation on the targeted platforms is ted1271gls, using 
/ eE E  with the GLS method. This implementation is about 28% faster than the previous record 
set by gls1271-ref4 [GLS08] on a slightly different processor (1.66GHz Intel Core 2 Duo). A 
more precise comparison, however, would be between measurements on identical processor 
platforms. In this case, ted1271gls is approx. 20%, 29%, 28% and 29% faster than gls1271-ref4 
[MIR] on Atom N450, Core 2 Duo E6750, Opteron 252 and Phenom II X4 940, respectively. 
Although [MIR] uses inverted Twisted Edwards coordinates ( IE ), the improvement with the 
change of coordinates only explains a small fraction of the speed-up. Similarly, in the case of J 
combined with GLS, jac1271gls is about 30% faster than the record set by gls1271-ref3 [GLS09] 
on a 1.66GHZ Intel Core 2 Duo. When comparing cycle counts on identical processor platforms, 
jac1271gls is 23%, 31%, 30% and 34% faster than gls1271-ref3 [MIR] on Atom N450, Core 2 
Duo E6750, Opteron 252 and Phenom II X4 940, respect. Our implementations are also 
significantly faster than the implementation of Bernstein's curve25519 by Gaudry and Thomé 
[GT07b]. For instance, ted1271gls is 46% faster than curve25519 [GT07b] on a 2.66GHz Intel 
Core 2 Duo. 









coordinates are ted256189 and jac256189, respectively. In this case, ted256189 and jac256189 
are 22% and 28% faster than the previously best cycle counts due to Hisil et al. [HWC+09] using 
also / eE E  and J coordinates, respectively, on a 2.66GHz Intel Core 2 Duo.  
It is also interesting to note that the performance boost given by the GLS method strongly 
depends on the characteristics of a given platform. For instance, ted1271gls and jac1271gls are 
about 40% and 45% faster than their “counterparts” over 
pF , namely ted256189 and jac256189, 
respectively, on an Intel Atom N450. On an Intel Core 2 Duo E6750, the differences reduce to 
25% and 32% (respect.). And on an AMD Opteron processor, the differences reduce even further 
to only 9% and 13% (respect.). Thus, it seems that there exists certain correlation between an 





operations on x86-64 based processors. In general, the greater such 
“aggressiveness” the smaller the 
 
gap. And since working on the quadratic extension 
involves a considerable increase in the number of multiplications and additions, GLS loses its 
attractiveness if such gap is not large enough on certain platform. For the record, ted1271gls 
achieves the best cycle counts on an AMD Opteron, with an advantage of about 31% over the 
best previous result in the literature by [GT07b], and on an AMD Phenom II X4, with an 
advantage of about 29% over the closest result obtained by gls1271-ref4 [MIR]. 
For extended benchmark results and comparisons with other previous works on different 64-
bit processors, the reader is referred to our online database [Lon10]. 










 ted1271gls / eE E  2pF , 127-bit 588000 210000 211000 181000 
 jac1271gls J 2pF , 127-bit 644000 228000 238000 188000 
 ted256189 / eE E  pF , 256-bit 982000 281000 232000 213000 
 jac256189  J pF , 256-bit 1168000 335000 274000 252000 
 gls1271-ref4 [MIR]  IE  2pF , 127-bit 732000 295000 295000 255000 
 gls1271-ref3 [MIR] J 2pF , 127-bit 832000 332000 341000 287000 
 gls1271-ref4 [GLS08] IE  2pF , 127-bit -      293000  
(1) - - 
 gls1271-ref3 [GLS09] J 2pF , 127-bit -      326000  
(1) - - 
 curve25519 [GT07b] Montgomery pF , 255-bit -      386000  
(2)     307000  (4) - 
 Hisil et al. [HWC+09] / eE E  pF , 256-bit -      362000  
(3) - - 
 Hisil et al. [HWC+09] J pF , 256-bit -      468000  
(3) - - 
(1) On a 1.66GHz Intel Core 2 Duo.  (2) On a 2.66GHz Intel Core 2 Duo E6700.   












Timings using Multibase Methods 
We also implemented the refined multibase algorithm using bases {2,3} and {2,3,5} proposed in 
Chapter 4 to assess its effectiveness on x86-64 processors. With an optimal number of 
precomputations (L = 7 points) and using J coordinates, a 256-bit scalar multiplication runs in 
approximately 252000 cycles using refined {2,3,5} multibase chains or wNAF on a Phenom II 
X4, without including the conversion cost. Thus, the small theoretical advantage of the multibase 
method (see §4.5) vanishes in this case because the inclusion of tripling and quintupling 
functions that are not used too frequently seems to degrade the cache performance and because 
radix-2 methods are able to exploit more advantageously additional techniques such as the 
merging of point operations (see §5.3.2).    
For illustrative purposes, in the same implementation above we eliminated the use of 
precomputations. In this case, the refined {2,3,5} multibase chains and NAF allowed the 
computation in 261000 and 277000 cycles, respectively, on a Phenom II X4 processor. Thus, on 
this processor the use of multibases introduces a cost reduction of about 6%. 
In all cases above, when conversion to multibase was included in the measurements the total 
cost of scalar multiplication became more expensive than the cases using (w)NAF. 
These results confirm our analysis and recommendations in Section 4.6.1, and justify the use 
of radix-2 methods in the x86-64-based implementations presented in this chapter.  
5.7. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have proposed and evaluated different techniques and optimizations to speed 
up elliptic curve scalar multiplication over prime fields on the increasingly popular x86-64-based 
processors. We have carefully studied the architecture of these processors and optimized the 
arithmetic of elliptic curves at the different computational levels accordingly. Extensive tests 
have been carried out on at least one x86-64 processor representative from the notebook/netbook, 
desktop and server/workstation processor classes. Whenever relevant, we have also discussed the 
extension of the analysis and optimizations to other microarchitectures. 
After detailing in §5.1 some previous work and the general features of x86-64 processors that 
are most relevant to this work, we studied the performance boost obtained when combining 
incomplete reduction and elimination of conditional branches with the use of a highly-efficient 
pseudo-Mersenne prime in §5.2. We provided explicit algorithms for performing different 
variants of modular addition, subtraction, multiplication by constant and division by constant 
with incompletely and completely reduced numbers. Our tests on the targeted platforms reveal 
cost reductions as high as 9% and 12% in the computation of point doubling and doubling-









256-bit scalar multiplication was estimated to be up to 11%. 
In §5.3, we analyzed the effect of RAW dependencies between contiguous field operations in 
the performance of scalar multiplication. We demonstrated that by rescheduling or merging field 
operations and merging point operations the cost of point doubling may be reduced in up to 12% 
in the targeted processors. This gain is obtained by the compound effect of reducing the number 
of pipeline stalls, memory reads/writes and function calls. Overall, the cost reduction in a 256-bit 
scalar multiplication was estimated in up to 9%, demonstrating that some modern compilers and 
dynamic out-of-order schedulers inside processors are unable to fully eliminate these contiguous 
dependencies. 
In §5.4, some optimizations exploiting the projective equivalence were proposed for point 
operations. Revised formulas carefully optimized with the techniques described in this chapter 
are explicitly stated in Appendix B1 for the case of Jacobian (J ) and mixed Twisted Edwards 
homogeneous/extended homogeneous ( ) coordinates. 
The application of the rescheduling/merging of field operations and merging of point 
operations over quadratic extension fields was studied in §5.5. Revised formulas carefully 
optimized with these techniques (and techniques exploiting the projective equivalence; §5.4) are 
explicitly stated in Appendix B2 for the case of J and  coordinates when using the GLS 
method over 2
p
F .      
In §5.6, we illustrated the significant performance improvement obtained with the techniques 
under analysis with high-speed implementations of variable-scalar-variable-point scalar 
multiplication at the 128-bit security level. Our software was extensively code-optimized and 
incorporates state-of-the-art ECC algorithms, including the best precomputation scheme for each 
setting following results from Chapter 3. We presented four variants using either  or J 
coordinates and with or without exploiting the GLS method. Remarkably, we showed that a point 
multiplication can be computed in only 181000 cycles (~60µsec.) on an AMD Phenom II X4 
when combining  with GLS. This represents a cost reduction of about 29% over the closest 
competitor. In the case of Jacobian coordinates with GLS, we reported a computation in only 
188000 cycles (~60µsec.) in the same platform, which represents an improvement of about 34%. 
For the traditional case without using GLS, our implementations using  and J coordinates 
are 22% and 28% faster than the previously best published results using the same coordinate 
systems. In summary, our implementations compute scalar multiplication up to 34% faster than 
the best previous results on x86-64 processors. We also reported that the use of GLS enables cost 
reductions as high as 45% on an Intel Atom and as high as 13% on an AMD Opteron.  
Similar results are expected when exploiting the proposed optimizations with other curve 
forms and coordinate systems or with other scenarios involving, for instance, multiple scalar 












6 Chapter 6 
Efficient Techniques for 
Implementing Pairings in Software 
In this chapter, we propose efficient methods and optimized explicit formulas that speed up 
significantly the computation of pairings on ordinary curves over prime fields. Our contributions 
can be summarized as follows:  
• We generalize the well-known technique of lazy reduction, previously applied to 
quadratic extension fields only [Sco07], to the whole pairing arithmetic including 
towering and curve arithmetic. We show that this approach leads to the elimination of at 
least 32% of the total number of reductions in a state-of-the-art implementation of the 
optimal ate pairing over a Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve at the 128-bit security level.    
• For dealing with more costly higher-precision additions required by lazy reduction, we 
develop a flexible methodology that keeps intermediate values under Montgomery 
reduction boundaries and maximizes the use of operations without carry checks.  
• Following the approach detailed in Section 5.4, formulas for point doubling and addition 
in Jacobian and homogeneous coordinates are carefully optimized by eliminating several 
commonly neglected operations that are not inexpensive on modern 64-bit platforms. 
• Finally, we illustrate the significant savings obtained by the new techniques with a high-








level. By combining our methods with other state-of-the-art techniques, we obtain an 
implementation that improves the best available timings in the literature by 28%-34% on 
several x86-64-based processors.     
This chapter is organized as follows. After discussing relevant previous work in §6.1, we 
describe the generalization of lazy reduction to pairing-friendly tower fields in §6.2. In the same 
section, we discuss how to optimize the implementation of tower field arithmetic when dealing 
with both single- and double-precision operations, and illustrate the flexible methodology with 
the popular tower 2 6 12p p p p→ → →F F F F . In §6.3, we present our optimizations to the curve 
arithmetic in the Miller loop, including the application of lazy reduction. Then, in §6.4 we 
describe our high-speed implementation of an optimal ate pairing on BN curves, carry out a 
detailed operation count and compare our results with the previously best results in the literature. 
We end this chapter with some conclusions in §6.5.  
6.1. Previous Work 
In recent years there has been a growing interest in pairing-based cryptography with numerous 
efforts focused on improving the efficiency of the pairing computation. Some works have 
proposed optimizations inside the Miller loop [BLS03, BLS04b] including the denominator 
elimination technique [BKL+02], while other works have focused on minimizing the length of 
the Miller’s algorithm [HSV06, BGO+07, ZZH08, Ver10], constructing pairing-friendly elliptic 
curves [BLS03b, BW05, SB06, Fre06] and devising tower extensions of finite fields k
p
F  
[KM05, BS10]. An important research effort involves the development and optimization of 
explicit formulas for the curve arithmetic; see for example [CHB+09, CLN10]. Yet another 




and base field 
arithmetic in pF  [FVV09, NNS10, BGM+10]. In this chapter we focus on the latter two issues 
and propose efficient methods for speeding up computations in the towering and curve 
arithmetic.  
In the case of efficient implementation of the towering and base field arithmetic, some 
research warns of the potential danger of employing a prime p with low Hamming weight (e.g., 
Mersenne primes), in which case a modified NFS could reduce the security level [Sch10]. 
Therefore, the chosen prime should ideally have a general form, in which case Montgomery 
reduction is the most efficient method available [Mon85]; see Section 2.2.4.1. This ultimately 
makes modular reduction one of the most expensive operations in the underlying field arithmetic 
of pairings. Some efforts focus on improving the interaction between field multiplication and 
reduction to minimize costs [FVV09, NNS10]. A different approach involves instead the 








to at least Crypto’98 [WD98], and has been advantageously exploited by many works in different 
scenarios [LH00, Ava04, Sco07]. According to [LH00], multiplication in k
p
F  can be performed 
with k reductions modulo p when k
p
F  is seen as a direct extension over pF  via an irreducible 
binomial. This improves the traditional method that requires 2k  reductions (or ( 1) / 2k k +  
reductions when using Karatsuba multiplication). Lazy reduction was first employed in the 
context of pairing computation by [Sco07] to eliminate reductions in 2
p
F  multiplication. 
Essentially, when using Karatsuba method for multiplication in 2
p
F , lazy reduction allows us to 
lower the number of reductions from 3 to only 2. Note that these savings are at the cost of 
somewhat more expensive additions. If, for instance, one considers the tower  
2 6 12p p p p
→ → →F F F F , then this approach requires 3 6 3 54⋅ ⋅ =  integer multiplications with 
2 6 3 36⋅ ⋅ =  reductions modulo p for performing one multiplication in 12
p
F ; see [Sco07, HMS08, 
BGM+10]. 
In this work we go a step further and generalize lazy reduction to the whole pairing 
computation, including the tower extension and curve arithmetic. For instance, these 
optimizations allow us to eliminate about 32% of reductions in a state-of-the-art implementation 
of the optimal ate pairing using a BN curve with 128 bits of security; see Section 6.4.2 for 
complete details. 
Recently, many authors have targeted the efficient software implementation of bilinear 
pairings at the 128-bit security level. Most remarkable results include the computation of the R-
ate pairing in 10,000,000 cycles on one core of an Intel Core 2 Duo processor by Hankerson et al. 
[HMS08], and the computation of the optimal ate pairing in 4,380,000 cycles on one core of an 
Intel Core 2 Quad Q9550 by Naehrig et al. [NNS10] and in 2,950,000 cycles on one core of an 
Intel Core 2 Duo T7100 by Beuchat et al. [BGM+10]. Beuchat et al. also reports an optimal ate 
pairing computation in 2,330,000 cycles on one core of an Intel Core i7 860 processor. 
In this work, to demonstrate the effectiveness of our optimizations, we realize a high-speed 
implementation of an optimal ate pairing at the 128-bit security level that additionally 
incorporates the latest advancements in the area, including software techniques by Beuchat et al. 
[BGM+10] to optimize carry handling and eliminate function call overheads in the 2
p
F  
arithmetic, and the use of efficient compressed squarings and decompression in cyclotomic 
subgroups to speed up computations in the final exponentiation by Karabina (see [Kar10] and 
also [AKL+10, Section 5.2]). We report a pairing computation in 2,194,000 cycles on one core of 
an Intel Core 2 Duo E6750 and in 1,688,000 cycles on an Intel Core i5 540M. Moreover, we also 
report a pairing computation in only 1,562,000 cycles (~0.5msec.) on an AMD Phenom II X4 
940 processor. Taking into account timings in identical platforms, our results introduce 








6.2. Lazy Reduction for Tower Fields 
In this section, we generalize the lazy reduction technique to towering-friendly fields k
p
F , with 
2 3
i j
k = , 1i ≥ , 0j ≥ , as defined by [BS10], which are conveniently built with irreducible 
binomials. We show that multiplication (and squaring) in a tower extension k
p
F  only requires k 
reductions and still benefits from different arithmetic optimizations available in the literature to 
reduce the number of subfield multiplications/squarings. For instance, with our approach one 
now requires  integer multiplications and 2 3 2 12⋅ ⋅ =  reductions modulo p using the 
tower 2 6 12p p p p→ → →F F F F  to compute one multiplication in 12pF  (eliminating 24 reductions 
in comparison with the traditional approach); or 36 integer multiplications and 12 reductions 
modulo p to compute one squaring in 12
p
F  (eliminating 18 reductions in comparison with the 
traditional approach). Although wider in generality, these techniques are analyzed in detail in the 
context of Montgomery multiplication and Montgomery reduction [Mon85], which are 
commonly used in the context of pairings over ordinary curves. We explicitly state our formulas 
for the towering construction 2 6 12p p p p→ → →F F F F  in Section 6.2.2. In the remainder, the 
term modular reduction modulo p always refers to modular reductions of double-precision 
integers. 
Lemma 6.1. A sum of products with the form modi ia b p± ⋅∑ , where ,i ia b  are elements in 
Montgomery representation, can be reduced with only one Montgomery reduction modulo p by 
accumulating inner products as double-precision integers always that 2Ni ia b p± ⋅ < ⋅∑ , where 
N n w= ⋅ , n is the exact number of words required to represent p, i.e., 2logn p w =     , and w 
is the computer word-size. 
Lemma 6.1 defines the basic lazy reduction technique in the context of Montgomery 
reduction. Readers should note that internal additions and subtractions with partial results r 
“slightly” outside the Montgomery reduction range [0,2 ]N p⋅ , i.e., 12 2N Np r p+⋅ ≤ < ⋅ , can be 
easily corrected at negligible cost by performing a subtraction with 2N p⋅ .  
Next, we present our main result applying lazy reduction to towering-friendly fields. 
Theorem 6.1. In a towering-friendly field k
p
F , multiplications and squarings can be computed 
with k reductions. 
Proof. We will proof this theorem in a wider context for generic tower extensions built with 
irreducible binomials. Let k
p
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where only 1n  reductions are necessary by applying Lemma 6.1.  
Similarly, assuming that an element 
1 2n np



















f v d v e v d v e v v ξ
− −
= =
= ⋅ = ⋅ −∑ ∑  







j l j j l j n
l j j l
d e d e vξ
− −
− − +





∑ ∑ ∑ .                                                                              (6.2) 
Then, by using (6.1) to perform 
1np
F  multiplications x yd e⋅  from (6.2) and applying Lemma 
6.1 again, we obtain the following expression for multiplication in 
1 2n np
⋅F :  
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∑ ∑ ,                                                                                         (6.3) 
where , ,m x yc  correspond to coefficients mc  in (6.1) for each multiplication x yd e⋅  from (6.2). 
Note that again reductions have been shifted and only 1 2n n⋅  reductions are required in each 
1 2n np
⋅F multiplication. If one continues applying this procedure recursively it can be easily seen 
that a multiplication in 
1 2k n n ntp p
⋅ ⋅ ⋅= …F F  requires 1 2 tk n n n= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅…  reductions.                               □  








irreducible binomials (e.g., β  and ξ  in the proof above). However, for efficiency purposes one 
should select parameters with small values such that multiplications with them can be converted 
to a few additions and subtractions (see for example the chosen parameters in the illustrative 
tower in Section 6.2.2).  
The next theorem extends our result to towering-friendly fields exploiting Karatsuba 
multiplication. 
Theorem 6.2. Multiplications in a towering-friendly field k
p
F  built with irreducible binomials, 
where 2 3
d e
k = , 1d ≥ , 0e ≥ , can be computed with k reductions and 3 6d e  multiplications.  
Proof. Let the tower 
0 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
 k k n k n n k n n nt tp p p p pp p p⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= → = → = → → = ……F F F F F F F F  represent 
ktp
F  s.t. 
1





= −F F   with {2,3}in ∈ , 0i >  integer, and assume ikβ  are chosen 
such that multiplication by these values can be computed with a few additions or subtractions. 
Then, multiplication c a b= ⋅  of two elements 0 1 0 1( ), ( ) kipa a a x b b b x= + = + ∈F  with 2in =  
(second degree irred. binomial) and 
1
, kii i p
a b −∈F
 
can be computed using Karatsuba method as 
follows: 
                                 [ ]0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1( ) ( )( )ikc a b a b a a b b a b a b xβ= + + + + − − ,                            (6.4) 
which requires 3 integer multiplications in 
1kip −
F . Similarly, multiplication c a b= ⋅  of two 
elements 20 1 2( )a a a x a x= + +  and 
2
0 1 2( ) kip
b b b x b x= + + ∈F  with 3in =  (third degree irred. 
binomial) and 
1
, kii i p
a b −∈F
 
can be computed using Karatsuba method as follows: 
                                              0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2, ,v a b v a b v a b= ⋅ = ⋅ = ⋅ , 
              [ ]0 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2( )( ) , ( )( ) ,i ik kc v a a b b v v c a a b b v v vβ β= + + + − − = + + − − +  
                                 21 0 2 0 2 0 1 2 0 1 1( )( ) ,c a a b b v v v c c c x c x= + + − + − = + + ,                            (6.5) 
which requires 6 integer multiplications in 
1kip −
F . Therefore, a tower consisting of d second 
degree extensions (i.e., 2in = ) and e third degree extensions (i.e., 3in = ) can be executed with 
3 6
d e  multiplications. Following Theorem 6.1, we only require k reductions in total since terms in 
both expressions (6.4) and (6.5) are simply sums of products as required.                                     □ 
Theorem 6.2 shows that lazy reduction can be combined with Karatsuba multiplication for 
efficient computation in tower extension fields. In fact, it is straightforward to generalize lazy 
reduction to any formula that also involves only sums (or subtractions) of products of the form 
i ia b± ⋅∑ , with , kli i pa b ∈F , such as complex squaring or the asymmetric squaring formulas 
devised by Chung and Hasan [CH07]. 








arithmetic. Proof of Theorem 6.1 implies that reductions can be completely delayed to the end of 
the last layer by applying lazy reduction, but in some cases (when the optimal k is already 
reached and no reductions can be saved) it will be more efficient to perform reductions right after 
multiplications or squarings. This will be illustrated later with the computation of squaring in 
12
p
F  in Section 6.2.2. 
In summary, the generalized lazy reduction can be applied to every computation involving 
operations in tower extension fields in the Miller loop and final exponentiation, including the 
recently proposed compressed squarings by [Kar10] (see Appendix C1).  
Remarkably, in the Miller Loop reductions can also be delayed from the underlying 2
p
F  field 
during multiplication and squaring to the arithmetic layer immediately above, i.e., the point 
arithmetic and line evaluation. Similarly to the tower extension, reductions on this upper layer 
should only be delayed in the cases where this technique leads to fewer reductions. For details, 
see Section 6.3. 
There are some penalties when delaying reductions. In particular, single-precision operations 
(with operands occupying 2logn p w =      words, where w is the computer word-size) are 
replaced by double-precision operations (with operands occupying 2n words). However, this 
disadvantage can be minimized in terms of speed by selecting a field size smaller than the word-
size boundary because this technique can be exploited more extensively for optimizing double-
precision arithmetic. 
6.2.1. Selecting a Field Size Smaller than the Word-Size Boundary 
If the modulus p is selected such that 2logl p N= <   , where again N n w= ⋅ , n l w=     and w 
is the computer word-size, then several consecutive additions without carry-out in the most 
significant word (MSW) can be performed before a multiplication with the form c a b= ⋅ , where 
, [0,2 1]Na b∈ −  s.t. 22 Nc < . In the case of Montgomery reduction, the restriction is given by the 
upper bound 2Nc p< ⋅ . Similarly, when delaying reductions the result of a multiplication without 
reduction has maximum value 2 2( 1) 2 Np − <  (assuming that , [0, ]a b p∈ ) and several 
consecutive double-precision additions without carry-outs in the MSW (and, in some cases, 
subtractions without borrow-outs in the MSW) can be performed before reduction. When using 
Montgomery reduction up to ∼ 2
N
p    additions can be performed without carry checks. 
Furthermore, cheaper single- and double-precision operations exploiting this “extra room” 
can be combined for maximal performance. The challenge is to optimally balance their use in the 
tower arithmetic since both may interfere with each other. For instance, if intermediate values are 
allowed to grow up to 2p before multiplication (instead of p) then the maximum result would be 
24 p . This strategy makes use of cheaper single-precision additions without carry checks but 








multiplication with delayed reduction. As it will be evident later, to maximize the gain obtained 
with the proposed methodology one should take into account relative costs of operations and 
maximum bounds.  
In the case of double-precision arithmetic, different optimizing alternatives are available. Let 
us analyze them in the context of Montgomery arithmetic. First, as pointed out by [BGM+10], if 
2Nc p> ⋅ , where c is the result of a double-precision addition, then c can be restored with a 
cheaper single-precision subtraction by 2N p⋅  (note that the first half of this value consists of 
zeroes only). Second, different options are available to convert negative numbers to positive after 
double-precision subtraction. In particular, let us consider the computation c a l b= + ⋅ , where 
2, [0, ]a b mp∈ , m +∈Z  and , which is a recurrent operation (for instance, when l β=  
from Section 6.2.2). For this operation, we have explored the alternatives listed in Table 6.1, 
which can be integrated in the tower arithmetic with different advantages.  
Table 6.1. Different options to convert negative results to positive after a subtraction with the 
form c a l b= + ⋅ , where 2, [0, ]a b mp∈ , m +∈Z  and  s.t. 2Nlmp < . 
Option 1:  (2 / 2 )N hr c p= + ⋅ , 2[0, 2 / 2 ]N hr mp p∈ + ⋅ , where h is a small integer s.t. 
                    2 2| | 2 / 2 2N h Nlmp p p mp< ⋅ < ⋅ − . 
Option 2:  if c < 0 then 2Nr c p= + ⋅ , [0, 2 ]Nr p∈ ⋅ .    
Option 3:  2r c lmp= − , 2[0, (| | 1) ]r l mp∈ + , s.t. (| | 1) 2Nl mp+ < .   
Option 4:  if c < 0 then 2r c lmp= − , 2[0, | |]r lmp∈ .   
 
In particular, Options 2 and 4 in Table 6.1 require conditional checks that make the 
corresponding operations more expensive. Nevertheless, these options may be valuable when 
negative values cannot be corrected with other options without violating the upper bound. Also 
note that Option 2 can make use of a cheaper single-precision subtraction for converting negative 
results to positive. Options 1 and 3 are particularly efficient because no conditional checks are 
required. Moreover, if l is small enough (and h maximized for Option 1) several following 
operations can avoid carry checks. Between both, Option 1 is generally more efficient because 
adding 2 / 2N hp⋅  requires less than double-precision if h w≤ , where w is the computer word-
size.  
Next, we demonstrate how the different design options discussed in this section can be 
exploited with a clever selection of parameters and applied to different operations combining 










6.2.2. Practical Application of the Generalized Lazy Reduction 




[ ]/( ), where 1pp
i i β β= − = −F F . 
• 6 2
3
[ ]/( ), where 1
p p
v v iξ ξ= − = +F F . 
• 12 6
2
[ ] /( )
p p
w w v= −F F . 
We use a similar tower construction for our illustrative implementation of the optimal ate 
pairing on a BN curve (see Section 6.4.1 for complete details). 
When targeting the 128-bit security level, single- and double-precision operations are defined 
by operands with sizes N = 256 and 2N = 512, respectively. For our selected prime, 
2log 254p =    and 
22 6.8N p p⋅ ≈ . We use the following notation [AKL+10]:  
 
(i) , ,+ − ×  are operators not involving carry handling or modular reduction for boundary 
keeping;  
(ii) ⊕, , ⊗ are operators producing reduced results through carry handling or modular 
reduction;  
(iii) a superscript in an operator is used to denote the extension degree involved in the 
operation;  
(iv) notation ,i ja  is used to address j-th subfield element inside extension field element ia ;  
(v) variables with lower case t and upper case T represent single- and double-precision 
integers or extension field elements composed of single and double-precision integers, 
respectively.  
 
The following notation is used for the cost of operations:  
 
(i) M, S, A denote the cost of multiplication, squaring, addition in , respectively;  




(iii) , ,u uM S R  denote the cost of unreduced multiplication and squaring producing double-
precision results, and modular reduction of double-precision elements in , respect.;  
(iv) , ,u um s r  denote the cost of unreduced multiplication and squaring, and modular 
reduction of double-precision elements in 2
p
F , respectively.  
 










precision addition has the cost of 2A and 2a in  and 2
p
F , respectively, which approximately 
follows what we observe in practice. 
Note that, as stated before, if  after adding  in double-precision we correct 
the result by computing . Similar to subtraction (see Table 6.1), we refer to the latter as 
“Option 2”. Remaining references to “Option x” are taken from Table 6.1. 
We will now illustrate a selection of operations for efficient multiplication in 12
p
F , beginning 
with multiplication in 2
p
F . Let 2, ,
p
a b c∈F  such that 0 1a a a i= + , 0 1b b b i= + , 0 1c a b c c i= ⋅ = +
. The required operations for computing 2
p
F  multiplication are detailed in Algorithm 6.1. As 
explained in Beuchat et al. [BGM+10, Section 5.2], when using the Karatsuba method and 
,i i pa b ∈F , 
2
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0( )( ) 2 2
Nc a a b b a b a b a b a b p p= + + − − = + < < ⋅ , additions are single-
precision, reduction after multiplication can be delayed and hence subtractions are double-
precision (steps 1-3 in Algorithm 6.1). Obviously, these operations do not require carry checks. 
For 0 0 0 1 1c a b a b= − , 0c  is in interval 
2 2
[ , ]p p−  and a negative result can be converted to positive 
using Option 1 with 2h =  or Option 2, for which the final 0c  is in the range 
2[0, (2 / 4) ] [0,2 ]N Np p p⋅ + ⊂ ⋅  or [0,2 ]N p⋅ , respectively (step 4 in Algorithm 6.1). Following 
Theorem 6.1, all reductions can be completely delayed to the next arithmetic layer (higher 
extension or curve arithmetic). 
 
Algorithm 6.1.  Multiplication in 2pF  without reduction (
2× , cost of 3 8u um M A= + )    
Input:  0 1( )a a a i= +  and 20 1( ) pb b b i= + ∈F  
  Output:  20 1( ) pc a b c c i= ⋅ = + ∈F  
1: 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1, , ,T a b T a b t a a t b b← × ← × ← + ← +   
2: 2 0 1 3 0 1,T t t T T T← × ← +  
3: 3 2 3T T T← −  
4: 4 0T T←  1T                                                                                                        (Option 1 or 2) 
5: Return 4 3( )c T T i= +  
 
Let us now define multiplication in 6
p
F . Let 6, ,
p
a b c∈F  such that 20 1 2( )a a a v a v= + + , 
2
0 1 2( )b b b v b v= + + , 
2
0 1 2( )c a b c c v c v= ⋅ = + + . The required operations for computing 6pF
 
multiplication are detailed in Algorithm 6.2. In this case, 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 2[( )( ) ]c v a a b b v vξ= + + + − − , 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2( )( )c a a b b v v vξ= + + − − +  and 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 1( )( )c a a b b v v v= + + − − + , where 0 0 0v a b= , 
1 1 1v a b=  and 2 2 2v a b= . First, note that the pattern ( )( )x i j i j i js a a b b v v= + + − −  repeats for each 
xc , 0 2x≤ ≤ . After multiplications using Algorithm 6.1 with Option 1 (h = 2), we have 
2
,0 ,0, [0,(2 /4) ]
N
i jv v p p∈ ⋅ +  and 
2
,1 ,1, [0,2 ]i jv v p∈  (step 1 of Alg. 6.2). Outputs of single-precision 
additions of the forms ( )i ja a+  and ( )i jb b+  are in the range [0, 2p] and hence do not produce 
carries (steps 2, 9 and 17 of Alg. 6.2). Corresponding  multiplications ( )( )x i j i jr a a b b= + +   
pF












Algorithm 6.2.  Multiplication in 6pF  without reduction (
6× , cost of 6 28um a+ )    
Input:  20 1 2( )a a a v a v= + +  and 620 1 2( ) pb b b v b v= + + ∈F  
  Output:  6
2
0 1 2( ) pc a b c c v c v= ⋅ = + + ∈F  
  1: 2 2 20 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2, ,T a b T a b T a b← × ← × ← ×                                               (Option 1, h = 2) 
  2: 2 20 1 2 1 1 2,t a a t b b← + ← +  
  3: 23 0 1T t t← ×                                                                                                            (Option 2) 
  4: 24 1 2T T T← +                                                                                                                 
  5: 3,0 3,0T T←  4,0T                                                                                                     (Option 2)    
  6: 3,1 3,1 4,1T T T← −                                                                                                
  7: 4,0 3,0T T←  3,1 4,1 3,0,T T T← ⊕ 3,1 4 3( )T T Tξ≡ ← ⋅                                                  (Option 2)                                      
  8: 5 4T T← ⊕
2
0T                                                                                                          (Option 2)                                      
  9: 2 20 0 1 1 0 1,t a a t b b← + ← +  
10: 23 0 1T t t← ×                                                                                                            (Option 2) 
11: 24 0 1T T T← +                                                                                                                 
12: 3,0 3,0T T←  4,0T                                                                                                     (Option 2)    
13: 3,1 3,1 4,1T T T← −                                                                                                
14: 4,0 2,0T T←  2,1T                                                                                          (Option 1, h = 1)                                      
15: 4,1 2,0 2,1 4 2(steps14-15 )T T T T Tξ← + ≡ ← ⋅                                                                                        
16: 6 3T T← ⊕
2
4T                                                                                                          (Option 2)                                      
17: 2 20 0 2 1 0 2,t a a t b b← + ← +  
18: 23 0 1T t t← ×                                                                                                            (Option 2) 
19: 24 0 2T T T← +                                                                                                                 
20: 3,0 3,0T T←  4,0T                                                                                                     (Option 2)    
21: 3,1 3,1 4,1T T T← −                                                                                                
22: 7,0 3,0T T← ⊕ 1,0T                                                                                                     (Option 2)    
23: 7,1 3,1 1,1T T T← +                                                                                                
24: Return 25 6 7( )c T T v T v= + +  
 
using Algorithm 6.1 with Option 2 give results in the ranges  and  
(steps 3, 10 and 18). Although , note that  and 
 since . Hence, for , 
double-precision subtractions for computing  using Karatsuba do not require carry checks 
(steps 4 and 6, 11 and 13, 19 and 21). For computing ,0 ,0 ,0 ,0( )x x i js r v v= − +  
addition does not 
require carry check (output range 2[0, 2(2 / 4 )] [0,2 ]N Np p p⋅ + ⊂ ⋅ ) and subtraction gives result 
in the range [0,2 ]N p⋅  when using Option 2 (steps 5, 12 and 20). For computing 0c , 
multiplication by ξ , i.e., 0 0S sξ=  involves the operations 0,0 0,0 0,1S s s= −  and 0,1 0,0 0,1S s s= + , 




,1 [0,8 ]xr p∈
2
,1max( ) 8 2
N
xr p p= > ⋅
2 28 2 Np <
2









which are computed in double-precision using Option 2 to get the output range [0,2 ]N p⋅  (step 
7). Similarly, final additions with 0v  require Option 2 to get again the output range [0,2 ]
N p⋅  
(step 8). For computing 1c , 1 2S vξ=  is computed as 1,0 2,0 2,1S v v= −  and 1,1 2,0 2,1S v v= + , where 
the former requires a double-precision subtraction using Option 1 (h = 1) to get a result in the 
range 2[0,2 / 2 2 / 4 )] [0,2 ]N N Np p p p⋅ + ⋅ + ⊂ ⋅  (step 14) and the latter requires a double-precision 
addition with no carry check to get a result in the range 2[0, (2 / 4) 3 ] [0,2 ]N Np p p⋅ + ⊂ ⋅  (step 
15). Then, 1,0 1,0 1,0c s S= +  and 1,1 1,1 1,1c s S= +  involve double-precision additions using Option 2 
to obtain results in the range [0,2 ]N p⋅  (step 16). Results 2,0 2,0 1,0c s v= +  and 2,1 2,1 1,1c s v= +  
require a double-precision addition using Option 2 (final output range [0,2 ]N p⋅ , step 22) and a 
double-precision addition without carry check (final output range 2[0,6 ] [0,2 ]Np p⊂ ⋅ , step 23), 
respectively. Modular reductions have been delayed again to the last layer 12
p
F . 
Finally, let 12, ,
p
a b c∈F  such that 0 1a a a w= + , 0 1b b b w= + , 0 1c a b c c w= ⋅ = + . Algorithm 
6.3 details the required operations for computing multiplication in 12
p
F . In this case, 1c =  
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1( )( )a a b b a b a b+ + − − . At step 1, 6pF  multiplications 0 0a b  and 1 1a b  give outputs in range 
[0, 2 ]
N
p⊂ ⋅  using Algorithm 6.2. Additions 0 1a a+  and 0 1b b+  are single-precision reduced 
modulo p so that multiplication 0 1 0 1( )( )a a b b+ +  in step 2 gives output in range [0, 2 ]
N
p⊂ ⋅  using 
Algorithm 6.2. Then, subtractions by  and  use double-precision operations with Option 
2 to have an output range  so that we can apply Montgomery reduction at step 5 to 
obtain the result modulo p. For , multiplication by v, i.e., , where 
, involves the double-precision operations , ,  and 
, all performed with Option 2 to obtain the output range  (steps 6-7). Final addi- 
 
Algorithm 6.3.  Multiplication in 12pF  (
12× , cost of 18 6 110um r a+ + )    
Input:  0 1( )a a a w= +  and 120 1( ) pb b b w= + ∈ F  
  Output:  120 1( ) pc a b c c w= ⋅ = + ∈F  
  1: 6 60 0 0 1 1 1 0 0, ,T a b T a b t a← × ← × ← ⊕
6
1 1 0,a t b← ⊕
6
1b  
  2: 62 0 1T t t← ×  
  3: 3 0T T← ⊕
6
1T                                                                                                          (Option 2) 
  4: 2 2T T← 
6
3T                                                                                                          (Option 2) 
  5: 61 2 modc T p←                                                                                                           
  6: 2,2,0 1,2,0T T←  1,2,1 2,0,1 1,2,0,T T T← ⊕ 1,2,1T                                                              (Option 2)                                      
  7: 2,1 1,0 2,2 1,1 2 1, (steps 6-7 )T T T T T v T← ← ≡ ← ⋅                                                                                        
  8: 2 0T T← ⊕
6
2T                                                                                                          (Option 2)                                      
  9: 60 2 modc T p←                                                                                                           
10: Return 0 1( )c c c w= +  
 
1 1a b 0 0a b
[0,2 ]N p⋅
0 0 0 1 1c a b va b= + 1T v v= ⋅
i i iv a b= 0,0 2,0 2,1T v v= − 0,1 2,0 2,1T v v= + 1 0T v=









tion with  uses double-precision with Option 2 again so that we can apply Montgomery 
reduction at step 9 to obtain the result modulo p. We remark that, by applying the lazy reduction 
technique using the operation sequence above, we have reduced the number of reductions in 
 from 3 to only 2, or the number of total modular reductions in  from 54 (or 36 if lazy 
reduction is employed in 2pF ) to only k = 12.  
As previously stated, there are situations when it is more efficient to perform reductions right 
after multiplications and squarings in the last arithmetic layer of the tower construction. We 
illustrate the latter with squaring in 12
p
F . As shown in Algorithm 6.4, a total of 2 reductions in 
6
p
F  are required when performing 6
p
F  multiplications in step 4. If lazy reduction was applied, 
the number of reductions would stay at 2, and worse, the total cost would be increased because 
some operations would require double-precision. The reader should note that the approach 
suggested by [PSN+10], where the formulas in [CH07] are employed for computing squarings in 
internal cubic extensions of 12
p
F , saves 1m in comparison with Algorithm 6.4. However, we 
experimented such approach with several combinations of formulas and towering, and it 
remained consistently slower than Algorithm 6.4 due to an increase in the number of additions. 
 
Algorithm 6.4.  Squaring in 12pF  (cost of 12 6 73um r a+ + )    
Input:  120 1( ) pa a a w= + ∈F  
  Output:  122 0 1( ) pc a c c w= = + ∈F  
1: 0 0t a← ⊕
6
1 1,0,0 1,2,0,a t a←  1,2,1 1,0,1 1,2,0,a t a← ⊕ 1,2,1a  
2: 1,1 1,0 1,2 1,1 1 1, (steps 2-3 )t a t a t v a← ← ≡ ← ⋅  
3: 1 0t a← ⊕
6
1t                                                                                                                
4: 6 6 6 61 0 1 0 0 1( ) mod , ( )modc a a p t t t p← × ← ×  
5: 1,0,0 1,2,0t c←  1,2,1 1,0,1 1,2,0,c t c← ⊕ 1,2,1c                                                             
6: 1,1 1,0 1,2 1,1 1 1, (steps 6-7 )t c t c t v c← ← ≡ ← ⋅                                                                                           
7: 1 1t t← ⊕
6
1c                                                                                                     
8: 0 0c t← 
6
1 1 1,t c c← ⊕
6
1c                                                                                                    
9: Return 0 1( )c c c w= +  
6.3. Optimizing Curve Arithmetic in Miller Loop 
In this section, we present our optimizations to the curve arithmetic. Remarkably, we show that 
the technique proposed in Section 6.2 for delaying reductions can also be applied to the point 
arithmetic over a quadratic extension field. Reductions can be delayed to the end of each 2
p
F  
multiplication/squaring and then delayed further for those sums of products that allow reducing 












formulas which have consecutive and redundant multiplications/squarings), there are a few 
places where this technique can be applied. To be consistent with other results in the literature, 
we only assume that double-precision addition has the cost of 2A and 2a in pF  and 2pF
 
when 
applying the lazy reduction technique. When this technique is not applied, we do not distinguish 
between single- and double-precision additions. 
6.3.1. Jacobian Coordinates 
The curve arithmetic in the Miller loop is traditionally performed using Jacobian coordinates 
[HMS08, BGM+10]. Let the point 21 1 1( , , ) ( )pT X Y Z E
′= ∈ F  be in Jacobian coordinates. The 
point doubling computation 3 3 32 ( , , )T X Y Z=  and evaluation of the arising line function l at 
point ( , ) ( )P P pP x y E= ∈ F  are traditionally performed with the following formulae [HMS08, 
Section 2]:  
                          4 23 1 1 19 8X X X Y= − ,  
2 2 4
3 1 1 1 3 13 (4 ) 8Y X X Y X Y= − − ,  3 1 12Z Y Z= ,  
                                                2 2 2 3 23 1 1 1 1 13 (3 2 )P Pl Z Z y X Z x X Y= − + − .                                      (6.6) 
An operation count of (6.6) reveals that this formula can be performed with 
6 5 11 4m s a M+ + + . We present the following revised formula that requires fewer 2
p
F  additions: 








X X Y= − ,  
2
2 41





Y X Y X Y= − − ,  3 1 1Z Y Z= , 
                                              
2 2 3
2 21 1 1
3 1 1
3 3




X Z x X
l Z Z y Y= − + − .                                     (6.7) 
This doubling formula only requires 6 5 8 4m s a M+ + +  if computed as follows ( P Px x= −  is 
precomputed): 
                                          2 2 21 1 1 13 2, , , 2 ,A X B Y C X Y D C= = = ⋅ =  
                         2 2 23 3 3 3 1 1 1, , , , ,X A D E C X Y A E B Z Y Z F Z= − = − = ⋅ − = ⋅ =  
                                     0,0 3 1,0 1,1 1, , .P Pl Z F y l A F x l A X B= ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ −  
Applying Lazy Reduction:  
Let the point 21 1 1( , , ) ( )pT X Y Z E
′= ∈ F  be in Jacobian coordinates. Formula (6.7) combined with 








( , ) ( )P P pP x y E= ∈ F  has a total cost of 6 5 10 10 4u um s r a M+ + + +  if computed as detailed in 
Algorithm 6.5. 
 
Algorithm 6.5.  Point doubling in Jacobian coordinates (cost of 6 5 10 10 4u um s r a M+ + + + )    
Input:  21 1 1( , , ) ( ), ( , ) ( ) andP P p P PpT X Y Z E P x y E x x′= ∈ = ∈ = −F F  
  Output:  23 3 32 ( , , ) ( )pT X Y Z E′= ∈ F  and the tangent line 12pl ∈F  
  1: 0 1t X← ⊗
2
1 2 1,X t Z← ⊗
2
1Z  
  2: 1 0t t← ⊕
2
0 3 1,t Z Y← ⊗
2
1Z  
  3: 0 0t t← ⊕
2
1 3 1,t t Y← ⊗
2
1Y                                                                                                             
  4: 20 0 / 2t t←  
  5: 1 0t t← ⊗
2
2 4 0,t t t← ⊗
2
1X                                                             
  6: 1,0,0 1,0l t← ⊗ 1,0,1 1,1,Px l t← ⊗ 1,1 4,Px l t← 
2
3 2 3,t t Z← ⊗
2
2t                                                                                         
  7: 1 3t t← ⊗
2
1X                                                             
  8: 0,0,0 2,0l t← ⊗ 0,0,1 2,1,Py l t← ⊗ 1 1,Py Y t← ⊕
2
1 1 0,t X t← ⊗
2
0t                                                                                         
  9: 3 1X X← 
2
1Y                                                             
10: 1 1t t← 
2
3X                                                             
11: 2 20 3 3 1 0 1,T t t T t t← × ← ×                                                                          (Option 1, h = 2) 
12: 1 1T T← 
2
0T                                                                                                          (Option 2)                 
13: 23 1 modY T p←                                                                     
14: Return 3 3 32 ( , , )T X Y Z=  and 0 1( , )l l l=  
 
Let the points 1 1 1( , , )T X Y Z=  and 22 2 2( , , ) ( )pR X Y Z E
′= ∈ F  be in Jacobian coordinates. To 
compute 3 3 3( , , )T R X Y Z+ =  and the tangent line l evaluated at point ( , ) ( )P P pP x y E= ∈ F  we 
use the following addition formula: 
                                                     3 22 1 1 2 1 1, ,Y Z Y X Z Xθ λ= − = −  
                          2 2 3 2 2 3 33 1 3 1 1 3 12 , (3 ) , ,X X Y X Y Z Zθ λ λ θ λ θ λ λ λ= − − = − + − =  
                                                   3 2 2 3( ) ( ),P Pl Z y x X Y Zθ θ= + + −                                             (6.8) 
that costs 10 3 11 10 4u um s r a M+ + + +  when exploiting lazy reduction (see Algorithm 6.6). 
6.3.2. Homogeneous Coordinates    
Costello et al. [CLN10, Section 5] proposed the use of homogeneous coordinates to perform the 








Algorithm 6.6.  Point addition in Jacobian coordinates (cost of 10 3 11 10 4u um s r a M+ + + + )    
Input:  21 1 1 2 2 2( , , ) and ( , , ) ( ), ( , ) ( ) andP P p P PpT X Y Z R X Y Z E P x y E x x′= = ∈ = ∈ = −F F  
  Output:  23 3 3( , , ) ( )pT R X Y Z E′+ = ∈ F  and the tangent line 12pl ∈F  
  1: 1 1t Z← ⊗
2
1Z  
  2: 3 2t X← ⊗
2
1 1 1,t t t← ⊗
2
1Z  
  3: 3 3t t← 
2
1 4 1,X t t← ⊗
2
2Y                                                                                                             
  4: 3 1Z Z← ⊗
2
3 0 4,t t t← 
2
1 1 3,Y t t← ⊗
2
3t                                                             
  5: 4 1t t← ⊗
2
3 3 0,t X t← ⊗
2
0t                                                             
  6: 1 1t t← ⊗
2
1X                                                             
  7: 3 1t t← ⊕
2
1t                                                             
  8: 3 3X X← 
2
3t                                                                                            
  9: 3 3X X← 
2
4t                                                             
10: 1 1t t← 
2
3X                                                             
11: 2 20 0 1 1 4 1,T t t T t Y← × ← ×                                                                          (Option 1, h = 2) 
12: 0 0T T← 
2
1T                                                                                                         (Option 2)                 
13: 23 0 1,0,0 0,0mod ,Y T p l t← ← ⊗ 1,0,1 0,1,Px l t← ⊗ Px                                                                    
14: 2 20 0 2 1 3 2,T t X T Z Y← × ← ×                                                                     (Option 1, h = 2) 
15: 0 0T T← 
2
1T                                                                                                         (Option 2)                 
16: 21,1 0 0,0,0 3,0mod ,l T p l Z← ← ⊗ 0,0,1 3,1,Py l Z← ⊗ Py                                                                    
17: Return 3 3 3( , , )T R X Y Z+ =  and 0 1( , )l l l=  
 
'23 4 1 ba M M+ + . The twisting of point P, given in our case by 
vw), is eliminated by multiplying the whole line evaluation by  and relying on the final 
exponentiation to eliminate this extra factor [CLN10]. Clearly, the main drawback of this formula 
is the high number of additions. We present the following revised formula: 
                    2 21 13 1 1( 9 )
2
X Y
X Y b Z′= − ,  2 2 2 43 1 1 1
1
( 9 ) 27
2
Y Y b Z b Z
 
′ ′= + −  
,  33 1 12Z Y Z= , 
                                      2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1( 2 ) (3 ) (3 ).P Pl Y Z y vw X x v b Z Yξ ′= − − + −                                  (6.9) 
This doubling formula gives the cost of 3 6 17 4 1 1bm s a M M Mξ′+ + + + + . Moreover, if the 
parameter b ′  is cleverly selected as in [PSN+10], multiplication by b ′  can be performed with 
minimal number of additions and subtractions. For instance, if one fixes b = 2 then b′ =  
2 /(1 ) 1i i+ = − . Accordingly, the following execution has a cost of 3 6 19 4m s a M+ + +  (note that 
computations for E and 0,0l  are over pF  and P Py y= −  is precomputed): 
                   2 21 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 02, , , 3 , , ,A X Y B Y C Z D C E D D E D D= ⋅ = = = = + = −  
2 3















                            2 23 33 , ( ), ( ) / 2, 3 ,F E X A B F G B F Y G E= = ⋅ − = + = −  
                         
2
1 1 3 0,0,0 0 1( ) ( ), , , ,H Y Z B C Z B H I E B l I I= + − + = ⋅ = − = −  
                                         
2
0,0,1 0 1 1,1 0,2 1, , 3 .P Pl I I l H y l X x= + = ⋅ = ⋅                                      (6.10) 
We point out that in practice we have observed that 3m s a− ≈ . Hence, it is more efficient to 
compute 1 1X Y  directly than using 
2
1 1( )X Y+ , B  and 
2
1X . If this was not the case, the formula 
could be computed with cost 2 7 23 4m s a M+ + + . 
Applying Lazy Reduction:  
Doubling formula (6.9) requires 25  reductions (3 per 2
p
F  multiplication using Karatsuba, 2 
per  squaring and 1 per  multiplication). First, by delaying reductions inside  arith-
metic the number of reductions per multiplication goes down to only 2, with 22 reductions in 
total. Moreover, reductions corresponding to 2G  and 23E  in  (see execution (6.10)) can be 
 
Algorithm 6.7.  Point doubling in homogeneous coordinates (cost of 3 6 8 22 4u um s r a M+ + + + )   
Input:  21 1 1( , , ) ( ), ( , ) ( ) andP P p P PpT X Y Z E P x y E y y′= ∈ = ∈ = −F F  
  Output:  23 3 32 ( , , ) ( )pT X Y Z E′= ∈ F  and the tangent line 12pl ∈F  
  1: 0 1t Z← ⊗
2
1 4 1,Z t X← ⊗
2
1 1 1,Y t Y← ⊗
2
1Y  
  2: 3 0t t← ⊕
2 2
0 4 4 5 0, / 2,t t t t t← ← ⊕
2
1t  
  3: 0 0t t← ⊕
2
3t                                                                                                            
  4: 2,0 0,0t t← ⊕ 0,1 2,1 0,1,t t t←  0,0 2 2( )t t b t′≡ ← ⋅                                                                                 
  5: 0 1t X← ⊗
2
1 3 2,X t t← ⊕
2
2t                                                             
  6: 3 2t t← ⊕
2 2
3 0,2 0 0,t l t t← +                                                                                         
  7: 3 1X t← 
2 2
3 0,2 0,2 0 3 1, ,t l l t t t← + ← ⊕
2
3t                                                         
  8: 3 4X t← ⊗
2 2
3 3 3, / 2X t t←                                                                                       
  9: 2 20 3 3 1 2 2,T t t T t t← × ← ×                                                                          (Option 1, h = 2) 
10: 22 1 1 3 1,T T T t Y← + ← ⊕
2
1Z                                                             
11: 22 1 2 3 3,T T T t t← + ← ⊗
2
3t                                                                     
12: 3 3t t← 
2
5t                                                                                                                     
13: 0 0T T← 
2
2T                                                                                                        (Option 2)                       
14: 23 0 3 1mod ,Y T p Z t← ← ⊗
2
3 2 2,t t t← 
2
1t                                                                     
15: 0,0,0 2,0l t←  2,1 0,0,1 2,0,t l t← ⊕ 2,1 0,0 2( )t l tξ≡ ← ⋅                                                                                 
16: 0,2,0 0,2,0l l← ⊗ 0,2,1 0,2,1,Px l l← ⊗ Px                                                             
17: 1,1,0 3,0l t← ⊗ 1,1,1 3,1,Py l t← ⊗ Py                                                             














further delayed and merged, eliminating the need of two reductions. Thus, the number of 
reductions is now 20 and the total cost of formula (6.9) is . The 
details are shown in Algorithm 6.7.  
Let  and  be points in homogeneous coordinates. 
To compute  and the tangent line l evaluated at point ( , )P P pP x y= ∈F  we 
use the following addition formula: 
                                                      
                   
                                              2 2 2( ) ( ) ,P Pl y x v X Y vwλ θ ξ θ λ= − + −                                        (6.11) 
that costs  when employing lazy reduction (see Alg. 6.8 below). 
 
Algorithm 6.8.  Point addition in homogeneous coordinates (cost of 11 2 11 12 4u um s r a M+ + + + )   
Input:  21 1 1 2 2 2( , , ) and ( , , ) ( ), ( , ) ( ) andP P p P PpT X Y Z R X Y Z E P x y E y y′= = ∈ = ∈ = −F F  
  Output:  23 3 3( , , ) ( )pT R X Y Z E′+ = ∈ F  and the tangent line 12pl ∈F  
  1: 1 1t Z← ⊗
2
2 2 1,X t Z← ⊗
2
2Y  
  2: 1 1t X← 
2
1 2 1,t t Y← 
2
2t  
  3: 3 1t t← ⊗
2
1t                                                                                                            
  4: 3 3X t← ⊗
2
1 4 2,X t t← ⊗
2
2t                                                             
  5: 3 1t t← ⊗
2
3 4 4,t t t← ⊗
2
1Z                                                             
  6: 4 3t t← ⊕
2
4t                                                                                         
  7: 4 4t t← 
2
3X                                                         
  8: 4 4t t← 
2
3X                                                         
  9: 3 3X X← 
2
4t                                                         
10: 2 21 2 3 2 3 1,T t X T t Y← × ← ×                                                                        (Option 1, h = 2) 
11: 2 1T T← 
2
2T                                                                                                        (Option 2)                       
12: 23 2 3 1mod ,Y T p X t← ← ⊗
2
4 3 3,t Z t← ⊗
2
1Z                                                                     
13: 0,2,0 2,0l t← ⊗ 0,2,1 2,1,Px l t← ⊗ Px                                                             
14: 20,2 0,2l l← −                                                                                                 
15: 2 21 2 2 2 1 2,T t X T t Y← × ← ×                                                                        (Option 1, h = 2) 
16: 2 1T T← 
2
2T                                                                                                        (Option 2)                       
17: 22 1 modt T p←                                                                    
18: 0,0,0 2,0l t←  2,1 0,0,1 2,0,t l t← ⊕ 2,1 0,0 2( )t l tξ≡ ← ⋅                                                                                 
19: 1,1,0 1,0l t← ⊗ 1,1,1 1,1,Py l t← ⊗ Py                                                             
18: Return 3 3 3( , , )T R X Y Z+ =  and 0 1( , )l l l=   
3 6 8 22 4u um s r a M+ + + +
1 1 1( , , )T X Y Z= 22 2 2( , , ) ( )pR X Y Z E
′= ∈ F
3 3 3( , , )T R X Y Z+ =
1 2 1 1 2 1, ,Y Y Z X X Zθ λ= − = −
3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3
3 1 1 3 1 1 1 3 1( 2 ), (3 ) , ,X Z X Y X Z Y Z Zλ λ θ λ θ λ λ θ λ λ= + − = − − − =








6.4. High-Speed Pairing Implementation    
In this section, we evaluate theoretically and empirically the performance gain obtained by 
exploiting the lazy reduction technique and improved explicit formulas. As a side effect, we 
demonstrate that a careful selection of curve and parameters, efficient coding and the use of other 
additional optimizations allow us to realize a high-speed software implementation that surpasses 
the best results in the literature by significant margins.   
6.4.1. Optimal Ate Pairing on BN Curves 
For our analysis and tests, we use the Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve: 
                                                                                                                    (6.12) 
defined over , where , embedding degree k = 12, 
prime order 4 3 236 36 18 6 1n u u u u= + + + +  and 62 55(2 2 1) 0u = − + + < ∈Z .  
To implement the arithmetic over extension fields efficiently, we follow the 
recommendations in [IEEE08] to represent k
p
F  with a tower of extensions using irreducible 
binomials. Accordingly, we represent 12
p
F  using the flexible towering scheme used in [DSD07, 
HMS08, BGM+10, PSN+10] combined with the parameters suggested by [PSN+10]: 
• 2
2
[ ]/( ), where 1pp
i i β β= − = −F F . 
• 4 2
2
[ ] /( ), where 1
p p
s s iξ ξ= − = +F F . 
• 6 2
3
[ ]/( ), where 1
p p
v v iξ ξ= − = +F F . 
• 12 4 6
3 2
[ ]/( ) or [ ]/( )
p p p
t t s w w v= − −F F F . 
As can be seen in Algorithm 6.1, the selection of 1β = − , enabled by the fact that 
3(mod 4)p ≡ , accelerates 2
p
F  arithmetic since multiplications by β  can be computed as simple 
subtractions [PSN+10]. 
Although several variants of the Tate pairing are available (e.g., R-ate, optimal ate, X-ate), 
our experiments reveal that they achieve very similar performance. For testing purposes, we 
choose to implement the optimal ate pairing given by: 
                    2 1 T: G G Gopta × →  




, [ ] , ( ) [ ] ( ), ( )




r Q r Q Q r Q Q Q
Q P f P l P l Pπ π π
−
+ −
→ ⋅ ⋅ ,                   (6.13) 
2 3: 2BNE y x= +
pF








where 6 2 0r u= + <  since 0u < . To accommodate the negative r, Arahna et al. [AKL+10] 
modifies Algorithm 2.9 with the replacement of an expensive inversion by a simple conjugation. 
The details are shown in Algorithm 6.9. For complete details, the reader is referred to [AKL+10, 
Section 5.1]. 
Curve arithmetic and line evaluation in Algorithm 6.9 (lines 1, 2, 5, 6, 9) were implemented 
with the optimized formulas in homogeneous coordinates discussed in Section 6.3.2 (Algorithm 
6.7 and Algorithm 6.8). Towering arithmetic (lines 3, 5, 6, 9, 10) was optimized with the lazy 
reduction technique as described in Section 6.2. Following [AKL+10], for accumulating line 
evaluations into the Miller variable,  is represented using the towering 2p p→ →F F
4 12
p p
→F F  and a special (dense× sparse)-multiplication (called sparse multiplication) costing 
13 6 61um r a+ +  is used (steps 5 and 6 of Algorithm 6.9). Aranha et al. also points that, during 
the first iteration of the loop, a squaring in 12
p
F  can be eliminated since the Miller variable is 
initialized as 1 (step 1 in Algorithm 2.9) and a special (sparse× sparse) multiplication (called 
sparser multiplication) costing 7 5 30um r a+ +  is used to multiply the first two line evaluations 
(step 3 of Algorithm 6.9). This sparser multiplication is also used for multiplying the two final 
line evaluations in step 9 of the algorithm. Final exponentiation in step 10 was implemented with 
the method by Scott et al. [SBC+09], in which the power  is factored in the exponents 
,  and . Among them, the most expensive part is the computation 
with the exponent . In this case, the execution can be performed in the cyclotomic 
subgroup , which requires, among other operations, 3 exponentiations by . In order 
to speed up these exponentiations, we use the faster compressed squarings by Karabina [Kar10]. 
 




G , G , 6 2 2
r i
ii
P Q r u r
=
∈ ∈ = + =∑  
  Output:  ( , )opta Q P  
  1: , ( ), 2 , 1Q Qd l P T Q e← ← ←  
  2:  2log 1 ,if 1 then ( ),r T Qr e l P T T Q− = ← ← +  
  3: f d e← ⋅                                                                                                         
  4: 2for log 2 downto 0 doi r= −                                                             
  5:        
2
, ( ), 2T Tf f l P T T← ⋅ ←  
  6:         ,if 1 then ( ),i T Qr f f l P T T Q= ← ⋅ ← +  
  7: 21 2( ), ( )p pQ P Q Qπ π← ←  
  8: 
6
if 0 then , pu T T f f< ← − ←                                                         
  9: 
1 2, 1 , 2( ), , ( ), , ( )T Q T Qd l P T T Q e l P T T Q f f d e−← ← + ← ← − ← ⋅ ⋅  
10: 
6 2 4 2( 1)( 1)( 1) /p p p p nf f − + − +←                                                           





12( 1) /p n−
6
( 1)p − 2( 1)p + 4 2( 1) /p p n− +













Remarkably, we note that these compressed squarings can be sped up by applying the generalized 
lazy reduction again. In total, about 8% of reductions can be eliminated per exponentiation by 
. The reader is referred to Appendix C1 for complete details.  
6.4.2. Operation Count 
We now consider all the described improvements and state-of-the-art techniques to carry out a 
detailed operation count of an optimal ate pairing over BN curves using Algorithm 6.9. We aim 
to determine the performance gain obtained with the use of the generalized lazy reduction 
technique introduced in Section 6.2.  
Operation counts for arithmetic performed by the Miller’s algorithm when using the 
generalized lazy reduction are detailed in Table 6.2. For reference, we also include costs when 
using lazy reduction for 2pF  arithmetic only (referred to as basic lazy reduction).  
First, using the parameter selection detailed in Section 6.4.1 the Miller loop in Algorithm 6.9 
requires 1 negation in pF
 
to precompute the coordinate Py− ; 64 point doublings with line 
evaluations, 6 point additions with line evaluations, 2 negations, 1 p-power Frobenius and 1 p
2
-
power Frobenius in 2( )
p
E F ; and 1 conjugation, 66 sparse multiplications, 63 squarings, 2 
sparser multiplications and 1 multiplication in 12
p
F . Thus, the cost of the Miller loop when using 
the generalized lazy reduction technique ( )GLML  is given by: 
1 64(3 6 8 22 4 ) 6(11 2 11 12 4 ) 5 (2 2 2 )GL u u u u uML A m s r a M m s r a M a m r A= + + + + + + + + + + + + + +                
          (1 2 ) 66(13 6 61 ) 63(12 6 73 ) 2(7 5 30 ) (18 6 110 )u u u ua M m r a m r a m r a m r a+ + + + + + + + + + + + + +  
1906 396 1370 10281 282 3GL u uML m s r a M A= + + + + + .                                                         (6.14) 
And the total cost of the Miller loop when using basic lazy reduction ( )BLML  is given by: 
1 64(3 6 19 4 ) 6(11 2 10 4 ) 5 (2 2 ) (1 2 )BLML A m s a M m s a M a m A a M= + + + + + + + + + + + + +             
           66(13 36 ) 63(12 51 ) 2(7 18 ) (18 67 )m a m a m a m a+ + + + + + + +  
1906 396 6974 282 3BLML m s a M A= + + + + .                                                                           (6.15) 
The final exponentiation in Algorithm 6.9 requires 1 inversion, 4 conjugations, 15 
multiplications, 3 u-th powers, 4 cyclotomic squarings, 5 p-power Frobenius and 3 p
2
-power 
Frobenius in . Thus, the cost of the final exponentiation when using the generalized lazy 














Table 6.2. Operation counts for arithmetic required by Miller’s algorithm when using: (i) 






Operation count  
(generalized lazy reduction) 
Operation count 
(basic lazy reduction) 
Point doubling/line evaluation 3 6 8 22 4u um s r a M+ + + +  3 6 8 19 4m s r a M+ + + +  
Point addition/line evaluation 11 2 11 12 4u um s r a M+ + + +  11 2 11 10 4m s r a M+ + + +  
p-power Frobenius 2 2 2um r A+ +  2 2m A+  
p2-power Frobenius 1 2a M+   
Negation 1a   
2pF Arithmetic Operation count Operation count 
Add/Sub 1 2a A=   
Double-precision Add/Sub 2a   
Multiplication by ξ  2A   
Double-precision Mult. by ξ  4A  - 
Conjugation 1A   
Reduction 2r R=   
Multiplication 3 2 8u um m r M R A= + = + +  3 2 8u um m r M R A= + = + +  
Squaring 2 2 3u us s r M R A= + = + +  2 2 3u us s r M R A= + = + +  
Inversion 1 2 2 2i I M S A= + + +   
12pF Arithmetic Operation count Operation count 
Add/Sub 6 12a A=   
Conjugation 3a   
Multiplication 18 6 110um r a+ +  18 67m a+  
Sparse Multiplication 13 6 61um r a+ +  13 36m a+  
Sparser Multiplication 7 5 30um r a+ +  7 18m a+  
Squaring 12 6 73um r a+ +  12 51m a+  
Cyclotomic Squaring 9 6 46us r a+ +  6 61m a+  
Compressed Squaring 6 4 31us r a+ +  4 27m a+  
p-power Frobenius 5 6m A+  5 6m A+  
p2-power Frobenius 10 2M a+  10 2M a+  




















          
.                               (6.16) 
 
And the total cost of the final exponentiation when using basic lazy reduction  is 
given by: 
           
.                                                                     (6.17) 
After adding (6.14) with (6.16) and adding (6.15) with (6.17), we obtain: 
 
                       .                                                                (6.18) 
.                                                                 (6.19) 
Therefore, in the case of a state-of-the-art optimal ate pairing the generalized lazy reduction 
technique allows us to eliminate about 32% of reductions. For instance, if we assume that 
 and  (neglecting the cost of field inversions for simplification purposes) 
the expected cost reduction for the whole pairing computation is approximately 9%. Obviously, 
this estimate is expected to grow with the ratios R/A (reduction/addition) and  (reduction/ 
integer multiplication). 
6.4.3. Implementation Results 
A software implementation was developed in collaboration with Diego F. Aranha to evaluate the 
performance boost obtained with the introduced techniques and improved explicit formulas. To 
optimize carry handling and eliminate function call overheads, we followed suggestions by 
[BGM+10] and implemented the 2
p
F  arithmetic purely in Assembly. Higher-level algorithms 
were implemented using the C language and compiled with GCC. To obtain our cycle counts, we 
ran our implementations 10
4
 times, averaged and approximated the results to the nearest 1000 
(1 25 9 24 112 ) 4(3 ) 15(18 6 110 ) 3(1 36 372 9 6GL u u u u uFE i m s r a a m r a i m s m s= + + + + + + + + + + + + +
260 2164 ) 4(9 6 46 ) 5(5 6 ) 3(10 2 )ur a s r a m A M a+ + + + + + + + +
4 394 61 1158 21 906 8456 30 30GL u uFE i m m s s r a M A= + + + + + + + +
( )BLFE
(1 25 9 82 ) 4(3 ) 15(18 67 ) 3(1 293 6 1830 ) 4(6 61 )BLFE i m s a a m a i m s a m a= + + + + + + + + + + + +
5(5 6 ) 3(10 2 )m A M a+ + + +
4 1223 27 6839 30 30BLFE i m s a M A= + + + + +
4 2361 1575 2358 18737 30 30GL GL u uML FE i m s r a M A+ = + + + + + +
4 10561 5044 61128uI M R A= + + +
4 3129 423 13813 312 33BL BLML FE i m s a M A+ = + + + + +
4 10561 7432 53968uBL BL I MF AM RL E+ = + + +









cycles. Table 6.3 compares the timings of our Basic and Optimized implementations: the former 
employs lazy reduction below 2
p
F  only, whereas the latter is fully optimized with the lazy 
reduction technique applied to the whole pairing computation. Both implementations exploit 
faster compressed squarings and our optimized explicit formulas using homogeneous 
coordinates. Therefore, Table 6.3 directly illustrates the benefits of using the generalized lazy 
reduction technique discussed in Section 6.2. As can be seen, this technique enables in practice 
cost reductions between 12% and 18% on x86-64-based processors. 
Table 6.3. Performance comparison of our implementations on several x86-64-based processors: 
(i) Basic implementation using lazy reduction below 2
p
F  arithmetic; (ii) Fully optimized 
implementation using generalized lazy reduction for the whole pairing computation. Timings are 
in millions of clock cycles.  












Basic 1.777 - 2.020 - 2.005 - 2.677 - 
Optimized 1.562 12% 1.688 16% 1.710 15% 2.194 18% 
 
Table 6.4 compares our implementation results with Beuchat et al. [BGM+10], which 
presented the previously fastest implementation at the 128-bit security level in the literature. We 
remark that the tested Core i5 exhibits a microarchitecture that is equivalent to the Core i7 
processor employed by [BGM+10]. To confirm this assumption, we benchmarked software by 
Beuchat et al. and compared the results with the ones reported in [BGM+10]. We also note that 
Phenom II was not considered in [BGM+10] and that we could not find a Core 2 Duo machine 
producing the same timings as in [BGM+10]. Hence, timings for these two architectures were 
measured independently by the authors using the available software. 
First, observe that the basic implementation in Table 6.3 consistently outperforms Beuchat et 
al.’s results. This is due to our careful implementation using an optimal choice of parameters 
combined with optimized curve arithmetic in homogeneous coordinates and faster cyclotomic 
formulas. When lazy reduction is enabled (optimized implementation), pairing computation 
becomes faster than the best previous result by 28%-34%. 
For extended benchmark results and comparisons with other previous works on different 64-








Table 6.4. Performance comparison of state-of-the-art pairing implementations on several x86-
64-based processors. Timings are in clock cycles.  
Operation 
Beuchat et al. [BGM+10] 
    Phenom II (1)    Core i7 (2)    Opteron (3)   Core 2 Duo (4)  
Multiplication in  440 435 443 590 
Squaring in  353 342 355 479 
Miller Loop 1,338,000 1,330,000 1,360,000 1,781,000 
Final Exponentiation 1,020,000 1,000,000 1,040,000 1,370,000 
Optimal Ate Pairing 2,358,000 2,330,000 2,400,000 3,151,000 
Operation 
This work 
    Phenom II (1)     Core i5 (5)    Opteron (6)   Core 2 Duo (4) 
Multiplication in  368 412 390 560 
Squaring in  288 328 295 451 
Miller Loop 898,000 990,000 988,000 1,275,000 
Final Exponentiation 664,000 713,000 722,000 919,000 
Optimal Ate Pairing 1,562,000 1,688,000 1,710,000 2,194,000 
Improvement 34% 28% 29% 30% 
   (1) On a 3.0GHz AMD Phenom II X4 940.   
   (2) On a 2.8GHz Intel Core i7 860.   
   (3) On a 2.3GHz AMD Opteron 2376.  
   (4) On a 2.66GHz Intel Core 2 Duo E6750.  
   (5) On a 2.53GHz Intel Core i5 M540.   
   (6) On a 2.2GHz AMD Opteron 275.  
6.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have proposed efficient methods and improved explicit formulas that speed up 
significantly the computation of pairings on ordinary curves over prime fields. Most remarkably, 
the introduced generalized lazy reduction technique is shown to apply to every computation 
involving tower field operations found in the Miller loop and final exponentiation, including the 
recently proposed compressed squarings by [Kar10] (see Appendix C1).  
After discussing relevant previous work in §6.1, we introduced the generalized lazy reduction 
technique in the context of tower extension fields in §6.2. We described a methodology that relies 
on the careful selection of the field size to keep intermediate results under Montgomery 
boundaries with the objective of reducing costs of additions/subtractions and maximizing the use 
of operations without carry checks. Moreover, we illustrated the efficient realization of these 




















F  and 12
p
F . 
In §6.3, we presented our optimizations to doubling/line evaluation and addition/line 
evaluation formulas using Jacobian and homogeneous coordinates. The revised formulas require 
fewer additions and “small” operations, which are not negligible in certain platforms. 
Furthermore, we also applied the generalized lazy reduction technique to the curve arithmetic and 
explicitly stated the new formulas with minimal number of reductions. 
In §6.4, we evaluated the new techniques and explicit formulas on a state-of-the-art 
implementation of the optimal ate pairing on BN curves at the 128-bit security level. We carried 
out a detailed operation count and determined that the generalized reduction technique allows us 
to eliminate about 32% of reductions, which represents (under certain assumptions) an estimated 
cost reduction of about 9% for the whole pairing computation. This improvement strongly relies 
on the typically large gap between reduction and addition costs, so the cost reduction is expected 
to grow with the R/A ratio. This analysis was confirmed in practice with a high-speed software 
implementation that was intensively code optimized and includes state-of-the-art techniques such 
as the fast compressed squaring formulas and efficient decompression by [Kar10]. We reported 
improvements between 12% and 18% on different 64-bit platforms when using our method. 
These results surpass the expected theoretical estimate since they include our methodology to 
optimize carry handling and maximize the number of operations without carry checks (see 
Section 6.2.1). As a side effect, we reported the fastest pairing implementation on x86-64-based 
processors with improvements ranging between 28% and 34% in comparison with the previously 
best results due to Beuchat et al. [BGM+10]. In particular, we reported a pairing computation in 
~0.5msec. on a 3.0GHz AMD Phenom II X4 processor.  




7 Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
In the last few years, intense research has been focused on the efficient computation of elliptic 
curve and pairing primitives to enable their realization in the plethora of potential applications 
and emerging platforms of the new millennium. This thesis has focused on devising efficient 
methods and formulas for enabling high-speed elliptic curve and pairing-based cryptography 
over fields of large prime characteristic. These results have a practical impact in the performance 
of cryptographic protocols and schemes based on elliptic curves and pairings. Most remarkably, a 
careful selection of state-of-the-art algorithms has led to the realization of record-breaking 
implementations in software. For instance, these results may directly increase the number of 
secure transaction requests per second that can be processed by a Web server in an Internet-based 
application such as e-banking or e-commerce. This could potentially lead to savings in hardware 
costs for corporations, to more Web-based content being protected and to reduced waiting times 
during online transactions for consumers, among other benefits.     
A more detailed description of the contributions of this thesis follow in §7.1. Possible future 
research directions are described in §7.2.    
7.1. Summary of Contributions 
In Chapter 2 a summary of fundamental concepts of ECC and Pairing-based Cryptography was 








were described.   
Chapter 3 introduced two new schemes for precomputing points. The LM Scheme, which is 
intended for tables of form id P  on standard curves using Jacobian coordinates, was adapted to 
the case using only one inversion (case 2) and to the case without inversions (case 1). For case 2, 
two variants were proposed with slightly different memory requirements and speeds, case 2a and 
case 2b. It was shown that the new method achieves the lowest costs in the literature when using 
an optimal number of precomputations. For instance, LM Scheme, case 2b, has a cost of 
1 (9 ) (2 6)I L M L S+ + +  with L non-trivial points, which is the lowest in the literature among 
methods using one inversion only. The cost formulas for the different variants were derived (see 
proofs in Appendices A1 and A2). On the other hand, the LG Scheme, which is based on the 
proposed idea of conjugate additions in projective coordinates, was shown to apply to different 
curve forms and types of scalar multiplication. Conjugate addition formulas were derived for J, 
e
JQ  and IE  coordinates (see Appendix A3). Moreover, an efficient method combining the LM 
and LG Schemes was proposed for the case of multiple scalar multiplication on standard curves 
using J. The generic cost formulas for single and multiple scalar multiplications were derived 
(see proofs in Appendices A5 and A6), as well as the cost formulas of the optimized schemes for 
J, eJQ  and IE  coordinates. Finally, an extensive comparative analysis of different pre-
computations methods for different scenarios, memory requirements and security levels was 
carried out to determine the most efficient scheme for each case when using J, eJQ  and IE  
coordinates. In general, it was shown that for the great majority of cases the proposed schemes 
achieve the best performance. Refer to §3.4 for complete details. Finally, potential applications 
for the use of conjugate additions were described (see §3.5). The outcomes of this chapter were 
exploited for speeding up further scalar multiplication in Chapters 4 and 5.   
Chapter 4 was about efficient multibase representations for scalar multiplication and how 
efficient these methods are in different scenarios. First, a taxonomy and comparative analysis of 
the various double- and multi-base methods for scalar multiplication were discussed. Then, the 
theoretical analysis of the multibase NAF (mbNAF) method and its windowed variant, wmbNAF, 
were developed. Our methods were modeled using Markov chains and formulas for estimating 
the average zero and nonzero densities for cases with bases {2,3} and {2,3,5} were derived. 
Then, the “fractional” windows recoding was applied to the setting of wmbNAF to solve the 
problem of restricted number of precomputations imposed by standard windows. The new 
method, denoted by Frac-wmbNAF, allows a flexible number of precomputations in the 
execution of scalar multiplication, which makes it ideal for applications with restricted memory. 
The method was also analyzed theoretically using Markov chains for the case with bases {2,3}. 
Furthermore, a new methodology based on the operation cost per bit to derive efficient multibase 
algorithms was introduced. The optimized algorithms were implemented in Matlab to perform an 








coordinates. The cases with bases {2,3} and {2,3,5} using (Frac-w)mbNAF and the refined 
multibase chains were compared with the performance of standard NAF-based methods and the 
most efficient double-base methods in the literature. For proposed and standard NAF methods, 
the best precomputation scheme available for each case was applied (using results from Chapter 
3). The conclusion was that, currently, the proposed refined multibase chains achieve the lowest 
costs found in the literature among methods without precomputations, for all curve forms under 
analysis. For instance, using bases {2,3,5} and {2,3} for n = 160 bits we can perform a scalar 
multiplication with costs of only 1451M (field multiplications) and 1351M in Jacobian and 
inverted Edwards coordinates, respectively. With eJQ , that cost can be as low as 1261M using 
bases {2,3,5}. These results provide cost reductions between 7%-10% in comparison with NAF. 
Similar results were attained by the refined multibase chains using an optimal number of 
precomputations, although in this case the gain was only 1%-3% in comparison with (Frac)-
wNAF (see §4.5 for complete details). A relevant comparison with the fastest curves using 
standard radix-2 methods followed. In conclusion, “slower” curves that can advantageously 
exploit multibase chains may become competitive with the “fastest” curves using radix-2 
methods when curve parameters are suitably chosen and no precomputations are allowed. 
Finally, a discussion of potential applications and variants of the proposed methods was included, 
as well as a critical look at the practical implications of double- and multi-base number systems 
in the computation of scalar multiplication (see §4.6). In conclusion, the use of multibases was 
recommended for memory-constrained devices and when the conversion step (if expensive) can 
be performed off-line. For non-constrained devices, it was shown that the gain may be negligible 
and that faster curves without exploiting multibases are available. These conclusions were 
confirmed by tests on real x86-64-based implementations in §5.6.4, subsection “Timings using 
Multibase Methods”. 
Chapter 5 studied and brought together most efficient algorithms for the field, point and 
scalar arithmetic levels with the objective of achieving high-speed implementations of ECC on 
x86-64 processors. Optimizations at different levels were carefully tuned for the targeted 
architectures. First, incomplete reduction and branchless arithmetic were optimally combined for 
suitably chosen pseudo-Mersenne primes for achieving efficient arithmetic in pF . Dependencies 
between consecutive field operations were found to degrade the performance on the targeted 
processors by stalling the pipeline. The rescheduling and merging of field operations and the 
merging of point operations were proposed to minimize this problem. These techniques also 
reduce the number of function calls and memory accesses. Explicit point formulas for the 
relevant cases of J and /
e
E E  over pF  and 2pF  were optimized by reducing the number of 
“small” operations and by applying the techniques aforementioned (see Appendices B1 and B2). 
By combining all optimized formulas with state-of-the-art algorithms, including the use of the 








traditional and two GLS-based implementations using J or /
e
E E  coordinates at the 128-bit 
security level. The various tests throughout the chapter as well as the benchmark results for full 
point multiplication were discussed for at least one x86-64 processor representative from the 
notebook, desktop and server computing classes. Presented implementations set new speed 
records and were shown to achieve up to 34% of cost reduction in comparison with best 
previous results. For instance, we reported a point multiplication computation in about 60µsec. 
on a 3.0GHz AMD Phenom II X4 processor. 
Finally, Chapter 6 studied and brought together most efficient algorithms for computing 
pairings with the objective of enabling high-speed implementations on x86-64 processors. First, 
the well-known technique of lazy reduction was generalized to the whole pairing arithmetic 
including towering and curve arithmetic. By carrying out a detailed operation count, this 
technique was shown to eliminate at least 32% of the total number of reductions in a state-of-the-
art implementation of the optimal ate pairing over a BN curve at the 128-bit security level. 
Furthermore, for dealing with more costly higher-precision additions required by lazy reduction, 
a flexible methodology that keeps intermediate values under Montgomery reduction boundaries 
maximizing the use of operations without carry checks was developed. Optimized formulas were 
derived for the case using the tower  and for the new compressed 
squarings by [Kar10] (see §6.2.2 and Appendix C1). Following the approach detailed in Section 
5.4, formulas for point doubling and addition in Jacobian and homogeneous coordinates were 
carefully optimized by eliminating several commonly neglected operations that are not 
inexpensive on modern 64-bit platforms (see §6.3). Finally, the significant savings obtained by 
the new techniques were illustrated with a high-speed implementation of the optimal ate pairing 
over a BN curve at the 128-bit security level. By combining our techniques with other state-of-
the-art methods, the presented implementation set new speed records and was shown to achieve 
up to 34% of cost reduction on x86-64 processors in comparison with the best results in the 
literature. For instance, we reported a pairing computation in about half a millisecond on a 
3.0GHz AMD Phenom II X4 processor. 
7.2. Future Work 
New potential research directions have arisen from the outcomes of this dissertation. We 
summarize them below: 
Precomputations for other special curves and settings. In particular, for the efficient Twisted 
Edwards curve using /
e
E E  or extended Jacobi quartics using homogeneous/extended 
homogeneous coordinates it is still unknown if other precomputation schemes with higher 
efficiency than the traditional scheme using 3 5P P P mP→ → → →…  exist. Further 
2 6 12p p p p








research could focus on the development of improved schemes for these systems. Also, in §3.5 it 
was observed that conjugate additions can be derived for formulas over 
2
mF . The application of 
LG-like precomputation schemes to this setting requires further analysis.   
More composite formulas and efficient conversion to multibase. In §4.6.1, it was argued that 
the main obstacle that opposes to the use of multiple bases in a wide range of applications is the 
computing cost of conversion from binary to multibase. Further research is needed to improve the 
implementation of conversion algorithms on different platforms. This effort can be 
complemented by the development of efficient tripling and quintupling formulas for other 
coordinate systems such as /
e
E E  where radix-2 methods are still more efficient.  
Implementation on constrained devices. Following the results and analysis in §4.5 and §4.6.1, 
the use of multibase methods is more promising for devices with constrained memory resources 
in which the gain is maximal in terms of speed. However, these devices are usually limited in 
terms of power. Further investigation supported with implementations is required for assessing 
the practical impact of using multibase methods in these platforms with such a constraint. 
Analysis on other platforms; improving ECC over binary fields, HECC. Several software 
techniques and optimizations were proposed for elliptic curve point multiplication over pF  and 
2
p
F  in Chapter 5. The analysis and implementations targeted x86-64 processors. In many cases, 
the proposed techniques and optimized formulas are generic and further study could be devoted 
to test them on different platforms, e.g., embedded devices with 32-bit and 8-bit 
microarchitectures. Moreover, further research can be focused on applying similar methods to the 
case over 
2m
F . For instance, it would be interesting to analyze whether data dependencies 
degrade performance of field operations and if similar countermeasures also apply. In fact, 
further study could analyze the application of these methods to other settings such as 
Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptosystems. 
Generalized lazy reduction on other platforms. This technique was shown to reduce 
significantly the computing cost of pairings on various x86-64-based processors. Practical 
implementation of the technique in Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), 32-bit embedded 
devices or microcontrollers with 8-bit architectures would be highly valuable. In certain cases, 
the gain is expected to grow even further as the ratio multiplication/addition is usually larger on 
smaller devices in which embedded multipliers are much less powerful.  
                                  
 
 




A Appendix A 
A1 Pseudocode of the LM Precomputation Scheme 


























Lemma A.1. Algorithm A.1, that computes the initial doubling (3.3) of Step 1 (see Section 
3.2.1), costs 1M + 5S and requires 6 temporary registers.  
 
Algorithm A.1.  Point doubling  2A → J,  2 3:E y x ax b= + +   
Input:  point 1 1( , )P x y=  in ( )pE F ,  1 1T x← ,  3 1T y← , curve parameter a 
Output:  point 2 2 22 ( : : )P X Y Z=  and 
(1) (1) (1)(1)
1 11 1 1( , , ) ( , ,1)P X Y Z x y= ≡  
  1: 22 3T T=                      
  2: 4 1 2T T T= +                
  3: 
2
4 4T T=                      
  4: 25 2T T=                     
(1) 4
11{ }Y y=  
  5: 
2
1 1T T=                       
  6: 4 4 1T T T= −                
  7: 6 4 2T T T= −              
2 2 2 4
1 1 1 1{2 ( ) }x y x yβ = + − −  
  8: 4 6 / 2T T=                    
(1) 2
1 11{ }X x yβ= =  
  9: 1 13T T=                     
10: 2 1T T a= +                
11: 2 2 / 2T T=                    
2
1{ (3 ) / 2}x aα = +  
12: 21 2T T=                     
2
{ }α  
13: 1 1 6T T T= −              
2
2{ 2 }X α β= −  
14: 6 4 1T T T= −              2{ }Xβ −  
15: 2 2 6T T T= ×              2{ ( )}Xα β −  
16: 2 2 5T T T= −             
4
2 2 1{ ( ) }Y X yα β= − −  
17: Return 
(1) (1)
1 2 3 4 5 2 2 2 1 1( , , , , ) ( , , , , )T T T T T X Y Z X Y=  
 
Lemma A.2. Algorithm A.2, that computes the first addition 2P P+  in sequence (3.2) using 
CoADD Z− , costs 5M + 2S and requires 6 temporary registers if the precomputed table contains 
only one point. Otherwise, Algorithm A.2 requires 6 temporary registers for calculations plus 2 
extra registers to store the ( , )X Y  coordinates of 3P. To adapt Algorithm A.2 to case 1, it should 







1 1{ }x y+
2 2

















Algorithm A.2.  Special addition with identical Z coordinate J + J → J,  2 3:E y x ax b= + +  
Input:  points 2 2 22 ( : : )P X Y Z=  and 
(1) (1) (1)(1)
1 1 1( , , )P X Y Z=  in ( )pE F ,   
            T1 ← X2,  T2 ← Y2,  T3 ← Z2,  
(1)
4 1T X← ,  
(1)
5 1T Y←  
Output:  point (1) 3 3 313 2 ( : : )P P P X Y Z= + =  
  1: 6 4 1T T T= −              
(1)
21{ }X X−  
  2: 3 3 6T T T= ×              
(1)
3 2 21{ ( )}Z Z X X= −  
  3: 
2
4 6T T=                   
(1) 2
21{( ) }X X−  
  4: 6 4 6T T T= ×              
(1) 3
21{( ) }X X−  
  5: 4 1 4T T T= ×              
(1) (1) 2
2 22 1{ ( ) }X X X X= −  
  6: 1 42T T=                   
(1) 2
2 21{2 ( ) }X X X−  
  7: 1 1 6T T T= +              
(1) (1)3 2
2 2 21 1{( ) 2 ( ) }X X X X X− + −  
  8: 6 2 6T T T= ×              
(1) (1) 3
2 22 1{ ( ) }Y Y X X= −  
  9: 2 5 2T T T= −              
(1)
21{ }Y Y−  
10: 
2
5 2T T=                    
(1) 2
21{( ) }Y Y−  
11: 1 5 1T T T= −              
(1) (1) (1)2 3 2
3 2 2 2 21 1 1{ ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) }X Y Y X X X X X= − − − − −  
12: 5 4 1T T T= −              
(1) 2
2 2 31{ ( ) }X X X X− −  
13: 5 2 5T T T= ×              
(1) (1) 2
2 2 2 31 1{( )[ ( ) ]}Y Y X X X X− − −  
14: 2 5 6T T T= −              
(1) (1) (1)2 3
3 2 2 2 3 2 21 1 1{ ( )[ ( ) ] ( ) }Y Y Y X X X X Y X X= − − − − −  
15: 5 6T T=                    
(1)
2{ }Y  
16:  If m > 3 then: 
17:         3 1X T=    
18:         3 2Y T=    
19: Return 
(1) (1)
1 2 3 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 32 2( , , , , , , ) ( , , , , , , )T T T T T X Y X Y Z X Y X Y=  
 
Lemma A.3. Algorithm A.3, that computes following additions in sequence (3.2) using 
CoADD Z−  operations, costs 5M + 2S per extra point, requires 6 temporary registers for 
calculations and 3 (4) extra registers per each point for case 2a (case 2b) to store the values 
, ,X Y A  ( , , , )X Y B C . In the last iteration the memory requirement is reduced by storing values 
,X Y  ( , , )X Y B  in temporary registers. To adapt Algorithm A.3 to case 1, one should execute the 
steps that correspond to case 2a except that, instead of values , one should store Z 
coordinates of points iP.  








Algorithm A.3.  Special addition with identical Z coordinate J + J → J,   
Input:   and 3 3 33 ( : : )P X Y Z= ,    
            , , , 
(1)
4 2T X← , 
(1)
5 2T Y←  
Output:  points , for , i odd 
                  LM Scheme, case 2a:                    LM Scheme, case 2b: 
  1: For  i = 5  to  m  do  (i odd) For  i = 5  to  m  do  (i odd) 
  2:                If  i ≠ m  then: 
  3:                                                
  4:                                                        
  5:                                                        
  6:                             
  7:                                       
  8:                                                               
  9:                                             
10:                                                      
11:                                                    
12:                                                           
13:                                                     
14:                                                            
15:                                                      
16:        If  i ≠ m  then:                        
17:                        
18:                        
19: Return     Else: 
20:                          
21:                                     
22:                               
23:       
      
 
24:                         
25:                             
26:                         
27:                              
28:                                 
29:                      
30:                                  
31:                           
32:                           
33:                                     
34:                        
35:  Return  
2 3:E y x ax b= + +
(1) (1) (1)(1)
2 2 22 ( , , )P X Y Z=
1 3T X← 2 3T Y←
(1)
3 2T Z←
(( 3) / 2)
( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 22 ( 2) ( , , )
i
i i iiP P i P X Y Z
−
+ + += + − = 5 toi m=
( 3) / 2 1 4iA T T+ = −
(( 3) / 2)
( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 2 2{ }
i
i iA X X
−
+ += −
3 ( 3) / 2 3iT A T+= × ( 3) / 2{ }iZ + 1 1 4T T T= −
(( 3) / 2)






1 ( 3) / 2iT A +=
2
( 3) / 2{ }iA + 3 1 3T T T= × ( 3) / 2{ }iZ +
4 1 4T T T= ×
(( 1) / 2) (( 3) / 2) 2






( 3) / 2 1iB T+ =
(( 3) / 2) 2
( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 2 2{ ( ) }
i
i iB X X
−
+ += −
1 1 ( 3) / 2iT T A += ×
3
( 3)/ 2{ }iA + ( 3) / 2 1 ( 3) / 2i iC T B+ += ×
(( 3) / 2) 3
( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 2 2{ ( ) }
i
i iC X X
−
+ += −
2 2 5T T T= −
(( 3) / 2)




+ − 4 4 ( 3) / 2iT T B += ×
(( 1) / 2) (( 3) / 2)





5 1 5T T T= ×
(( 1) / 2) (( 3) / 2) 3




+= 1 42T T=
(( 3) / 2)






(( 3) / 2) 2




+ 1 1 ( 3) / 2iT T C += +
(( 3) / 2)
( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 22{ 2 }
i
i iC X B
−
+ ++
1 1 6T T T= +
3 (( 3) / 2) 2
( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 22{ 2 }
i
i iA X A
−
+ ++ 2 2 5T T T= −
(( 3) / 2)







(( 3) / 2) 2




+ − 5 5 ( 3) / 2iT T C += ×
(( 1) / 2) (( 3) / 2)





1 6 1T T T= − ( 3) / 2{ }iX +
2
6 2T T=
(( 3) / 2) 2





6 4 1T T T= −
(( 3) / 2) 2
( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 22{ }
i
i is X A X
−
+ += − 1 6 1T T T= − ( 3) / 2{ }iX +
2 2 6T T T= ×
(( 3) / 2)




+⋅ − 6 4 1T T T= −
(( 3) / 2)
( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 22{ }
i
i is X B X
−
+ += −
2 2 5T T T= − ( 3) / 2{ }iY + 2 2 6T T T= ×
(( 3) / 2)





2 2 5T T T= − ( 3) / 2{ }iY +
( 3) / 2 1iX T+ = ( 3) / 2 1iX T+ =
( 3) / 2 2iY T+ = ( 3) / 2 2iY T+ =
1 2 3 ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2( , , , , , )i i iT T T A X Y+ + +
1 1 4T T T= −
(( 3) / 2)





3 1 3T T T= × ( 3) / 2{ }iZ +
2
6 1T T=
(( 3) / 2) 2
( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 2 2{ ( ) }
i
i iB X X
−
+ += −
( 3) / 2 1 6iC T T+ = ×
(( 3) / 2) 3
( 3) / 2 ( 1) / 2 2{ ( ) }
i
i iC X X
−
+ += −
2 2 5T T T= −
(( 3) / 2)





5 5 ( 3) / 2iT T C += ×
(( 3) / 2)





4 4 6T T T= ×
(( 3) / 2)






(( 3) / 2)







(( 3) / 2) 2





1 1 ( 3) / 2iT T C += −
(( 3) / 2) 2
( 1) / 2 ( 3) / 22{( ) }
i
i iY Y C
−
+ +− −
1 1 4T T T= − ( 3) / 2{ }iX +
4 4 / 2T T=
(( 3) / 2)





4 4 1T T T= −
(( 3) / 2)
( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 22{ }
i
i is X B X
−
+ += −
2 2 4T T T= ×
(( 3) / 2)





2 2 5T T T= − ( 3) / 2{ }iY +








Lemma A.4. Algorithm A.4, that computes the modified Montgomery’s method corresponding 
to Step 2 (see Section 3.2.1), costs 1I + (3M + 1S) + (4M + 1S)(L − 1) and 1I + (3M + 1S) + 4(L 
− 1)M for cases 2a and 2b, respectively, and requires 4 temporary registers for calculations and 
storage for the affine coordinates (x, y) of (L − 1) precomputed points. In addition, case 2a 
requires (L − 1) registers for values jA , and case 2b requires 2(L − 1) registers for values 
( , )j jB C . This step is not executed in case 1. 
 
Algorithm A.4.  Modified Montgomery’ simultaneous inversion method,  2 3:E y x ax b= + +  
Input:  1 2 3 6 ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2, , , , , ,m j j jT T T T B A B C+ + + += , for 5 toj m= , j odd 
            ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2,i iX Y+ + , for 3 toi m= , i odd 
Output:  points ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2( , )i iiP x y+ +=  for 3 toi m= , i odd 
                 LM Scheme, case 2a:                    LM Scheme, case 2b: 
  1:    
1
3 3T T
−=                                1( 3)/ 2{ }mZ
−
+     ( 3) / 2 6mB T+ =  
  2:    
2
4 3T T=                                 
2
( 3)/ 2{ }mZ
−
+     
1
3 3T T
−=                                 1( 3)/ 2{ }mZ
−
+  
  3:    ( 3) / 2 1 4mX T T+ = ×                   ( 3) / 2{ }mx +     
2
4 3T T=                                  
2
( 3)/ 2{ }mZ
−
+  
  4:    4 3 4T T T= ×                           
3
( 3)/ 2{ }mZ
−
+     ( 3) / 2 1 4mX T T+ = ×                  ( 3) / 2{ }mx +  
  5:    ( 3) / 2 2 4mY T T+ = ×                  ( 3) / 2{ }my +     3 3 4T T T= ×                             
3
( 3)/ 2{ }mZ
−
+  
  6:    For ( 2) downto 3i m= −  do (i odd)    ( 3) / 2 2 3mY T T+ = ×                   ( 3) / 2{ }my +  
  7:          3 3 ( 5) / 2iT T A += ×             
1
( 3)/ 2{ }iZ
−
+           For ( 2) downto 3i m= −  do (i odd)  
  8:          
2
4 3T T=                          
2
( 3)/ 2{ }iZ
−
+                 4 4 ( 5) / 2iT T B += ×              
2
( 3)/ 2{ }iZ
−
+        
  9:          ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2 4i iX X T+ += ×   ( 3) / 2{ }ix +           3 3 ( 5) / 2iT T C += ×              
3
( 3)/ 2{ }iZ
−
+        
10:          4 3 4T T T= ×                     
3
( 3)/ 2{ }iZ
−
+                 ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2 4i iX X T+ += ×    ( 3) / 2{ }ix +  
11:          ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2 4i iY Y T+ += ×       ( 3) / 2{ }iy +           ( 3) / 2 ( 3) / 2 3i iY Y T+ += ×        ( 3) / 2{ }iy +  








A2 Cost Analysis of the LM Precomputation Scheme  
Theorem A.1. The LM Scheme, case 1, has the following cost: 
                                          LM Scheme, case 1Cost (6 1) (3 5)L M L S= + + + , 
and requires (3L + 6) registers, where L is the number of non-trivial points in the precomputed 
table id P . The requirement increases to (5L + 6) if values 
2
iZ  and 
3
iZ  are also stored in order to 
use the addition (or doubling-addition) with stored values during evaluation. 
Proof: Following Lemmas A.1-A.3, Algorithms A.1, A.2 and A.3 cost 1 5M S+ , 5 2M S+  and 
(5 2 )( 1)M S L+ − , respectively. Also, precomputing values 2iZ , 
3
iZ  (to enable the use of ADD or 
DBLADD with store values during the evaluation stage) costs (1 1 )M S L+ . By adding these 
values we obtain the cost of the LM Scheme, case 1, above. In terms of memory, this method 
only requires 6 temporary registers during the execution of Algorithms A.1, A.2 and A.3 plus 3 
registers to store the ( : : )X Y Z  coordinates of each precomputed point. That makes a total 
requirement of 3L + 6 registers. If the pair 2 3/i iZ Z  is also stored per point, the total requirement 
increases to 5L + 6.                                                                                                                          □ 
Theorem A.2. The LM Scheme, case 2a, has the following cost: 
                                       LM Scheme, case 2aCost 1 (9 ) (3 5)I L M L S= + + + , 
and requires (3L + 3) registers. 
Proof: Following Lemmas A.1-A.3, Algorithms A.1, A.2 and A.3 cost 1M + 5S, 5M + 2S and 
(5M + 2S)(L − 1), respectively. According to Lemma A.4, Algorithm A.4 costs 1I + (3M + 1S) + 
(4M + 1S)(L − 1). By adding these values, we obtain the cost of the LM Scheme, case 2a, above. 
Regarding memory requirements, Algorithm A.1 needs 6 temporary registers 1 6, ,T T… . The same 
registers can be reused by Algorithm A.2 for calculations. Additionally, it needs 2 extra registers 
to store ( , )X Y  coordinates corresponding to 3P, making a total of 6 + 2 = 8 registers (see 
Lemma A.2). Algorithm A.3 also reuses temporary registers 1 6, ,T T… , and requires 3 registers 
per point, excepting the last one, to store (X, Y, A) values. For the last iteration, we only require 
registers 1 6, ,T T…  and 1 extra register to store A since the last  coordinates are stored in 1T  
and 2T  
(see Lemma A.3). That makes an accumulated requirement of 6 + 2 + 3(L − 2) + 1 = 3L + 
3 at the end of Algorithm A.3, for L ≥ 2. If L = 1, we do not compute Algorithm A.3, and the 
requirement is fixed by Algorithm A.2 at only 6 registers (note that in this case (X, Y) coordinates 








are stored in 1T  and 2T ). Algorithm A.4 requires 4 temporary registers for calculations (where  
and  can store the (x, y) coordinates of the last point mP), 2(L − 1) − 2 registers for (x, y) 
coordinates of the remaining (L − 1) points (assuming that 3T  and 4T  can store the (x, y) 
coordinates of 3P) and (L – 1) registers for values jA  for 4 ( 3) / 2j m≤ ≤ + , 3m >  odd, making 
a total requirement of 3L – 1. In conclusion, LM Scheme, case 2a, requires 3L + 3 registers.       □ 
Theorem A.3. The LM Scheme, case 2b, has the following cost: 
                                        LM Scheme, case 2bCost 1 (9 ) (2 6)I L M L S= + + + , 
and requires (4L + 1) registers. 
Proof: Following Lemmas A.1-A.3, Algorithms A.1, A.2 and A.3 have the same costs as cases 1 
and 2a, and Algorithm A.4 costs 1I + (3M + 1S)  + (4M)(L − 1). Adding these costs we obtain the 
value indicated for the LM Scheme, case 2b. Regarding memory requirements, Algorithm A.1 
needs 6 registers 1 6, ,T T… , which can be reused by Algorithm A.2 for temporary calculations. 
Additionally, Algorithm A.2 needs 2 extra registers to store ( , )X Y  coordinates corresponding to 
3P, making a total of 6 + 2 = 8 registers (see Lemma A.2). Algorithm A.3 also reuses registers 
1 6, ,T T… , and requires 4 registers per point, excepting the last one, to store (X, Y, B, C) values. 
For the last iteration, we only require registers 1 6, ,T T…  and 1 extra register to store C since the 
last ( , )X Y  coordinates are stored in 1T  and 2T , and 6T  stores B (see Lemma A.3). That makes an 
accumulated requirement of 6 + 2 + 4(L − 2) + 1 = 4L + 1 at the end of Algorithm A.3, for L ≥ 2. 
If L = 1, we do not compute Algorithm A.3, and the requirement is fixed by Algorithm A.2 at 
only 6 registers as pointed out in the analysis for case 2a. Algorithm A.4 requires 4 registers for 
calculations (where  and  can store the (x, y) coordinates of the last point mP), 2(L − 1) − 2 
registers for (x, y) coordinates of the remaining (L − 1) points (assuming that 3T  and 4T  can store 
the (x, y) coordinates of 3P) and 2(L – 1) registers for values ,j jB C  for 4 ( 3) / 2j m≤ ≤ + , 3m >  
odd, making a total requirement of 4L – 2 registers. In conclusion, case 2b requires 4L + 1 










A3 Conjugate Addition Formulas  
Conjugate (Mixed) Addition in Jacobian Coordinates 
Let 1 1 1( : : )P X Y Z=  and 2 2 2( : : )Q X Y Z=  be two points in Jacobian coordinates on an elliptic 
curve WE  over pF . If the general addition P Q+  is performed using [LM08, formula (15)] and 
the partial values 3 2 212(4 8 )Z Xβ β+ , 
2 2
12Z X β , 
3 3
12Z Y β− , 3Z , 
3
21Z Y  and 
3
12Z Y  are temporarily 
stored, the conjugate addition 1 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 4( ) ( : : ) ( : : ) ( : : )P Q P Q X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z− = + − = + − =  can 
be performed with the following: 
2 3 2 2
4 12(4 8 )X Z Xγ β β= − + ,  
2 2 3 3
4 1 4 12 2( )Y Z X X Z Yγ β β= − − ,  4 3Z Z= ,                             (A.1) 
where  3 32 11 22( )Z Y Z Yγ = − + . This formula only requires 1M + 1S + 4A + 1 ( 2)× . 
In the case of mixed addition, let 1 1 1( : : )P X Y Z=  and 2 2( , )Q x y=  be two points on an 
elliptic curve WE  over pF . If the mixed addition P Q+  is performed using [LM08, formula 
(16)] and the partial values 3 21(4 8 )Xβ β+ , 
2
14X β , 
3
18Y β− , 3Z  and 
3
21Z y  are temporarily 
stored, the conjugate mixed addition 1 1 1 2 2 4 4 4( ) ( : : ) ( : ) ( : : )P Q P Q X Y Z x y X Y Z− = + − = + − =  
can be performed as follows: 
2 3 2
4 1(4 8 )X Xγ β β= − + ,  
2 3
4 1 4 1(4 ) 8Y X X Yγ β β= − − ,  4 3Z Z= ,                                      (A.2) 
where 31 2 12( )Z y Yγ = − + . This formula only costs 1M + 1S + 4A + 1 ( 2)× .  
To obtain the costs of the different addition/conjugate addition variants from Table 3.2, one 
needs to add the costs from Table 2.2 to costs of formulas (A.1) or (A.2). For instance, an 
addition/conjugate addition pair using [2,2]ADD  has a cost of  (10M + 2S) + (1M + 1S) = 11M + 
3S, or (9M + 3S) + (1M + 1S) = 10M + 4S if applying one S-M trading. 
Conjugate (Mixed) Addition in eJQ  Coordinates  
Let 2 21 1 1 1 1( : : : : )P X Y Z X Z=  and 
2 2
2 2 2 2 2( : : : : )Q X Y Z X Z=  
be two points in eJQ  coordinates 
on an extended Jacobi quartic curve /JQ pE F  with 1d =  in (2.11). If the addition P Q+  is 
performed using the following formula due to [HWC+07, HWC+08b]:  
3 1 2 1 2( 2 )( 2 ) 4X Y Y Y Yα β αβ= + + − − ,  
2 2 2 2
3 1 2 1 24 4Z Z Z X X= − ,  
2 2
33 ( )X X= ,  
2 2
33 ( )Z Z= ,     
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 1 21 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 3 3(4 4 2 )[4( )( ) 4 ] 16( )Y X X Z Z X Z X Z a Y Y X Zαβ αβ= + + + + + + − + ,           (A.3)       
where 2 2 21 1 1 1( ) ( )X Z X Zα = + − + , 
2 2 2








1( 2 )Yα + , 22Y , α β , 1 24Y Y− , 
2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2(4 4 )X X Z Z+ , 2αβ , 
2 2 2 2
1 21 1 2 24( )( ) 4X Z X Z Y Y+ + + , aαβ , 
3Z  and 
2
3Z  are temporarily stored, then the conjugate addition ( )P Q P Q− = + − =  
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 41 1 2 2( , , , , ) ( , , , , ) ( , , )X Y Z X Z X Y Z X Z X Y Z+ − =  can be performed with only 2M + 1S + 
7A + 1 ( 16)×  as follows: 
4 1 2 1 2( 2 )( 2 ) 4X Y Y Y Yα β αβ= + − + + − ,  
2 2 2 2
4 31 2 1 24 4Z Z Z X X Z= − = ,  
2 2
44 ( )X X= ,  
2 2
4 3Z Z= ,  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 4 4(4 4 2 )[4( )( ) 4 ] 16( )Y X X Z Z X Z X Z a Y Y X Zαβ αβ= + − + + − + − + ,           (A.4)   
Thus, the cost of an addition/conjugate addition pair is of (7M + 4S) + (2M + 1S) = 9M + 5S 
if using an ADD operation or (7M + 3S) + (2M + 1S) = 9M + 4S, if using an [0,1]ADD  operation. 
See Tables 2.4 and 3.2. 
In the case of mixed addition, let 2 21 1 1 1 1( : : : : )P X Y Z X Z=  and 
2
2 2 2( , , )Q x y x=  be two points 
in eJQ  and A coordinates, respectively, on an extended Jacobi quartic curve /JQ pE F  with 
1d =  in (2.11). If the mixed addition P Q+  is performed using the following formula due to 
[HWC+07, HWC+08b]:  
3 1 2 2 2 1 2( 2 )( ) 2X Y x y x Y yα α= + + − − ,  
2 2 2
3 1 1 22( )Z Z X x= − ,  
2 2
3 3( )X X= ,  
2 2
3 3( )Z Z= ,    
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 32(( )[2( )( 1) 2 ] 2( ))Y X x Z x X Z x a x Y y X Zα α= + + + + + + − + ,                      (A.5) 
where 2 2 21 1 1 1( ) ( )X Z X Zα = + − + , and the partial values 1( 2 )Yα + , 2xα , 1 22Y y− , 
2 2 2
1 2 1( )X x Z+ , 
2 2 2
1 1 2 1 2[2( )( 1) 2 ]X Z x Y y+ + + , 2a xα , 3Z  and 
2
3Z  are temporarily stored, then the conjugate 
mixed addition 2 2 2 2 21 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4( ) ( : : : : ) ( , , ) ( : : : : )P Q P Q X Y Z X Z x y x X Y Z X Z− = + − = + − =  
can be performed with 2M + 1S + 7A + 2 ( 2)×  as follows: 
4 1 2 2 2 1 2( 2 )( ) 2X Y x y x Y yα α= + − + + − ,  
2 2 2
4 1 1 2 32( )Z Z X x Z= − = ,  
2 2
4 4( )X X= ,  
2 2
4 3Z Z= ,                                                        
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 4 42(( )[2( )( 1) 2 ] 2( ))Y X x Z x X Z x a x Y y X Zα α= + − + + − + − + .                      (A.6) 
Thus, the cost of a mixed addition/conjugate mixed addition pair is of (6M + 3S) + (2M + 1S) 
= 8M + 4S. See Tables 2.4 and 3.2. 
Conjugate (Mixed) Addition in IE Coordinates  
Let 1 1 1( : : )P X Y Z=  and 2 2 2( : : )Q X Y Z=  be two points in IE coordinates on a Twisted 
Edwards curve /TE pE F  with 1a =  in (2.12). If the general addition P Q+  is performed using 










3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2[ ( ) ]( )X X X Y Y d Z Z X X Y Y= + − ,  
2
3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1[ ( ) ]( )Y X X Y Y d Z Z X Y X Y= − + , 
3 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1( )( )Z Z Z X X Y Y X Y X Y= − + ,                                                                                    (A.7)          
and the partial values 21 2 1 2 1 2[ ( ) ]X X Y Y d Z Z+ , 1 2X X , 1 2Y Y , 
2
1 2 1 2 1 2[ ( ) ]X X Y Y d Z Z− , 1 2X Y , 
2 1X Y  and 1 2Z Z  are temporarily stored, then the conjugate addition ( )P Q P Q− = + − =
1 1 1 2 2 2 4 4 4( : : ) ( : : ) ( : : )X Y Z X Y Z X Y Z+ − =  can be performed with the following (with a cost of 
only 4M + 2A): 
2
4 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2[ ( ) ]( )X X X Y Y d Z Z X X Y Y= − + ,  
2
4 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1[ ( ) ]( )Y X X Y Y d Z Z X Y X Y= − + − , 
4 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1( )( )Z Z Z X X Y Y X Y X Y= − + − ,                                                                                  (A.8)          
Thus, the cost of an addition/conjugate addition pair is of (10M + 1S) + 4M  = 14M + 1S.  
The formula for mixed addition can be obtained by setting 2 1Z =  in formula (A.7) and has a 
cost of 9M + 1S + 4A. Then, if the partial values 21 2 1 2 1( )X x Y y dZ+ , 
2
1 2 1 2 1( )X x Y y dZ− , 1 2X x , 
1 2Y y , 1 2X y  and 2 1x Y  are temporarily cached, the conjugate mixed addition ( )P Q P Q− = + − =  
1 1 1 2 2 4 4 4( : : ) ( : ) ( : : )X Y Z x y X Y Z+ − =  can be performed by: 
2
4 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 21[ ]( )X X x Y y dZ X x Y y= − + ,  
2
4 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 11[ ]( )Y X x Y y dZ X y x Y= − + − , 
4 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1( )( )Z Z X x Y y X y x Y= − + − ,                                                                                       (A.9)          
which only costs 4M + 2A. Therefore, the cost of a mixed addition/conjugate mixed addition pair 
is of (9M + 1S) + 4M  = 13M + 1S. 
 
 




A4 Calculation of Precomputed Points for the LG Scheme   
The following table shows the proposed sequences for computing a table with the form  id P , 
where { }\ {0,1} 3,5,...,id D m
+∈ =
 
with m odd. For m = 5, the first sequence corresponds to J 
and , and the second one to IE coordinates. Tied arrows denote an addition/conjugate 
addition pair (or mixed addition/conjugate mixed addition pair if addition is performed with 
affine point P).  
 
 
































A5 Cost Analysis of the LG Scheme, Table diP 
Theorem A.4. Given an elliptic curve E of arbitrary form, the cost of using the LG Scheme for 
computing a precomputed table with the form , where 
 
with m 
odd and the base point , is given by: 
, 
where , ,  is the value of the highest “strategic” point, 
 and  denotes the cost of 
converting points from projective to affine coordinates in case 2. 
Proof: first, note that . If  is defined as the value of the highest “strategic” point, then 
it holds that  for some integer 2ω ≥  since “strategic” points have the form 
, for integers  with . It easily follows that calculating all “strategic” points 
up to 
 
requires one tripling and  doublings. Then, additions are 
required to compute each point in the table except , which is already calculated. Since there 
are L non-trivial points in the table, we require  additions in total. Let us now estimate the 
number of regular additions required for computing points below maxr P , and then above maxr P . 
First, up to  there are  odd points, from which  are computed with a 
conjugate addition. If P and 3P are discarded we require  
regular additions up to . Above maxr P  there is a range for which points are computed with 
conjugate additions. Then we need to establish the value  s.t. points kP , ( 2)k P+ , 
… , mP  are calculated with regular additions. Following Appendix A4, it is straightforward to 
note that  if ,  if ,  if , and so on. Thus, k =
max(4 3) /3r +  and, hence, 
max(4 3) / 3
2
m r− +
max1 1 2 / 3L r+ = + −   regular additions are required above 
maxr P . However, an exception happens when , for which case the number of additions 
above maxr P  should be zero. The latter can be accomplished by simply multiplying 
 with max1 2 / 3L r+ − . 
Therefore, the total number of regular additions is given by the expression 
. Since it was established that 
there are  additions in total, then  are addition/conjugate addition pairs and 
 are individual additions. By definition, case 2 requires the addition of 
the cost of converting projective points to affine.                                                                            □        
id P \{0,1}id D
+∈ = { }3,5,...,m
( )pP E∈ F
case1/3 (2)Cost 1TPL ( 2)DBL + (2 1)ADD + ( 1)ADD-ADD ( Cost )L Lω ε ε →′= + − − + − − + P A
3m ≥ ( 1) / 2L m= − 2max 3 2r
ω−= × ε =





1 2i iP P+ = 0i ≥ 0 3P P=
2
max (3 2 )r P P
ω−= × ( 2)ω −
3P
( 1)L −
maxr P max / 2r max( / 6) 1r −
max max max( / 2) ( / 6) 1 2 ( /3) 1r r r− + − = −
maxr P
maxr k m< <
9k = max 6r = 17k = max 12r = 33k = max 24r =
m k<
max max max max max(2 1 (4 3) / 3) (2 1) (6 2 3) /(6 3)r m r r L r r− + − + − = + − −      
( )max max max max(6 2 3) /(6 3) 1 2 / 3 ( / 3) 1L r r L r rε = + − − + − + −  
( 1)L − ( 1 )L ε− −








Corollary A.1. In the setting of Theorem A.4, the cost of the LG Scheme when using mixed 
coordinates is given by: 
                                                                 
                    . 
Proof: assuming that the base point P is given in affine coordinates, then  can be 
computed using a mixed tripling with the form 3 →A P . Since  doublings are required, 
there are also 
 
“strategic” points. By definition, , so for each “strategic” point  
there is always a pair of points with the form . Then, there are  points that can be 
calculated with an addition/conjugate addition pair using mixed Projective-affine coordinates, 
that is, computing ± →P A P . According to Theorem A.4, there are  addition/ 
conjugate addition pairs in total. Hence,  are addition/ 
conjugate addition pairs using Jacobian coordinates, that is, computing ± →P P P .                  □ 
( )case 1(2)Cost 1mTPL ( 2)DBL + ( 2)mADD-mADD + 1 ADD-ADD +Lω ω ε ω′ ′= + − − − − + …
(2 1)ADD ( Cost )Lε →− + +… P A
0 3P P=
( 2)ω −
( 2)ω − maxm r> jP
jP P± ( 2)ω −
( 1)L ε− −
( 1) ( 2) 1L Lε ω ε ω− − − + = − − +
 
 




A6 Cost Analysis of the LG Scheme, Table ciP ± diQ  
Theorem A.5. Given an elliptic curve E of arbitrary form, the cost of using the LG Scheme for 
computing a precomputed table with the form i ic P d Q± , where { }, 0,1,3,5,...,i ic d D m
+∈ = , 










+ − ′= − + − +   
P A , 
where 2( 4 1) / 2 1L m m= + − >  is the number of non-trivial points in the table and Cost →P A  
denotes the cost of converting points from projective to affine coordinates in case 2. 
Proof: first, let us establish the value L. There are ( 1)m +  points with the form ic P  or id Q , 
which can be combined in 2( 1) 2m +  ways to get points of the form i ic P d Q±   with 0i ic d ≠ . 





( 1) 2m+ + − = ( 4) 1
2
m m + −
. As it always holds that 1m ≥ , then 1L > . The points ic P  or id Q  with 
3ic ≥  and 3id ≥  
can be computed with two sequences with the form P → P+2P = 3P → 3P+2P 
= 5P → … → (m−2)P+2P = mP. This requires in total two doublings and ( 1)m −  additions. Note 
that when 1m = , there are no calculations required for this part. Hence, for 1m ≥  the number of 
required doublings can be expressed by 2 ( 1) /m m−   . Finally, the computation of the 
2( 1) 2m +  points i ic P d Q±  with 0i ic d ≠  involves 
2( 1) 4m +  addition/conjugate addition pairs. 
By definition, case 2 requires in addition the cost of converting points from projective to affine 
coordinates.                                                                                                                            □ 
Theorem A.6. In the setting of Theorem A.5 and assuming that 5m ≥ , the cost of the LG 










′= − + − J A , 
where 2Cost2 [2 ( 4) 1] [( 1) / 4 2]m m M m S→ = + − + + +J A  for case 2.                                                                 
Proof: according to Theorem A.1, if 3m ≥  points with the form id P , where \ {0,1}id D
+∈ =
{3,5, , }m…  can be computed with the sequence P → P+2P = 3P → 3P+2P = 5P → … → 
(m−2)P+2P = mP using one (mixed) doubling and ( 1) / 2m −  additions with identical Z 
coordinate. Then, points ic P  and id Q  with 3ic ≥  and 3id ≥  
can be computed with two 
doublings and ( 1)m −  additions with identical Z coordinate. The restriction 5m ≥  is because 
when 3m =  it is more efficient to compute 3P directly with a (mixed) tripling operation. 








involves 2( 1) 4m +  addition/conjugate addition pairs. Let us now proof Cost2 →J A . Following 
the LM Scheme, case 2b, sequences for ic P  and id Q  using additions with identical Z coordinate 
yield the two Z-coordinates mPZ  and mQZ . Since conjugate additions share the same Z 
coordinate, the 2( 1) 4m +  addition/conjugate addition pairs i ic P d Q±  with 0i ic d ≠  yield 
2( 1) 4t m= +  Z-coordinates. In total, there are ( 2)t +  distinct Z-coordinates. Applying 
Montgomery’s method for simultaneous inversion, the latter first requires one inversion and 
3( 1)t +  multiplications to invert all Z coordinates combined and then recover each of them. 
Second, recovering ( : : )X Y Z  coordinates of the 2t = 2( 1) 2m +  points i ic P d Q±   involves 
(3 1 )M S t+  and (2 )M t  for points obtained by addition and conjugate addition, respectively; and 
recovering ( : : )X Y Z  coordinates of the points ic P  and id Q  by applying LM Scheme, case 2b, 
to coordinates mPZ  and mQZ  costs [ ]2 (2 3) 1m M S− + . In total, the cost of conversion to affine is 










A7 Comparison of LG and LM Schemes using Jacobian 
Coordinates 
The tables below compare the performance of LM and LG Schemes with the DOS method for     
n = 256 and 512. For each method, we show the cost of performing an n-bit scalar multiplication 
and the optimal number of precomputed points L when considering that a maximum of 
(2 )ESL R+  registers are available for the evaluation stage (i.e., ESL L≤ ). For our analysis, R = 
7. Also, to compare the performance of schemes for cases 1 and 2, we include costs of the most 
efficient scheme for case 1 (i.e., LM Scheme, case 1) and show at the bottom of each table the 
I/M range for which LM Scheme, case 1, would achieve the lowest cost. 
 
Table A.1. Performance comparison of LG and LM Schemes with the DOS method in 256-bit 
scalar multiplication for different memory constraints on a standard curve (1M = 0.8S). 
# Registers ( )
ES
L  11 (2) 13 (3) 15 (4) 17 (5) 19 (6) 
Method L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost 
LM, case 2b 2 1I + 2396M 3 1I + 2349M 3 1I + 2349M 4 1I + 2335M 4 1I + 2335M 
LM, case 2a 2 1I + 2397M 3 1I + 2350M 4 1I + 2337M 4 1I + 2337M 5 1I + 2326M 
LG, case 2 2 1I + 2401M 3 1I + 2354M 4 1I + 2347M 5 1I + 2345M 6 1I + 2331M 
DOS [DOS07] 2 1I + 2399M 3 1I + 2354M 4 1I + 2342M 5 1I + 2333M 6 1I + 2326M 
LM, case 1 1 2548M 1 2548M 1 2548M 2 2505M 2 2505M 
I/M range (LM, case1) I > 152M I > 199M I > 211M I > 172M I > 179M 
 
# Registers ( )
ES
L  23 (8) 27 (10) 29 (11) 35 (14) ≥ 61 (27) 
Method L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost 
LM, case 2b 5 1I + 2323M 6 1I + 2313M 6 1I + 2305M 7 1I + 2305M 7 1I + 2305M 
LM, case 2a 6 1I + 2317M 7 1I + 2309M 7 1I + 2309M 7 1I + 2309M 7 1I + 2309M 
LG, case 2 7 1I + 2316M 7 1I + 2316M 7 1I + 2316M 7 1I + 2316M 7 1I + 2316M 
DOS [DOS07] 7 1I + 2320M 7 1I + 2320M 7 1I + 2320M 7 1I + 2320M 7 1I + 2320M 
LM, case 1 3 2457M 4 2443M 4 2443M 5 2414M 6 2397M 









Table A.2. Performance comparison of LG and LM Schemes with the DOS method in 512-bit 
scalar multiplication for different memory constraints on a standard curve (1M = 0.8S). 
# Registers ( )
ES
L  11 (2)  13 (3) 15 (4) 17 (5) 19 (6) 
Method L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost 
LM, case 2b 2 1I + 4768M 3 1I + 4663M 3 1I + 4663M 4 1I + 4624M 4 1I + 4624M 
LM, case 2a 2 1I + 4769M 3 1I + 4665M 4 1I + 4626M 4 1I + 4626M 5 1I + 4593M 
LG, case 2 2 1I + 4773M 3 1I + 4668M 4 1I + 4636M 5 1I + 4611M 6 1I + 4577M 
DOS [DOS07] 2 1I + 4771M 3 1I + 4668M 4 1I + 4632M 5 1I + 4600M 6 1I + 4572M 
LM, case 1 1 5089M 1 5089M 1 5089M 2 4991M 2 4991M 
I/M range (LM, case1) I > 321M I > 426M I > 463M I > 391M I > 419M 
 
# Registers ( )
ES
L  21 (7) 23 (8) 25 (9) 27 (10) 29 (11) 
Method L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost 
LM, case 2b 5 1I + 4589M 5 1I + 4589M 6 1I + 4559M 6 1I + 4559M 7 1I + 4532M 
LM, case 2a 6 1I + 4563M 6 1I + 4563M 7 1I + 4537M 8 1I + 4530M 8 1I + 4530M 
LG, case 2 7 1I + 4543M 7 1I + 4543M 7 1I + 4543M 7 1I + 4543M 7 1I + 4543M 
DOS [DOS07] 7 1I + 4547M 8 1I + 4543M 9 1I + 4539M 10 1I + 4536M 11 1I + 4533M 
LM, case 1 3 4887M 3 4887M 3 4887M 4 4849M 4 4849M 
I/M range (LM, case1) I > 344M I > 344M I > 350M I > 319M I > 319M 
 
# Registers ( )
ES
L  31 (12) 33 (13) 35 (14) 37 (15) 39 (16) 
Method L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost 
LM, case 2b 7 1I + 4532M 8 1I + 4525M 8 1I + 4525M 9 1I + 4518M 9 1I + 4518M 
LM, case 2a 9 1I + 4525M 10 1I + 4520M 10 1I + 4520M 11 1I + 4515M 12 1I + 4512M 
LG, case 2 7 1I + 4543M 13 1I + 4536M 14 1I + 4525M 15 1I + 4516M 15 1I + 4516M 
DOS [DOS07] 12 1I + 4531M 13 1I + 4530M 14 1I + 4529M 14 1I + 4529M 14 1I + 4529M 
LM, case 1 5 4811M 5 4811M 5 4811M 6 4774M 6 4774M 












# Registers ( )
ES
L  41 (17) 43 (18) 47 (20) 51 (22) 55 (24) 
Method L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost L Cost 
LM, case 2b 10 1I + 4512M 10 1I + 4512M 11 1I + 4507M 12 1I + 4503M 13 1I + 4499M 
LM, case 2a 12 1I + 4512M 13 1I + 4508M 14 1I + 4506M 15 1I + 4504M 15 1I + 4504M 
LG, case 2 15 1I + 4516M 15 1I + 4516M 15 1I + 4516M 15 1I + 4516M 15 1I + 4516M 
DOS [DOS07] 14 1I + 4529M 14 1I + 4529M 14 1I + 4529M 14 1I + 4529M 14 1I + 4529M 
LM, case 1 7 4740M 7 4740M 7 4740M 8 4730M 9 4719M 
I/M range (LM, case1) I > 228M I > 232M I > 234M I > 227M I > 220M 
 
# Registers ( )
ES
L  59 (26) 61 (27)  ≥ 81 (37)   
Method L Cost L Cost L Cost     
LM, case 2b 14 1I + 4495M 15 1I + 4492M 15 1I + 4492M     
LM, case 2a 15 1I + 4504M 15 1I + 4504M 15 1I + 4504M     
LG, case 2 15 1I + 4516M 15 1I + 4516M 15 1I + 4516M     
DOS [DOS07] 14 1I + 4529M 14 1I + 4529M 14 1I + 4529M     
LM, case 1 10 4709M 11 4699M 15 4665M     









B Appendix B 
The following Maple scripts detail the improved explicit formulas for the case of Jacobian (J ) 
and mixed Twisted Edwards homogeneous/extended homogeneous ( / )eE E  coordinates 
exploiting the techniques discussed in Chapter 5, namely incomplete reduction, merging and 
scheduling of field operations and merging of point operations.  
 
 
B1 Explicit Formulas for “Traditional” Implementations 
These formulas have been used for the “traditional” implementations discussed in Section 5.6.1. 
Temporary registers are denoted by it  and Mul = multiplication, Sqr = squaring, Add = addition, 
Sub = subtraction, Mulx = multiplication by x, Divx = division by x, Neg = negation. DblSub 
represents the computation 2 (mod )a b p−  and SubDblSub represents the merging of 
(mod )a b p−  and ( ) 2 (mod ).a b c p− −  Underlined field operations are merged and operationIR 
represents a field operation using incomplete reduction. In practice, input registers are reused to 
store the result of an operation. 
 
Explicit Formulas using Jacobian Coordinates 
# Weierstrass curve (for verification): 
x1:=X1/Z1^2; y1:=Y1/Z1^3; x2:=X2/Z2^2; y2:=Y2/Z2^3; ZZ2:=Z2^2; ZZZ2:=Z2^3; a:=-3; 
x3:=((3*x1^2+a)/(2*y1))^2-2*x1; y3:=((3*x1^2+a)/(2*y1))*(x1-x3)-y1; 










DBL, 2 →J J : 1 1 12( : : ) ( : : )out out outX Y Z X Y Z→ . Cost = 4Mul+4Sqr+3Sub+1DblSub+ 
1AddIR +1Mul3IR+1Div2IR; 5 contiguous data dependencies 
# In practice, Xout,Yout,Zout reuse the registers X1,Y1,Z1 for all cases below. 
t4:=Z1^2; t3:=Y1^2; t1:=X1+t4; t4:=X1-t4; t0:=3*t4; t5:=X1*t3; t4:=t1*t0; t0:=t3^2; 
t1:=t4/2; t3:=t1^2; Zout:=Y1*Z1; Xout:=t3-2*t5; t3:=t5-Xout; t5:=t1*t3; Yout:=t5-t0; 
simplify([x3-Xout/Zout^2]), simplify([y3-Yout/Zout^3]); # Check 
 
4DBL, 8 →J J : 1 1 18( : : ) ( : : )out out outX Y Z X Y Z→ . Cost = 4*(4Mul+4Sqr+3Sub+1DblSub+ 
1AddIR+1Mul3IR+1Div2IR); 1.25 contiguous data dependencies/doubling 
t4:=Z1^2; t3:=Y1^2; t1:=X1+t4; t4:=X1-t4; t2:=3*t4; t5:=X1*t3; t4:=t1*t2; t0:=t3^2; 
t1:=t4/2; Zout:=Y1*Z1; t3:=t1^2; t4:=Z1^2; Xout:=t3-2*t5; t3:=t5-Xout; t2:=Xout+t4; 
t5:=t1*t3; t4:=Xout-t4; Yout:=t5-t0; t1:=3*t4; t3:=Yout^2; t4:=t1*t2; t5:=Xout*t3; 
t1:=t4/2; t0:=t3^2; t3:=t1^2; Zout:=Yout*Zout; Xout:=t3-2*t5; t4:=Zout^2; t3:=t5-Xout; 
t2:=Xout+t4; t5:=t1*t3; t4:=Xout-t4; Yout:=t5-t0; t1:=3*t4; t3:=Yout^2; t4:=t1*t2; 
t5:=Xout*t3; t1:=t4/2; t0:=t3^2; t3:=t1^2; Zout:=Yout*Zout; Xout:=t3-2*t5; t4:=Zout^2; 
t3:=t5-Xout; t2:=Xout+t4; t5:=t1*t3; t4:=Xout-t4; Yout:=t5-t0; t1:=3*t4; t3:=Yout^2; 
t4:=t1*t2; t5:=Xout*t3; t1:=t4/2; t0:=t3^2; t3:=t1^2; Zout:=Yout*Zout; Xout:=t3-2*t5; 
t3:=t5-Xout; t5:=t1*t3; Yout:=t5-t0; 
 
mDBLADD, 2 + →J A J : 1 1 1 2 22( : : ) ( , ) ( : : )out out outX Y Z x y X Y Z+ → . Cost = 13Mul+5Sqr+ 
7Sub+2DblSub+1AddIR+1Mul2IR; 5 contiguous data dependencies 
t5:=Z1^2; t6:=Z1*t5; t4:=x2*t5; t5:=y2*t6; t1:=t4-X1; t2:=t5-Y1; t4:=t2^2; t6:=t1^2; 
t5:=t6*X1; t0:=t1*t6; t3:=t4-2*t5; t4:=Z1*t1; t3:=t3-t5; t6:=t0*Y1; t3:=t3-t0; t1:=2*t6; 
Zout:=t4*t3; t4:=t2*t3; t0:=t3^2; t1:=t1+t4; t4:=t0*t5; t7:=t1^2; t5:=t0*t3; Xout:=t7-
2*t4; Xout:=Xout-t5; t3:=Xout-t4; t0:=t5*t6; t4:=t1*t3; Yout:=t4-t0; 
simplify([x5-Xout/Zout^2]), simplify([y5-Yout/Zout^3]); # Check  
 
DBLADD, 2 + →J J J : 2 31 1 1 2 2 2 2 22( : : ) ( : : : : ) ( : : )out out outX Y Z X Y Z Z Z X Y Z+ → . Cost = 16Mul+ 
5Sqr+7Sub+2DblSub+1AddIR+1Mul2IR; 3 contiguous data dependencies 
t0:=X1*ZZ2; t5:=Z1^2; t7:=Y1*ZZZ2; t4:=X2*t5; t6:=t5*Z1; t1:=t4-t0; t5:=Y2*t6; t6:=t1^2; 
t2:=t5-t7; t4:=t2^2; t5:=t6*t0; t0:=t1*t6; t3:=t4-2*t5; t6:=Z1*t1; t3:=t3-t5; t4:=Z2*t6; 
t3:=t3-t0; t6:=t7*t0; Zout:=t4*t3; t4:=t2*t3; t1:=2*t6; t0:=t3^2; t1:=t1+t4; t4:=t0*t5; 
t7:=t1^2; t5:=t0*t3; Xout:=t7-2*t4; Xout:=Xout-t5; t3:=Xout-t4; t0:=t5*t6; t4:=t1*t3; 
Yout:=t4-t0; 
simplify([x5-Xout/Zout^2]), simplify([y5-Yout/Zout^3]); # Check  
Explicit Formulas using E/E e Coordinates 
# Twisted Edwards curve (for verification): 











DBL, 2 →E E : 1 1 12( : : ) ( : : )out out outX Y Z X Y Z→ . Cost = 4Mul+3Sqr+1SubDblSub+1AddIR+ 
1Mul2IR+1Neg; no contiguous data dependencies 
t1:=2*X1; t2:=X1^2; t4:=Y1^2; t3:=Z1^2; Xout:=t2+t4; t4:=t4-t2; t3:=t4-2*t3; t2:=t1*Y1; 
Yout:=-t4; Zout:=t4*t3; Yout:=Yout*Xout; Xout:=t3*t2; 
simplify([x3-Xout/Zout]), simplify([y3-Yout/Zout]); # Check 
# Iterate this code n times to implement nDBL with cost n(4M+3S+1SubDblSub+1AddIR+ 
1Mul2IR+1Neg) 
 
Merged DBL–ADD, (2 )e e+ →E E E : 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 22( : : ) (( ) : ( ) : 2 : 2 )X Y Z X Y X Y Z T+ + − → ( :outX
: )out outY Z . Cost = 12Mul+3Sqr+3Sub+1SubDblSub+4AddIR+1Mul2IR; no contiguous data 
dependencies 
# If Z2=1 (Merged DBL-mADD), t5:=(2*Z2)*t6 is replaced by t5:=2*t6 and the number of 
multiplies reduces to 11M at the expense of one extra Mul2 
t1:=2*X1; t5:=X1^2; t7:=Y1^2; t6:=Z1^2; Xout:=t5+t7; t7:=t7-t5; t6:=t7-2*t6; t5:=t1*Y1; 
t8:=t7*Xout; t0:=t7*t6; t7:=t6*t5; t6:=Xout*t5; Xout:=t7+t8; t1:=t7-t8; t7:=(2*T2)*t0; 
t5:=(2*Z2)*t6; t0:=(X2-Y2)*t1; t1:=t5+t7; t6:=(X2+Y2)*Xout; Xout:=t5-t7; t7:=t0-t6; 
t0:=t0+t6; Xout:=Xout*t7; Yout:=t1*t0; Zout:=t0*t7; 
simplify([x4-Xout/Zout]), simplify([y4-Yout/Zout]); # Check 
 
 




B2 Explicit Formulas for GLS-Based Implementations 
These formulas have been used for the GLS-based implementations discussed in Section 5.6.2. 
Temporary registers are denoted by it  and Mul = multiplication, Sqr = squaring, Add = addition, 
Sub = subtraction, Mulx = multiplication by x, Divx = division by x, Neg = negation. DblSub 
represents the operation 2 (mod )a b p−  or (mod )a b c p− − , Mul3Div2 represents the operation 
( ) / 2 (mod )a a a p+ + , AddSub represents the merging of (mod )a b p+  and (mod )a b p− , 
AddSub2 represents (mod )a b c p+ − , SubSub represents the merging of (mod )a b p−  and 
(mod )c d p− , and Mul2Mul3 represents the merging of (mod )a a p+  and (mod )a a a p+ + . 
Underlined field operations are merged and operationIR represents a field operation using 
incomplete reduction. In practice, input registers are reused to store the result of an operation. 
Explicit Formulas using Jacobian Coordinates 
# Weierstrass curve (for verification): 
x1:=X1/Z1^2; y1:=Y1/Z1^3; a:=-3; 
x3:=((3*x1^2+u^2*a)/(2*y1))^2-2*x1; y3:=((3*x1^2+u^2*a)/(2*y1))*(x1-x3)-y1; 
x4:=((y1-y2)/(x1-x2))^2-x2-x1; y4:=((y1-y2)/(x1-x2))*(x2-x4)-y2;  
x5:=((y1-y4)/(x1-x4))^2-x4-x1; y5:=((y1-y4)/(x1-x4))*(x4-x5)-y4; 
 
DBL, 2 →J J : 1 1 12( : : ) ( : : )out out outX Y Z X Y Z→ . Cost = 4Mul+4Sqr+2Sub+1DblSub+ 
1Mul3Div2+1AddSub+1Mulµ ; no contiguous data dependencies 
# In practice, Xout,Yout,Zout reuse the registers X1,Y1,Z1 for all cases below. 
t2:=Z1^2; t3:=Y1^2; t1:=u*t2; t2:=X1+t1; t1:=X1-t1; t1:=3*t1/2; t4:=t3*X1; t1:=t2*t1; 
t3:=t3^2; Xout:=t1^2; Zout:=Y1*Z1; Xout:=Xout-2*t4; t2:=t4-Xout; t1:=t1*t2; Yout:=t1-t3; 
simplify([x3-Xout/Zout^2]), simplify([y3-Yout/Zout^3]); # Check 
 
mADD, + →J A J : 1 1 1 2 2( : : ) ( , ) ( : : )out out outX Y Z x y X Y Z+ → . Cost = 8Mul+3Sqr+5Sub+ 
1DblSub; no contiguous data dependencies 
t2:=Z1^2; t1:=Z1*t2; t2:=t2*x2; t1:=t1*y2; t2:=t2-X1; t1:=t1-Y1; t3:=t2^2; t4:=t1^2; 
Zout:=Z1*t2; t2:=t2*t3; t3:=t3*X1; Xout:=t4-t2; Xout:=Xout-2*t3; t3:=t3-Xout; t1:=t1*t3; 
Yout:=t2*Y1; Yout:=t1-Yout; 
simplify([x4-Xout/Zout^2]), simplify([y4-Yout/Zout^3]); # Check 
 
mDBLADD, 2 + →J A J : 1 1 1 2 22( : : ) ( , ) ( : : )out out outX Y Z x y X Y Z+ → . Cost = 13Mul+5Sqr+ 
2Sub+2DblSub+1SubSub+1Add+1Mul2+1Mul2Mul3+1Div2; no contiguous data depend. 
t2:=Z1^2; t1:=Z1*t2; t3:=x2*t2; t1:=y2*t1; t2:=t3-X1; t1:=t1-Y1; t3:=t2^2; t5:=t1^2; 
t4:=X1*t3; t3:=t2*t3; Xout:=2*t4; t4:=3*t4; Zout:=Z1*t2; t5:=t5-t3-t4; Yout:=t3*Y1; t1:= 
t1*t5; t2:=2*Yout; t3:=t5^2; t1:=t1+t2; t2:=Xout*t3; Xout:=t1^2; t3:=t5*t3; Xout:=Xout-
t2-t3; t2:=t2/2; Zout:=Zout*t5; Yout:=Yout*t3; t2:=Xout-t2; t1:=t1*t2; Yout:=t1-Yout; 








Explicit Formulas using E/E e Coordinates 
# Twisted Edwards curve (for verification): 
x1:=X1/Z1; y1:=Y1/Z1; a:=-1; 
x2:=X2/Z2; y2:=Y2/Z2; T2:=X2*Y2/Z2; x5:=X5/Z5; y5:=Y5/Z5; T5:=X5*Y5/Z5; 
x3:=(2*x1*y1)/(y1^2+u*a*x1^2); y3:=(y1^2-u*a*x1^2)/(2-y1^2-u*a*x1^2); 
x4:=(x3*y3+x2*y2)/(y3*y2+u*a*x3*x2); y4:=(x3*y3-x2*y2)/(x3*y2-y3*x2);  
x6:=(x4*y4+x5*y5)/(y4*y5+u*a*x4*x5); y6:=(x4*y4-x5*y5)/(x4*y5-y4*x5); 
 
DBL, 2 →E E : 1 1 12( : : ) ( : : )out out outX Y Z X Y Z→ . Cost = 4Mul+3Sqr+1Sub+1AddSub+2Mul2+ 
1Mulµ ; no contiguous data dependencies 
Zout:=Z1^2; t1:=2*X1; t2:=X1^2; t1:=t1*Y1; Xout:=u*t2; Yout:=Y1^2; Zout:=2*Zout; t2:= 
Yout-Xout; Yout:=Yout+Xout; Zout:=Zout-t2; Yout:=t2*Yout; Xout:=t1*Zout; Zout:= t2*Zout; 
simplify([x3-Xout/Zout]), simplify([y3-Yout/Zout]); # Check 
 
Merged DBL–ADD, (2 )e e+ →E E E : 1 1 1 2 2 2 22( : : ) ( : : : ) ( : : )out out outX Y Z X Y Z T X Y Z+ → . Cost 
= 13Mul+3Sqr+3Sub+1Add+2AddSub+1AddSub2+2Mul2+2Mulµ ; no contiguous dependencies 
# If Z2=1 (Merged DBL-mADD), T1:=T1*Z2 is not needed and the number of multiplies reduces 
to 12M 
Zout:=Z1^2; t1:=2*X1; t2:=X1^2; t1:=t1*Y1; Xout:=u*t2; Yout:=Y1^2; Zout:=2*Zout; t2:= 
Yout-Xout; Yout:=Xout+Yout; Zout:=Zout-t2; T1:=t1*Yout; Yout:=t2*Yout; Xout:=t1*Zout; 
Zout:=t2*Zout; t1:=Xout*X2; T1:=T1*Z2; Zout:=Zout*T2; t2:=u*t1; t3:=T1+Zout; Zout:=T1-
Zout; T1:=Yout*Y2; Xout:=Xout-Yout; Yout:=X2+Y2; t2:=T1-t2; Xout:=Xout*Yout; Yout:= 
Zout*t2; t1:=Xout+T1-t1; Zout:=t1*t2; Xout:=t1*t3; 
simplify([x4-Xout/Zout]), simplify([y4-Yout/Zout]); # Check 
 
Merged DBL–ADDADD, (2 )e e e+ + →E E E E : 1 1 1 2 2 2 22( : : ) ( : : : )X Y Z X Y Z T+ + 3 3( : :X Y
3 3: ) ( : : )out out outZ T X Y Z→ . Cost = 22Mul+3Sqr+5Sub+2Add+3AddSub+2AddSub2+2Mul2+ 
3Mulµ ; no contiguous data dependencies 
# If Z2=1, T1:=T1*Z2 is not needed and the number of multiplies reduces in 1M 
# If Z5=1, T1:=T1*Z5 is not needed and the number of multiplies reduces in 1M 
Zout:=Z1^2; t1:=2*X1; t2:=X1^2; t1:=t1*Y1; Xout:=u*t2; Yout:=Y1^2; Zout:=2*Zout; 
t2:=Yout-Xout; Yout:=Xout+Yout; Zout:=Zout-t2; T1:=t1*Yout; Yout:=t2*Yout; Xout:=t1*Zout; 
Zout:=t2*Zout; t1:=Xout*X2; T1:=T1*Z2; Zout:=Zout*T2; t2:=u*t1; t3:=T1+Zout; Zout:=T1-
Zout; T1:=Yout*Y2; Xout:=Xout-Yout; Yout:=X2+Y2; t2:=T1-t2; Xout:=Xout*Yout; Yout:= 
Zout*t2; Xout:=Xout+T1-t1; T1:=Zout*t3; Zout:=Xout*t2; Xout:=Xout*t3; t1:=Xout*X5; T1:= 
T1*Z5; Zout:=Zout*T5; t2:=u*t1; t3:=T1+Zout; Zout:=T1-Zout; T1:=Yout*Y5; Xout:=Xout-Yout; 
Yout:=X5+Y5; t2:=T1-t2; Xout:=Xout*Yout; Yout:=Zout*t2; Xout:=Xout+T1-t1; Zout:=Xout*t2; 
Xout:=Xout*t3; 
simplify([x6-Xout/Zout]), simplify([y6-Yout/Zout]); # Check 
 
 




C Appendix C 
C1 Optimizing Compressed Squarings 
Karabina [Kar10] introduced a new method for computing an exponentiation 
u
g  in cyclotomic 
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= +∑  where 2,i i pg h ∈F . 
Karabina showed that g and 2g  can be compressed to 2 3 4 5( ) [ , , , ]C g g g g g=  and 
2
2 3 4 5( ) [ , , , ]C g h h h h= , respectively, where: 
                                 2 2 4,52( 3 )h g Bξ= + ,  3 4,5 4,5 33( ( 1) ) 2h A B gξ= − + − , 
                                  4 2,3 2,3 43( ( 1) ) 2h A B gξ= − + − ,  ,                              (C.1) 
with  and . 
The formulae above have a cost of 4 multiplications and 4 reductions in . The following 
improved version was proposed in [AKL+10]:  
                               ,  , 
                                ,  ,                            (C.2) 
with  and . 
It is straightforward to see that the formulae above have a cost of 6 integer squarings and only 
4 reductions in 2pF  by applying lazy reduction.  
5 5 2,32( 3 )h g B= +




2 2 4,5 4 52 3 ( )h g S S Sξ= + − − 3 4 5 33( ) 2h S S gξ= + −
4 2 3 43( ) 2h S S gξ= + − 2 5 2,3 2 32 3( )h g S S S= + − −
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In total, the computation of an exponentiation  involving compression and decompression 
in the cyclotomic subgroup  requires 62 compressed squarings (C.2) during 
compression,  for decompression and 2  multiplications to obtain the 
final result. Then, the total cost when applying the generalized lazy reduction technique is given 
by (see [AKL+10, Section 5.2] for complete details): 
 
. 
In contrast, the traditional computation would cost (using lazy reduction below 2pF  only): 
 
, 
Hence, our technique reduces the number of reductions in  in about 8% (from 299 to 
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1 36 372 9 6 260 2164u ui m sp m sEx r a= + + + + + +
' 62(4 27 ) (1 9 6 22 ) 2(18 67 )Exp m a i m s a m a= + + + + + + +
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